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Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism/m Concept and Critique
Chairperson: Burke Townsend
The task of this thesis is to identify the central ideas associated with naturalism as it is
employed in the contemporary philosophical context for the purposes of providing a
clear, identifiable, realistic, and plausible formulation in order to enrich current
understanding o f its role in contemporary philosophy and to subject it to a relevant
critique. It is my contention that naturalism cannot be held consistently as an analytic
philosophical position. Attempts to formulate naturalism in this way result in positions
that are either unwarranted or not identifiably naturalistic, that is, they are compatible
with anti-naturalistic positions. However, it is easy to understand how a philosopher
could be warranted, in a broad inductive sense, in personally holding naturalism. I will
use the term “worldview” to denote this type of broad inductive position. I will argue that
the naturalistic worldview is best characterized as the beliefs that the natural sciences are
the sole authority for producing knowledge o f any kind and that science possesses
autonomy from any philosophical argument. I will show that, though the naturalist is
unable to show a connection between naturalism and a contemporary conception of
science, she remains rational in believing naturalism at the personal level. However, this
belief is subject, as all worldviews, to questions of consistency and completeness. I will
argue that naturalism as a worldview faces four possible defeaters, one undercutting and
three rebutting, that are cause for concern if the naturalist cannot adequately surmount
them.
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...[W ]e find many philosophers engaged in such projects as naturalizing epistemology,
naturalizing rationality, naturalizing jurisprudence, naturalizing the mind, naturalizing
the a priori, naturalizing morality, and so on.
But what is naturalism?
(Michael Rea, World Without Design, 2002)

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1: Preliminaries
What do philosophers mean by the term ‘naturalism’? The concept enjoys what Michael
Rea calls, “the lofty status of academic orthodoxy,” yet when someone labels their
position ‘naturalistic,’ we tend to have only a vague idea of what they are trying to
communicate. We might think something along the lines of empiricism, materialism, or
scientism, even pragmatism. Depending upon the philosophical area in which it is
employed, naturalism may seem to imply other qualifiers, such as nominalism,1 atheism,2
or scientific realism.3 But these complex ‘ism’s accept a multiplicity of uses and incite
various controversies in the current literature. Most versions of naturalism actually resist
reduction to any of the aforementioned terms. On close inspection, naturalism has an
identity of its own, independent of other philosophical theses. Making ‘naturalism’
precise will involve a meticulous analysis of contemporary philosophical tendencies in
general, specifically the contemporary posture toward science, and an analysis of how
naturalism is used in the contemporary literature. The ubiquity of the term makes an
understanding of this philosophical position requisite for understanding much of

1 Wilfrid Sellars writes that, “A naturalist ontology is necessarily a nominalist ontology,” Naturalism and
Ontology (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1979) p. 109, cited in J. P. Moreland, “Naturalism
and the Ontological Status of Properties, Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, ed. by Moreland and Craig
(London: Routledge, 2000), p. 68.
2 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
3 Philip Kitcher, Advancement o f Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) and Larry Laudan,
Science and Rlativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy o f Science (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1990).
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contemporary philosophy, whether or not the philosophers who label their positions
naturalistic make their use of the concept explicit or attempt to defend it.
Progress is being made toward clarifying the central issues involved in naturalism.
Many contemporary philosophers who label their theories ‘naturalistic’ try to narrow the
scope of their concept by identifying it within more familiar categories, i.e.
methodological naturalism, ontological naturalism, etc. But again, the attachment of
‘ism’s does not solve the practical problem of identifying a sustainable concept. Not
surprisingly, the projects that are the most motivated to define naturalism are those that
fall outside the naturalist camp.4 These projects seek to undermine naturalism and
therefore need something substantive in order to analyze and subvert. We must be careful
to avoid straw men when defining naturalism via the critics, but their critiques, when
accurate, lend valuable insight. I will make use of insights from proponents as well as
critics of naturalism in order to make the concept as explicit as possible.

The task of this thesis is to identify the central ideas associated with
naturalism as it is employed in the contemporary philosophical context for the
purposes of providing a clear, identifiable, realistic, and plausible formulation in
order to enrich current understanding of its role in contemporary philosophy and to
subject it to a relevant critique. It is my contention that naturalism cannot be held
consistently as an analytic philosophical position. Attempts to formulate naturalism
in this way result in positions that are either unwarranted or not identifiably

4 William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, Naturalism: A Critical Analysis (London: Routledge, 2000),
Steven J. Wagner and Richard Warner, Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1993), Michael Rea, World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences o f Naturalism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993), “Methodological Naturalism, pt. 1,” Origin and Design, 18:1,1997,
“Methodological Naturalism, pt. 2,” Origin and Design, 18:2, 1997.
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naturalistic, that is, they are compatible with anti-naturalistic positions. However, it
is easy to understand how a philosopher could be warranted, in a broad inductive
sense, in personally holding naturalism. I will use the term “worldview” to denote
this type of broad inductive position. I will argue that the naturalistic worldview is
best characterized as the beliefs that the natural sciences are the sole authority for
producing knowledge of any kind and that science possesses autonomy from any
philosophical argument. I will show that, though the naturalist is unable to show a
Connection between naturalism and a contemporary conception of science, she
remains rational in believing naturalism at the personal level. However, this belief is
subject, as all worldviews, to questions of consistency and completeness. I will argue
that naturalism as a worldview faces four possible defeaters, one undercutting and
three rebutting, that are cause for concern if the naturalist cannot adequately
surmount them.
The defeater that I propose undercuts belief in naturalism is that the openended nature of science precludes naturalism from ever being constructed
analytically. Science has veto power over any philosophical argument so that
naturalists’ commitment to science, rather than providing analytic support for
naturalism, is neutral concerning it. If science makes no claims about reality as a
whole, then neither can naturalists. This open-ended posture toward a conception of
reality runs contrary to naturalism’s core disposition to the causal closure of the
physical realm. Even if science came to the end of its efficacy and had defined
everything that is scientifically detectable in terms of scientific data, then we would
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ask by what criteria this status could be determined and by what criteria it could be
truly said that no causal process exists outside the scientifically detectable.
I will also propose three rebutting defeaters in the form of questions
surrounding three fundamental concerns of human experience: justice, origins, and
loVe. If a naturalistic explanation cannot incorporate the fundamental human
experiences, desires, and questions surrounding these features of reality, then
naturalism is not comprehensive in the way naturalists claim. I think my arguments
at least give the naturalist sufficient reason to pause and consider other rational
worldviews that do sufficiently incorporate and explain these features of reality. The
ultimate question of whether these defeaters can be sufficiently surmounted must be
left to future research and dialogue.
Naturalism is a reasonable position, warranted by the history of scientific success
and the ubiquity of adherence to scientific progress among the world population.
Nevertheless, naturalism is not strictly derived from any philosophical or empirical
evidence, which restricts it to the status of a worldview. A worldview does not typically
possess the resources to compel mental assent and most naturalist do not attempt a
defense of their worldview. A person holding a specific worldview can construct
arguments to the best explanation in favor of her worldview and some naturalists offer
sketches of such a defense. Worldviews are also open, because of their epistemic status,
to defeaters of various kinds. A naturalist will come to find his position unwarranted if he
accepts defeaters that identify a contradiction within the concept itself—an undercutting
defeater.5 A naturalist may find her position challenged if she accepts defeaters that

5 With regard to defeaters, I follow John Pollock’s and Joseph Cruz’s characterization in Contemporary
Theories o f Knowledge, 2nd ed., that, “Defeasible reasons are those for which there are (possible)
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constitute an alternative proposition, contrary to naturalism, concerning a question— a
rebutting defeater. If the naturalist finds either of these defeaters successful, then she will
have to admit that she is no longer warranted in holding naturalism On pain of
irrationality. A worldview proceeds on the basis of what the theorist believes, so that one
naturalist may come to think that he is unwarranted based on the success of a defeater,
where another, upon viewing the same proposed defeater, does not find it successful and
considers himself to remain warranted in holding his worldview. The implications of
taking naturalism as a research program or worldview are epistemological, that is,
specifically related to what the theorist can and cannot claim about the nature and source
of knowledge on the program under consideration. The naturalist must come to terms
with the epistemological implications which are, though not problems of self-referential
defeat, still significant and possibly undesirable depending on the goal of an individual
project.
I will begin in this chapter by fleshing out the terms of my investigation, defining
‘science,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘justified belief’ as they will be employed in the remainder of
the project. In chapter 2 I will provide a contemporary definition of naturalism,
identifying the distinctive, unifying characteristics common to almost every formulation
of naturalism after Quine. In addition I will distinguish naturalism from the various
positions in philosophy of science with which it is regularly confused or implicated, such
as physicalism and empiricism. Given the complexity of and controversies over these

defeaters,” and these include rebutting defeaters, where, “If M is a defeasible reason for S to believe Q, M*
is a rebutting defeater for this reason if and only if M* is a defeater (for M as a reason for S to believe Q)
and M* is a reason for S to believe ~Q,” and undercutting defeaters, where, “If believing P is a defeasible
reason for S to believe Q, M* is an undercutting defeater for this reason if and only if M* is a defeater (for
believing P as a reason for S to believe Q) and M* is a reason for S to doubt or deny that P would not be
true unless Q were true,” p. 196.
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concepts this will be a particularly involved discussion, but one necessary for a
comprehensive understanding of naturalism in its contemporary setting.
In chapter 3, after defining the broad category of ‘strict analytic thesis,’ I will
identify the major conceptions of naturalism on the contemporary market. I will
distinguish six types of naturalism: three minor versions—religious, evolutionary, and
ethical— and three major versions—ontological, epistemological, and methodological. I
will walk through contemporary formulations of each version, making them as explicit as
possible. The discussion is intended to highlight the central issues common to current
conceptions of naturalism, specifically those central to an adequate justification of any
position claiming to be ‘naturalistic.’ By this point it should be obvious that the
dispositions I identify at the beginning of chapter 2 are the defining characteristics of
naturalism and are the characteristics around which its justification is concerned.
In chapter 4 I criticize naturalism as an analytic thesis. If it turns out that
naturalists make claims beyond the scope of what is warranted by the sciences, then their
position is unwarranted. If it turns out that naturalism merely reduces to identity with the
methods of science, then it loses all normative force and becomes something other than
naturalism. Positions that claim to be naturalistic but that rely on sources of justification
that are unwarranted by science, or controversial according to science, are not clearly or
uniquely ‘naturalistic’ at all. In addition, though it might be possible to justify naturalism
on a constructivist or pragmatic conception of science, this characterization of naturalism
is not the majority view and is not under consideration here. Since the majority of
scientific progress is made under the impression that we are getting closer to an
objectively accurate understanding of the world, I will take it that the second option is
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open only if pragmatism can be defended as epistemically viable within a realist
paradigm—that is, if it could be shown that what is useful is also true in a noncoherentist
sense. But this is a question that I will not pursue.
In addition to criticizing naturalism as an analytic thesis, I will show that
naturalists are warranted in holding naturalism as a worldview. This involves showing
how certain perceptual information gathering devices work to help us form basic beliefs
and therefore worldviews. Basic beliefs are typically held to a different degree than
beliefs formed through argument and must be countered with defeaters that appeal to the
subjective reasons behind the beliefs. Everyone has different sets of reasons for holding
the same basic beliefs and the same is true with naturalism. But I offer several possible
defeaters for naturalism, the complete efficacy of which will only be determined through
dialogue.
If the scientific realist is ultimately unable to abide the difficulties and
commitments posed by these defeaters, it may be desirable to abandon naturalism for
hope elsewhere. To date, few philosophers define their version of naturalism explicitly as
merely a worldview, though their usages are not typically in direct conflict with it. It is
my contention that it is impossible to hold naturalism consistently without conceiving of
it as merely a worldview, and that as a worldview we are prima facie justified in taking
scientific evidence as epistemically basic, though not normative in any significant sense.
And in virtue of taking science as the sole epistemically basic belief, naturalists hold that
science exhausts the field of knowledge.
1.2: Clarification and Pitfalls to Avoid
If naturalism can be defined as explicitly as I hope to do, why do we need such a
long and careful explication? If anyone coming upon the term naturalism could merely

affirm the use of the three methodological dispositions that I will outline and, with minor
qualifications, determine different uses based on context, why undertake such an intricate
project to appraise naturalism? There are four central reasons.
First, no one seems to have done so. The closest anyone has come to doing so
seems to be Michael Rea’s recent work World Without Design. There he argues,
differently from me, that naturalism is not actually a philosophical thesis— what I am
calling an ‘analytic thesis’— at all and that any formulation of naturalism as a research
program faces insurmountable ontological commitments. Also, he is not concerned to
‘pin down’ contemporary uses of ‘naturalism.’ Uses of ‘naturalism’ vary widely across
the various areas of philosophy and science and the implications intended in some uses
are less than clear. This means that naturalism in philosophy of mind differs significantly
from naturalism in epistemology. It also means that sometimes it is not clear to what a
philosopher is appealing by claiming naturalism; the qualification is either irrelevant or
not interesting. There are common threads, as the methodological dispositions I will
mention express, but given that the principle usage differs from context to context, it is
necessary that we know the differences and the different implications of each. This work
is an attempt to flesh out what is available to philosophers in naturalism.
Second, flat definitions impede understanding of the richness of theories intended
by their authors. And so-called “cooked” definitions help even less. To take one example,
David Chalmers, in his book The Conscious Mind,6 vows to take “consciousness to be a
natural phenomena,” and says that, “it is properly a scientific subject matter: it is a
natural phenomenon like motion, life, and cognition, and calls out for explanation in the
way that these do.” With these careful qualifications few would disagree. But Chalmers
6 David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. xiv.

further qualifies his arguments for solutions to the problem as “not open to investigation
by the usual scientific methods,” and he presents “conclusions that some people may
think of as ‘antiscientific’” while still claiming generally that his work is all “just part of
the scientific process.” So just how should we characterize Chalmers? On the one hand
we want to say that he appeals to natural science as the only legitimate way of
understanding the world. However he admits that he takes some arguably unscientific
approaches, but argues that it remains within the process of science. It is evident from his
other writings that he wishes to be a naturalist and follow science wholeheartedly. But at
the same time he appeals to certain philosophical arguments that are not necessarily
derived from empirical data. Without presenting the arguments in detail it is difficult to
say what it would mean to say that Chalmers is or is not a naturalist. But, we may ask,
what is he doing that is specifically naturalistic? He makes use of both science and logic;
he makes warranted assumptions based on the best available scientific evidence and
arguments to the best explanation— everything we should expect from any serious
philosopher or scientist. He is not willing to push philosophy out to make room for more
science; he says, “The problem of consciousness lies uneasily at the border of science and
philosophy,”7 which should kick him squarely out of the naturalist camp as we shall
define it. But he makes no generally unacceptable epistemological moves, aside from
whether you agree or disagree with his conclusions.
The Chalmers example raises two important questions the naturalist (and we)
must flesh out: (1) What makes a theory uniquely naturalistic, and (2) if science is the
primary guide and norm for naturalism, is it possible to conceive science in a way that
supports naturalistic intuitions? For the first question, if there is nothing unique about a
7 Ibid., p. xiv.
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naturalistic theory, that is, if it is merely reducible to other well-known philosophies of
science or merely the current methods of science, then it is superfluous. For the second
question, if science cannot be justified without relinquishing naturalist intuitions, say, by
accepting other philosophical theses, then one cannot reasonably call any position
naturalistic. Therefore, just calling a theory naturalistic because it adheres to a relevant
scientific methodology is not good enough. The justification of the central claim of
naturalism (identified in chapter 2) is the central question this thesis will address.
Third, historical use of the term ‘naturalism’ varies greatly. The term ‘naturalist’
as applied to the famous wanderer and writer John Muir is significantly different from
that which is applied to renowned epistemologist John L. Pollock, just as it is
significantly different when applied to Descartes or Aristotle. The development of the
term has caused genuine controversy. Many epistemologists reject the major thrust of
Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized,” though it was Quine who first inspired the move
toward a “naturalization” of epistemology. Few philosophers hold the truncated ontology
of D. M. Armstrong, but the specific aspects of Armstrong’s theory that give rise to his
ontology are not what qualify him as a naturalist.
Fourth, and most importantly, all positions carry with them implications. Some of
these implications, if not successfully substantiated within the theory, can break a theory
down the line. Naturalism as a worldview seems to carry implications that lead away
from the goal of traditional philosophical queries into the nature of reality, at which many
naturalist projects are currently aimed, which include compelling intellectual assent in the
view under consideration; On one hand, nonempirical knowledge, such as that of memory
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and the perception of time, cannot be derived from direct experience, so that empiricism
as a scientific conception of the world remains agnostic concerning the truth-value
(though not necessarily the reliability, as we will see) of this knowledge, and therefore
fails as a defense of naturalism. On the other hand, worldviews, as we shall construe
them, are not at liberty to extend normative authority into other projects of inquiry. This
is because they cannot determine relevantly basic beliefs for other programs to thereby
provide compelling justification to those who do not agree with their own properly basic
assumptions. Since the naturalist, in most cases, desires to compel belief that science is
the only available project for determining accurate, representational, and most
importantly, comprehensive knowledge to a rational world, she might have to turn her
attention to rooting out the basic beliefs of every other worldview before she can
reasonably begin her own project. I will flesh this out more thoroughly in chapter four.
1.3: Defining Ineffable “Science ”
One of the central themes of naturalism, shared among its historical and
contemporary versions, is that all inquiry must begin with and regulate itself by the
methods and findings of the natural sciences. Most naturalists hold a version of moderate
empiricism, which holds both science and logic to be basic, with the provision that logic
is insufficient to provide prepositional content about the world. Naturalists hold that logic
is continuous with science providing a rational framework from within which empirical
claims can be clarified and tested. Some hold a more radical empiricism, on which even
our knowledge of logic is contingent upon scientific progress, especially progress in the

8 Though they do constitute ‘experience’ of some kind. This is a contentious claim, given that memory is
very similar to sensory perception, though not ‘as direct,’ in some ways. I will make this connection more
explicit in a later section.
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field of evolutionary biology.9 Since this latter view is still in the minority, I will accept
that most naturalists hold logic as basic and tautologous, rather than empirically
derivable. Apart from logic, philosophy is not relegated to the mere role of the
clarification of concepts, as it was for the positivists. Naturalists feel much more free than
philosophers of decades ago to extend philosophy into scientific theorizing, armed with
knowledge of ‘scientific revolutions’ and the conceptual workings of Darwinism.
Naturalist Alex Rosenberg comments:
Philosophy neither needs to nor can it defend itself as merely the logical clarification of
thought. It need no longer fear to tread the ground hitherto reserved for science, and it
must be assessed on the same standards as very abstract scientific theory. For that is the
only thing philosophy can be for those who accepted [Quine’s] ‘Two Dogmas.’10

Other naturalists extend philosophy into the age-old philosophical questions using their
working knowledge of science as a measure against which the old problems stand or fall.
This is especially the case with subjects like intentionality and ethics. But before we
begin to characterize naturalism we must first attempt to characterize, as adequately as
possible within the confines of this project, the view of science that moderate empiricists,
and therefore naturalists, presently hold.
To begin, we must recognize the difference between science as a method of
inquiry and science as a worldview. For many naturalists, science is “Science,” the
unified whole of hypothetically complete data gathering and interpretation processes that
speak through past discoveries, into all future possibilities of inquiry. As unreasonable as
this sounds, it is common for scientists and philosophers to speak this way. This is
science as a worldview. The reflective reader will see through this ex cathedra heraldry
and, hopefully, penetrate to the meat of data and reasoning that actually purports to say
something about the relationship between science and philosophy. Science as a
9 Cf. John Cooper, The Evolution o f Reason: Logic as a Branch o f Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
10 Alex Rosenberg, “A Field Guide to Some Recent Species of Philosophical Naturalism,” British Journal
fo r the Philosophy o f Science, vol. 47, (1996), p. 2.
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worldview and naturalism as a worldview are very similar because of the content of their
beliefs concerning science’s hegemony. There is a difference and it typically revolves
around the open-ended nature of the scientific process. Scientism tends to be more
absolutist about the status of scientific findings and the concept of science’s hypothetical
completion. Naturalism on the whole is aware of the limitations of science and emphasize
its incompleteness, but also emphasize the power and flexibility of the methods of
science to pursue any avenue that opens through research. For some there is no difference
at all, as with philosopher of science Jerry Fodor, who admits of holding scientism but
does not argue in terms of science as hypothetically complete.
With so much hype from “popular” science writers, it is difficult to separate
science from the scientist. Dallas Willard criticizes philosophers who make universal
claims about all types of entities (universal ontological claims) or all legitimate methods
of inquiry (universal epistemological claims), and who invoke Science as their
justification for these claims. He writes, “The naturalist must then have recourse to that
popular but philosophically suspect abstraction, ‘science’ itself, which says even less than
the individual sciences about the nature of reality as a whole, because it says nothing at
all.”11 Willard claims that science says nothing about reality as whole, but particular
scientists do. And it seems true that determining when scientists are speaking
‘scientifically’ and when they are not can be frustrating.
Willard quotes John Searle as an example of a philosopher who “reifies” science.
Concerning a scientific view of the world, Searle claims that it includes “all of our
generally accepted theories about what sort of place the universe is and how it works,”

" Dallas Willard, “Knowledge and Naturalism,” in Craig and Moreland, Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, p.
28 .
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and “theories ranging from quantum mechanics and relativity theory to the plate tectonic
theory of geology and the DNA theory of hereditary transmission.”12 But Willard says
that, the theories of science cannot determine an ontology, in the sense of specifying the
nature of that which exists or identifying all the types of entities that exist. The ensuing
ontology of the scientific worldview would have to be something like a “very long
conjunctive sentence” containing all the theories Searle mentions and calling that a
“worldview”:
But this will hardly do what he wants. One thing that will not show up in such a
conjunctive sentence is any claim about reality as a whole or knowledge in general. Such
specific scientific theories as those just mentioned— and no matter how many of them
we may list—cannot provide an ontology. They never even attempt to determine what it
is to exist or what existence is, and cannot by the nature of their content provide an
exhaustive list of what ultimate sorts of things there are.13

Willard has raised an important issue for the naturalist. If we are going to allow
science to be the justification for a position, we must have a reasonably clear idea of that
which we are calling science, and in what sense we are using science to denote a relevant
justification. In addition, we must have a clear view of what our justification can and
cannot accomplish. It is eminently more reasonable to think of science as a method of
inquiry with contingent, fallible claims. I am emphasizing this distinction because too
many times, even in academic literature, current scientific findings are confused with a
scientist’s opinion or bias.
On the other hand, we must not be too quick to criticize statements of belief found
within scientific writings. The complex mixture of scientific research methods and
theory-choice now available make determining ‘good’ science very difficult. Primacy is
still given to empirical data obtained through ever more accurate instruments. Hypotheses

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
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and experiments are still our best reasoning tools at the ground level. But higher up, at the
level of meta-theory—justification for scientific knowledge and justification for theory
choice—things get much more difficult.
In fact, a complete epistemology of science escapes philosophers to this day.14
The advances in the theory of logic that the positivists accomplished have helped our
understanding of the “logic of confirmation” but have yet to solve Hume’s problem of
induction, or Goodman’s “new riddle of induction,” or answer the question of when
“evidence provides a positive instance of a hypothesis.”15 Alex Rosenberg explains that,
Even if we adopt the most widely accepted account of theory confirmation, we face a
further challenge: the thesis of underdetermination, according to which even when all
the data are in, the data will not by themselves choose among competing scientific
theories...This conclusion, to the extent it is adopted, not only threatens the empiricist’s
picture of how knowledge is certified in science but threatens the whole edifice of
scientific objectivity altogether...”15

This is not the whole story, since science is still an extremely successful
enterprise. There is no reason to write-off scientific progress because we do not know
where all the strings attach. But it is enough to indicate that science has no definitive
boundaries and definitions on which one can rely. But knowing this will keep us from
construing science too narrowly and confining the naturalist to an untenable view of
science. Contemporary naturalism finds itself caught in the evolving definitions of the
“best available” scientific theories in all the various disciplines. Therefore, a broad
conception of what counts as ‘good’ science will serve both the interests of naturalists
and anti-naturalists. Michael Rea provides us with a generous reading of science around

14 Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy o f Science: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 2000)
chapter 5.
15 Ibid., p. 131.
15 Ibid., p. 107.

15

which to frame a conception of naturalism. Whenever I refer to science, unless otherwise
qualified, this is the conception to which I am referring:
...[T]he methods of science are, at present time anyway, those methods (including
canons of good argument, criteria for theory choice, and so on) regularly employed and
respected in contemporary biology, chemistry, and physics departments. Reliance on
memory and testimony is included in the methods of science, as well as reliance on
judgments about apparent mathematical, logical and conceptual truths. Perhaps saying
the latter implies that naturalists are committed to treating the appearance of
mathematical and logical necessity, as well as the appearance of conceptual truth, as
basic sources of evidence. But even if this is so, it does not follow that naturalists are
committed to treating the appearance of necessity in general as a basic source of
evidence.17

In addition, I take it to be widely accepted that scientific methods are designed and
intended to produce truths about the world, that is, theories that increasingly approximate
truth as opposed to those determining increasing usefulness or reliability within the
context of a goal-directed system. This is by no means uncontroversial, given the number
of anti-realists working in philosophy of science. But this project will deal specifically
with a realist version of naturalism, since it seems to be the dominant conception in the
practice of philosophy and science. In addition, Dallas Willard provides an account of
knowledge that will serve this project well.
Knowledge itself, then—and, more weakly, justified belief—is simply belief that is
produced in a certain way, for example, in ways that are reliable, ways that tend to
produce true beliefs in actual as well as counterfactual situations that are relevant
alternatives to the actual situation.18

The ‘reliability’ of our cognitive functions for providing information that
approximates truth is controversial. For now I will presume, or take it to be a basic belief,
that our cognitive faculties are indeed composed such that, under normal conditions, they
support reliable belief-forming processes and truth-approximating representations of
reality. This presumption will be scrutinized later when I will raise the question as to

17 Rea, World Without Design, p. 67, emphasis his.
18 Willard, “Naturalism and Knowledge,” p. 25, emphasis his.
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whether unaided evolutionary processes are adequate for producing these types of
faculties.
These definitions provide us with a conception of the scientific project that resists
strict reduction, at least prima facie, to pure pragmatism (because pragmatism is an antirealistic program), physicalism (since scientists frequently posit nonphysical—or at least
indirectly physical—entities for the purpose of theory construction, i.e., memory,
intentional states), and (moderate) empiricism (because scientists frequently appeal to
non-empirical entities, i.e., infinitesimal singularities, quanta). These will be explained in
the next section. It might be that the naturalist has to truncate these definitions to remain
tenable, but it is possible that in doing so, she will undermine her strict commitment to
natural science; therefore, I will not entertain this possibility. If naturalism comes into
conflict with these definitions, I will take it that the demand for revision or rejection will
be on the naturalists’ shoulders, and not the scientists’.
Naturalists’ holistic commitment to science is usually justified by appeal to the
success of science itself. They typically claim no further justification for the fact that
science is a reliable, truth-approximating procedure than its glorious history of providing
ever more reliable and successful means of predicting and manipulating reality. This, of
course, is a pragmatic justification on a coherence theory of truth. Though it is not clear
that pragmatism is not an epistemically reliable truth-approximating process, most
philosophers of science reject pragmatism as sufficient justification for truth claims.19 The
problem, traditionally, is that if pragmatism is to be considered truth-approximating, the
judgment for this would have to take place outside of pragmatism itself, since
pragmatism only reveals what works best for a given situation in relation to pre-specified
,9 Fodor, Kitcher, Rosenberg, etc.

goals. Therefore we have to turn to something more epistemically basic (though not
unrealistically foundational) than pragmatism to justify the typical naturalist claim
concerning the truth-approximating nature of science. I take it that most naturalists want a
theory that is justified in revealing reality and not “systematic empirical success,” and
therefore, for them, pragmatism is not a clear option for justification, even broadly
inductive justification, of scientific methodology.20 What the naturalist needs is a
warranted, scientifically agreeable starting point from which to judge philosophical
claims, and then to remain within the confines of the scope of this starting point, since
knowledge claims beyond the scope of science are considered illegitimate.
None of this implies that science has lost its intimate connection with empiricism
in general, or that it should let it go. Broadly empirical methods are still the most reliable
methods for determining physical reality available to the human mind. I qualify
‘empirical’ with ‘broadly’ to avoid any connection with certain narrow, pre-positivist
foundationalism. Therefore, science is more than a reasonable choice for a picture of the
world. The question is only the nature of the picture. Is it the whole story? Steven
Wagner and Richard Warner explain:
Although few philosophers today accept positivist views of observation and inductive
logic, a favored epistemic status for natural science is not so easily dismissed. A
principled, albeit rough, demarcation of natural science from other forms of inquiry still
seems possible— the category is not arbitrary. It is also hard to deny that science enjoys
particularly close ties to observation, or that telling good from bad reasoning is easier in
science than elsewhere. These features give rise to certain salient features of science:
relative clarity, objectivity, and the (generally) cumulative growth of knowledge. For
contemporary naturalists, these are doxastic virtues sufficient to establish the epistemic
superiority of science. 21

For all the reasons of the previous paragraph it should be clear that I do not intend
to argue against scientific methods or findings. On the contrary I intend to make use of
20 This is not the final word, however, as we shall see that the progress of evolutionary theory might
provide a pragmatic route to epistemically reliable belief-forming processes. Cf. chapter 2.7.
1Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal, p. 6.
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common scientific practices and findings as a backdrop for understanding and criticizing
the claims of naturalism. Therefore, though science and its methods are vexed at some
levels, we must recognize that they can be delineated and are comprehensible, and that
broadly empirical methods are still among our most reliable. I will argue later that
science alone cannot justify a realist perspective, but that the addition of a warranted
belief in either intuitionism or supematuralism is required. The question for naturalism
concerns its claims concerning the type of information that science can produce and
whether it exhausts the field of inquiry. I will argue that there are certain defeaters that
should give naturalists pause, though I will leave the ultimate conclusions to future
research.
Before moving on I should note that I am taking the term ‘ontology’ in its
etymological usage, ‘logos to on’: the study/logic/pattem/science of that which ‘is.’ The
implication is that of existence, and an ontology includes those entities or events that can,
with proper qualification, be reasonably claimed to exist. Therefore, as with any
philosophical position, only the entities warranted within its scope of justification can be
reasonably claimed to exist.
1.4 Defining Justification and Knowledge
When we ask whether a position is justified, we must first qualify the relevant
intent of the theory; the “justified for what?” which identifies the implications for the
type o f information a project (of inquiry) is designed to yield. The justification for belief
in a project must be adequate to the scope of the claims of the project. If the project can
reveal only empirical facts, then it is insufficient to justify an ontological thesis that
includes anything undetectable by scientific methods. If a project recognizes that its
scope is merely pragmatic, then we may say a person is justified in continuing that
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project if the results are consistent with the goals of the pragmatic program, for instance,
efficiently manipulating objects so that they produce certain patterns. If one project
accomplishes this more quickly and easily than another then that is the “correct”
procedure. No other knowledge may be obtained from this procedure without additional
justificatory grounds rooted in reasoning beyond those that are pragmatic.
Traditionally we have held that for a belief to be “rational” it must be justified in
some relevantly foundational sense. This has typically taken an evidentialist (not
necessarily empirical) tone, which is a necessary but insufficient condition. Laurence
Bonjour echoes this sentiment:
Perhaps the most pervasive conviction within the Western epistemological tradition is
that in order for a person’s belief to constitute knowledge it is necessary (though not
sufficient) that it be justified or warranted or rationally grounded, that the person have an
adequate reason for accepting it. Moreover, this justifying must be of the right sort:
though one might accept a belief for moral reasons or pragmatic reasons or religious
reasons or reasons of some still further sort and be thereby in a sense justified, such
reasons cannot satisfy the requirements for knowledge, no matter how powerful, in their
own distinctive ways, they may happen to be.22

Bonjour goes on to qualify his use of the phrase “the right sort” in same way that I
have done above when I said that a belief must be adequate to the scope of the claims of
that individual’s project of inquiry:
Knowledge requires instead that the belief in question be justified or rational in a way
that is internally connected to the defining goal of the cognitive enterprise, that is, that
there be a reason that enhances, to an appropriate degree, the chances that the belief is
true. Justification of this distinction, truth-conducive soft will be here referred to as
23
epistemic justification.

Justification is not an uncontroversial topic, especially in light of several
important works in religious epistemology. We must be careful how we couch our use of
“justification.” If we insinuate an evidentialist framework, such as that of Locke, then we

22 Laurence Bonjour, In Defense o f Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 1,
emphasis his.
23 Ibid., emphasis his.
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will be overlooking important daily occurrent beliefs that we all concede to be “justified”
in holding, such as belief in other minds. If we take a phenomenological perspective, then
there is little that could be realistically proscribed as illegitimate, since all knowledge
reduces to incorrigible perceptions. What we need is a broadly construed, experientiallybased starting point, which is not empiricism, that makes room for common sense beliefs
as well as scientific findings, yet that is concrete enough to identify irrational or
unscientific positions.
As an example of this difficulty, consider Alvin Plantinga’s critique of William
Alston’s “Alston Justification.” Alston defines justification in terms of “grounds” rather
than evidence, in order to avoid the classical problems of defining ‘evidence’ too
narrowly. But Plantinga shows how even Alston’s definition is insufficient. Alston
writes:
...to be justified in believing that p is to be in a strong position for realizing the
epistemic aim of getting the truth. ..I will begin by making the plausible assumption that
to be in an epistemically strong position in believing that p is to have an adequate ground
or basis for believing that p. Where the justification is mediate, this ground will consist
in other things one knows or justifiably believes. Where it is immediate, it will consist
typically of some experience...24

Plantinga responds in three ways, of which I will explain two. 25 First, he says that daily
memory beliefs do not have mediate grounds. Consider that you had a banana for
breakfast: this belief is not prepositional—you do not infer it from other beliefs, such as
that bananas exist or that you owned one prior to this morning; you don’t infer it from
experiential factors such as that it is now lunchtime, that the place where my banana was
is empty, that there is a peel in the trash. The belief that you ate a banana is similarly not
based on experiential belief, in that memory images are not sensory or phenomenal in the
24 William Alston, Perceiving God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 73.
25 The following arguments are found in Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000), pp. 105-07.
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usual sense. Plantinga goes on to argue that a priori beliefs such as deductive
arguments—“Necessarily, if all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is
m ortal'' —do not have “grounds” in the mediate or immediate sense that Alston
indicates. This is because, though the belief may have an associated image— say, an
English sentence on a board in a classroom—“surely the belief isn’t formed on the basis
of that imagery; that imagery isn’t anything like a ground for it...”27 One might counter
that the memory of the banana constitutes a “justifiable belief’ and therefore succeeds as
a mediate ground. In addition, one might “know” that the logical structure of the
syllogism named “Darii” is valid, of which the argument concerning Socrates is a form,
and which would then be sufficient for Alston Justification. But Plantinga’s point is that
memories are not mediate, they are, if anything, immediate. No reasoning process need
take place to be justified, or perhaps, no justification is needed. It is also his point that a
syllogism like that concerning Socrates could be justifiably accepted by someone who
has never been in a logic class without any significant reasoning processes.
Second, Plantinga notes that some beliefs do have truth-conducive grounds
though some of them are unreasonable. He considers the proposition 29 x 38 = 1102, and
that the probability of this proposition is 1 under any condition, so that, according to
Alston’s criteria, no matter why I believe this proposition, I am justified in doing so.
Plantinga humorously illustrates that, “just because I picked up a comic book on the
sidewalk and found therein a character who claims that [the equation] is his favorite”
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does not mean that it is rational to believe it, even though the equation has a truth-

26 Ibid., p. 106.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 107.
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conducive ground. My purpose here is only to identify the difficulties of specifying a
well-defined starting point for the experiential component of justification.
For this project, I want to highlight the senses of “justification” as I will use the
term. In the first sense I will just use “justification” and will employ it in the evidentialist
sense, as when naturalists appeal to the success of science as a reason for their rejection
of the a priori. In the second sense, I will use the term “warrant,” unless otherwise
indicated, which will describe when a person is in a rationally acceptable state of belief,
as when naturalists appeal to science as “warranting” their belief in the sole adequacy of
science as a method of inquiry into reality, rather than providing direct evidence or
argument to that effect. In this second sense it is similar to what Plantinga calls
“epistemic warrant”:
(EW) A belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive
faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that
is appropriate for S's kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is
successfully aimed at truth.29

I do not need to go into the extensive details of this definition, but only note that
any project for which philosophical justification is attempted and that accepts sensory
experience as properly basic while retaining a realist view of science (that is, that science
produces knowledge), must indicate why cognitive faculties might be adequately aimed at
this task. It must also be noted that such a position is defeasible and knowledge is
contingent upon the relevant ‘normal’ conditions being in effect, as well as the wider
interrelation of correctly functioning cognitive states necessary to interpret the
information once received. If the terminology of ‘design plan’ is undesirable, (since
Plantinga intends it in the teleological sense of a divine designer) the theorist may

29 Ibid., p. 156.
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substitute an appropriate evolutionary account, though, as we will see in section 2.7,
Plantinga would regard any evolutionary account as intrinsically unsuccessful.
A naturalist may take it that science warrants belief in itself as the most effective
method of inquiring into the efficient means of predicting and controlling reality. In this
case it is generally accepted that the naturalist is taking an anti-realist approach and
accepting a pragmatic justification. The naturalist could even say that he was ‘justified’
(my first sense) in the belief that science is a self-justified enterprise of reliable inquiry
into the world. Neither of these two theses are disputed in this project. But as I
understand it, neither constitutes the central thesis of naturalism. My project is
specifically aimed at naturalism that claims that science is the sole producer of
‘knowledge of reality’ in the classical ‘correspondence’ sense. I am not concerned to
analyze anti-realist or pragmatic projects.
I accept that certain experiential beliefs are held rationally (are warranted), even if
we feel we possess no conceivable capacity to compel assent in the same beliefs from
others. We may not be able to construct a deductive argument to the conclusion that our
belief necessarily follows, but we may rely on broadly accepted justificatory
environments to support a claim that we have an epistemic right to a belief; that is, we did
not form the belief in an irrational manner. One question for naturalism will be whether it
is possible to derive warrant from experiential beliefs that are intrinsic to science for the
belief in their efficacy in approximating truth. The central question for naturalism is
whether we can derive warrant from those same experiential beliefs for naturalism’s
claim concerning science’s sole authority in producing knowledge to the exclusion of all
other epistemological projects.
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It is also important that we have a conception of what I am calling “knowledge”
in its contemporary philosophical setting. Without plotting an extensive analysis, suffice
it to say that, as classically understood, knowledge consists of a dispositional state, which
involves “the capacity to represent a respective subject matter as it is, on an appropriate
on

basis o f thought and/or experience.”

In this sense, knowledge involves truth, that is, the

“matching up,” or correspondence, of a mental representation to reality, though the
cognitive faculties instantiating this representation may be defeasibly flawed or outside of
the conditions under which such representation might be made accurately. In addition,
knowledge involves logical grounding. Here I do not mean an extensive reductionism
like that of foundationalism, but merely a working grasp of the logical relations
‘consistent,’ ‘inconsistent,’ ‘identity,’ etc: Even if Alston Justification is not completely
sufficient, it is certainly necessary. “Belief’ is necessarily involved, since the event of our
coming to knowledge is defeasible. One person may feel that his warrant for a belief has
been defeated by an argument, where another may remain unconvinced. Unless the
defeater clearly identifies a contradiction, the individual remains warranted in his belief.
In addition, we may reasonably hold a conception of what would constitute knowledge
even in the absence of those beliefs that include or come to include it. This is the
characterization of ‘knowledge’ accepted by most contemporary naturalists. Some may
choose a different concept of ‘truth,’ such as the coherence theory, but most are realists
and want correspondence with reality. The version of truth I have described differs from
the classical picture in its rejection of foundationalism and its addition of the role of
belief and defeasibility.

30 Dallas Willard, “Knowledge and Naturalism,” p. 31, emphasis his.
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Now that I have defined science, justification, warrant, knowledge, and truth as
naturalists typically construe them, I will now indicate why I feel the project of defining
naturalism in its contemporary form is important to the philosophical conversation before
moving on to define it explicitly in chapter 2.
1.5: Before Defining Naturalism—various uses, various fields.
William Alston, in his article, “What is Naturalism, that We should Be Mindful of
It?”31 gives us good indication of why a project such as mine is so important in the
contemporary literature. He says that defining naturalism, if conducted in a way that
merely reflects the usage of the term, leads invariably to incoherence. The intricacy of
application of so-called naturalistic terms is extremely field-centric. For example, in
philosophy of mind the term ‘naturalism’ is used most specifically of intentional states, to
proscribe the hint that these might not be physical. In ethics naturalistic concepts are
described in terms of physical properties that exhibit emergent moral characteristics
identifiable by human perception, and which proscribe appeal to transcendental ethical
absolutes.
Alston says that even when we try to pinpoint specific naturalistic tendencies
common to the discipline, we get into trouble:
...[S]eeing what naturalists work with when giving "naturalistic" accounts of various
entities fails to give us unambiguous guidance to what is supposed to be "natural". But
we are not totally without attempts to say in general what naturalism amounts to.
Consider Arthur Danto's article on Naturalism in the Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, where
he writes:
The entire knowable universe is composed of natural objects - that is,
objects which come into and pass out of existence in consequence of
the operation of "natural causes".

31 William Alston, “What Is Naturalism, that We Should Be Mindful of It?” Leadership University,
December 2002, http://www.leaderu.com/aip/docs/alston-naturalism.html.
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A natural cause is a natural object or an episode in the history o f a
natural object which brings about a change in some other natural
object.
A natural process is any change in a natural object or system of
natural objects which is due to a natural cause or system of natural
causes. (Vol. 5, p. 448)
’Natural object' is explained in terms of 'natural causes'. ’Natural causes' is explained in
terms 'natural object'. 'Natural process' is explained in terms of 'natural object' and
'natural cause'. This is a very small circle, or system thereof. It can hardly be supposed to
throw any radical light on what it is for an object, cause, or process to be natural. The
closest Danto comes to breaking into the circle comes when he introduces science and
scientific method as our only source of knowledge of the world.32

Circularity of the type explained here will haunt any concept of naturalism. The
concept of naturalism is built on the success and utility of experimental methods, that is,
its ability to warrant itself as consistent and as a generally truth-approximating account of
the natural world. Therefore, if held to be a consistent analytic thesis, the naturalist must
explain this warrant without reference to mere pragmatism, unless pragmatism proves to
be an acceptable method of epistemic justification. If it is taken to be purely selfjustifying, then science itself is accepted as a properly basic source of knowledge, which
makes it irrational as a realist project, that is, without warrant for realism, but tenable as a
research program.
Given the vast intricacies among and within philosophical and scientific
disciplines and positions, naturalism has been attached, in one way or another, to a large
number of individual positions. Unlike the positivist tendency to reject traditional
philosophical problems, naturalists have regularly done just the opposite. It is typically
assumed that now that science has taken the position of rational hegemony, it is
reasonable to apply it to every traditional philosophical issue, determining the nature of
language, knowledge, consciousness, material constitution, ontology, and religion. But in

32 William Alston, “What Is Naturalism, that We Should Be Mindful of It?” p. 5.
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each of these fields, naturalism is couched differently. The Darwinian arguing against the
Creationist will characterize naturalism as having those specifics needed to support the
arguments, specifically physicalism and atheism, and vice versa. The philosopher of mind
who wants to maintain a nonreductive line between reductioiiism and dualism will invoke
a naturalism with the characteristics to mark out the edges of her argument, usually the
necessity of physically causal reductive links. Some philosophers, like David Chalmers,
get so close to dualism that it looks as if they’ve crossed over at points, so they qualify
their theory as naturalistic from the start to allay any fears of the anathema ‘dualism.’
There is nothing irrational in this, given that each field incorporates a mode of
dialogue that is unique to its domain and to which the naturalist must comport himself.
But the extensive variety of domains and dialogues makes it difficult to deal with
“naturalism” as a position, since it has different implications in each philosophical area.
Despite vast differences and implications in various fields, naturalism seems
always to revert back to an epistemological position. Naturalism specifically identifies a
manner (science) in which we investigate a subject (the world) and then makes claims
concerning the criteria for legitimate knowledge based on the methods and findings of
this manner of investigation. Therefore I intend, in the next section, to carefully identify
some of the basic, common assumptions among characterizations of naturalism that
constitute its central claim. These are assumptions that many think are indispensable for
any seriously naturalistic claim. From there we can determine if there is a relevant sense
in which science warrants these central assumptions for the naturalist.
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...[Njaturalism is but science in the role of philosophy.
(Ralph Barton Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, 1912)

Chapter 2: Defining Contemporary Naturalism
2.1: Respect and Care fo r Conceptual Terms
A theory is naturalistic if it makes an attempt to bring all hypotheses, ontological
claims, and concerns about knowledge into the scope of the natural sciences. This
characterization of naturalism is supported by the majority of naturalists including, John
Pollock, Robert Pennock, Scott Sturgeon, W. Sellars, Arthur Danto, Frederick Schmitt,
Alvin Goldman, W. V. O. Quine, Brian Leiter, Jean Hampton, Alex Rosenberg, and
many others. Naturalist Michael Devitt writes, “There is only one way of knowing: the
empirical way that is the basis of science (whatever that way may be).”33
There are a few dissenters, at least to the strict ascription of ‘science’ to
naturalism. Those who do not accept the above characterization claim to choose a broader
characterization for naturalism, allowing for the possibility that naturalism might not
“automatically” generate an interest in science.34 They claim to accept broader types of a
posteriori insight that are (supposedly) not necessarily scientific. These philosophers
include Susan Haack, Keith Lehrer, and Jaegwon Kim. Susan Haack explains:
Does science have special epistemic status? Thinking about this question at a
commonsense level, unalloyed by an sophisticated epistemological theory, I should be
inclined to answer ‘yes and no’. ‘Yes’, because science has had spectacular successes,
has come up with deep, broad and detailed explanatory hypotheses which are anchored
by observation...; ‘no’, because although, in virtue of those successes, science as a
whole has acquired a certain epistemic authority in the eyes of the lay public, there is not
reason to think that it is in possession of a special method of inquiry unavailable to
historians or detectives or the rest of us, nor that it is immune from the susceptibility to
fad and fashion, politics and propaganda, partiality and power-seeking to which all
human cognitive activity is prone.3

33 Michael Devitt, “Naturalism and the A Priori,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 92,1998, p. 45.
34 John Pollock and Joseph Cruz, Contemporary Theories o f Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1999) p. 164.
35 Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1993) p. 137.
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If there is a difference here between general empirical bases for inquiry and the methods
of natural science I am unsure what it is supposed to be. Pollock writes that this is more
of a “less committal version of naturalism where the influence of empirical insight is
understood widely enough to include many types of a posteriori inquiry.”

^ft

But what

would a posteriori insight include if not human experience, the reliability of which is the
foundational presupposition of science. And while Pollock notes that this characterization
'in

has been “somewhat less influential in discussions of naturalism,”

it is unclear that this

broadly construed commitment to perceptual insight is not just the central adherence of
science in the first place. If it is, then the distinction between these conceptions of
naturalism is trivial. This view, as explained by Pollock and Haack, is somewhat ill
defined and, even though it takes experience as basic, it is even more vulnerable to the
charge that naturalism offers us nothing new or insightful. Therefore I will address only
the former, widely held view that naturalism is, first and foremost, committed to science
as the only legitimate method of attaining knowledge, and that this does imply a
commitment to broadly held perceptual beliefs.
More specifically, then, we may say that naturalism generally consists of a
commitment (1) to the reliability of human experience, (2) to scientific realism, as
opposed to constructivism, instrumentalism, or antirealism, (3) that is usually congenial
to abstract objects such as universals, sets, propositions, etc., though it need not be
inconsistent with nominalism, which is not congenial to these entitie, (4) and three
methodological dispositions: (i) an absolute commitment to the methods, findings, and
authority of the natural sciences, (ii) a commitment to the causal closure of the natural

36 Pollock and Cruz, p. 164.
37 Ibid.
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world (physicalism), and (iii) a rejection of a priori (or ‘first’) philosophy. Naturalism
more generally implies the concepts of (broad) empiricism and pragmatism (because of
the “success” of science), while rejecting strict identity with either one, since neither is
sufficient to guarantee naturalism. The central claim of naturalism is that science is

the only legitimate method of obtaining knowledge. This means that, according to
naturalists, if there is a legitimate claim to knowledge about a subject, that claim is a
result of or consistent with the findings or methods of the natural sciences, and is
obtained in ways that are grounded in the experiential presupposition of science that
perception is generally reliable.
Concerning the definition of naturalism Michael Rea writes:
No one will doubt that the methodological dispositions shared by Quine and Dewey—
high regard for science and scientific method, a disposition to employ scientific methods
and results in all domains of inquiry as much as possible to the exclusion of a priori
speculative methods, opposition to theories, particularly religious ones, that are
untestable and do not play any significant role in filling out interstices of scientific
theory— are the crucial dispositions of naturalism.38

This characterization is echoed in the work of several contemporary naturalists.
John Pollock defines naturalism in terms of the justification required to make it
consistent:
Naturalistic Justifiction = df.
A theory of justification is naturalistic if it maintains that epistemology should either
consist partly or wholly in empirical disciplines, or should be informed by the results of
empirical disciplines.39

In 1944 William Dennes wrote of naturalism that it “leaves to ordinary scientific
observation and inference all questions as to what the patterns of processes in the world
probably are.”40 The idea that science should be conceived as a negative constraint on

38 Rea, p. 49.
39 Pollock and Cruz, p. 165.
40 William Dennes, “The Categories of Naturalism,” in Yervant Krikorian, Naturalism and the Human
Spirit (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944) p. 288-89.
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theories is also evident in the work of Christopher Cherniak (1986), Hilary Komblith
(1989), and Paul Thagard (1982). Pollock, along with most contemporary naturalists,
takes an anti-justificationist position regarding science, going back to a Quinean-type
empiricism, claiming that the human cognitive faculties are only justified by our
scientific understanding of them. This means that knowledge comes only in light of
science and cannot provide a justification for science prior to or apart from the methods
intrinsic to science. Pollock says that he is following Daniel Dennett’s (1971) suggestion
of a “design stance” that states something to the effect that the only way to judge rational
behavior is to examine the way we, as agents, perform cognitive tasks, from within the
constraints of the cognitive faculties that perform those tasks:
It can be argued that many of the general features of human cognition represent the only,
or the only obvious, way of performing various cognitive tasks consistent with the
various logical and computational constraints that must be satisfied by any real agent.41

Naturalists do not typically attempt any justification for science apart from
highlighting its pragmatic success as an epistemology. Science has told us significant
facts about the world, more than any other program of investigation, and therefore
deserves credence. At this point, then, we shall tentatively define naturalism as taking the
methods and findings of contemporary science as justification for the thesis that scientific
methods alone are sufficient to determine reality. But does this anti-justificationist stance
concerning science allow naturalists to forego justifying their belief that science is the
exclusive method of obtaining knowledge? Many treat their posture toward science as
just such an excuse. However, there is an underlying premise that is unsupported by
science, namely, that science gives us a picture of the world complete enough and

41 Pollock and Cruz, p. 173.
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successful enough in its endeavors to reject any additional avenues. At the end of this
project I will raise some questions that challenge this presupposition.
2.2: Then what’s an anti-naturalist?
If science is such a ubiquitous and successful aspect of the contemporary
academic world, and if naturalism involves a strict commitment to science, who is really
an anti-naturalist? The answer is complicated, but in general, anti-naturalist positions
usually entail adding something to science, claiming that whatever the addition is, it is
just as legitimate as science as a source of knowledge. The addition could involve any
number of philosophical commitments that purport to introduce something a priori into
knowledge content (as opposed to merely tautologies), or they may introduce substantive
analytic arguments whose conclusions involve entities or processes inaccessible to
scientific methods. Also, any position that claims to adhere strictly to science, but does
not prescribe such adherence as normative or does not claim that science is the only
legitimate method of knowledge is not specifically naturalistic. This is the case especially
with apologetic work in religious epistemology where some proponents still hold a high
view of natural theology.
Michael Rea argues that, when defining naturalism, a theorist must take certain
precautions to avoid characterizations that fall outside the boundaries of naturalism. He
claims that any naturalistic thesis must make clear its conception of nature and
supemature otherwise it will be impossible to identify what makes a claim specifically
natural. However, he argues that, given the open-ended nature of contemporary science,
naturalism is unable to provide any sufficient criterion for distinguishing nature from
supemature, and therefore what is legitimate from what is illegitimate:
,[N]aturalists respect the natural sciences as absolutely authoritative with respect to
what there is and what the world is like. Naturalism demands that we follow science
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wherever it leads with respect to such issues. This much is uncontroversial. Indeed, it is
affirmed most emphatically by those typically characterized as metaphysical naturalists.
It is furthermore uncontroversial among naturalists that science will lead somewhere—
that it will in fact tell us something about what the world is like. But then naturalism,
whatever it is, must be compatible with anything science might tell us about nature or
supernature. Thus, no version of naturalism can include any substantive thesis about the
nature of nature or supemature.42

This seems a bit rash. It does not seem that naturalism can tell us nothing of the
nature of what would count as supernatural. It would merely say that knowledge is
confined to science, and anything claiming to be extra-scientific is illegitimate. Since the
claim for something to be “supemature” is typically a claim implying something extrascientific, the naturalist has a criterion by which to disregard it.
But this is not exactly what Rea is saying. He says that naturalism must be
compatible with anything science might tell us about supemature. If, say, the theory of
intelligent design, increasingly bears out in scientific evidence, then what is
supemature—in this case, a nonphysical causal agent, however that might be
understood43—would not be extra-scientific at all, but would fall into the purview of the
best available science. This would mean that ‘supemature’ is not identical to ‘extrascientific.’ Yet, if the naturalist cannot distinguish between nature and supemature purely
by the methods of the natural sciences, then naturalism cannot claim that a strict
adherence to the natural sciences prevents acceptance of supernatural entities or
causation.
The naturalist might object that this is merely a problem of clarifying our terms. It
is typically conceded that anything that is lent support by scientific theories is, by

42 Rea, p. 55, emphasis his.
43 Albert Borgmann of the University of Montana has suggested that a non-physical being could not ‘cause’
the universe, on the current scientific understanding of causation. He says that if there is design in the
world we would have to use a different term. He suggests ‘donation.’ He also, however, indicates that
design could not be supported by a scientific theory and must be revealed, if knowable at all. In
conversation.
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definition, natural, since science is typically understood as the study of the natural world.
It is what we mean when we use the term ‘natural sciences.’ But this is just a stipulation
of terms. The naturalist could point to everything currently accepted as science and say,
“Okay, for now, everything that is not “this” is ‘supernatural.’” But this is vague and not
very helpful in the long run. Since empirical research is intentionally open-ended, and
since the naturalist cannot stipulate physicalism a priori, then it seems that Rea is
generally correct: naturalism cannot distinguish between nature and supemature. But is
this relevant to naturalism’s consistency?
We have to remember that naturalists do not consider legitimate anything that can
reasonably be claimed to be “supernatural,” therefore they may define the limits of
knowledge as ‘science,’ then claim that what is outside of this is not necessarily
‘supematuralistic,’ but ‘unscientific,’ or just meaningless. They do not need a criterion
for what would count as supernatural, but merely one that identifies when a claim is
scientific, as opposed to pseudo-scientific. There are many pseudo-scientific claims that
might become scientific with the relevant data, but which are not deemed supernatural,
such as extra-terrestrial life. We would not say that the claim to an encounter with an
extraterrestrial was meaningless, given its possible verifiability, but we would say that, so
far, all such accounts have proven unscientific or just false. So, given the fact that many
scientists still do not accept intelligent design, the naturalist is within his rights to call
science ‘naturalistic’ as opposed to ‘supematuralistic.’ But if the evidence does bear out,
the naturalist should not have to change much aside from terminology, since adherence to
scientific methods would still be worthy of adherence. The problem will be that
naturalism is then reduced to identity with the methods of science and then lacks any
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normative force as analytic thesis. This is because science would then have led to the
inclusion of an entity, or at least a set of properties, that genuinely comes into conflict
with the account of the universe the naturalist is intent upon preserving.
So even if we grant Rea’s argument—that naturalism cannot provide a sufficient
account of the supernatural—we cannot really hold this as a standard for a position to
count as naturalistic. Since physicalism and causal closure principles are the relevant
defense against supematuralism for the naturalist, these are the positions that would have
to define the relevant elements that count against supematuralism. But it seems
reasonable to demand that, if you are going to hold physicalism, you need to provide a *
criterion for what counts as physical, and if you are going to hold the causal closure of
the universe, you need to determine what would count as a violation of the laws of nature.
But these seem like relatively simple criteria that would fulfill the major assumptions of
naturalism without requiring anything so robust as Rea’s demand, that is, defining what
would count as a positive instance of the supernatural, The naturalist may have to cross
that bridge in the future, but for now he is out of the water.
Rea, however, is concerned to denote what counts as supematuralism as a
concept. He says that, whereas for the naturalist adherence to the natural sciences is the
only properly basic assumption, the supematuralist position includes, in addition to the
natural sciences, an adherence to religious experience as properly basic. The point here is
the introduction of a method of obtaining knowledge that stands outside the traditional
scientific methods, and is therefore characterized by the method that is added, namely
some sort of divine revelation.44

44 Rea’s concepts of ‘divine revelation’ and ‘religious experience’ do not imply something as fantastical as
they might first sound. Though he does not specify, I take it that he has something more subtle in mind,
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In the history of the philosophy of science, a criterion for what counts as
‘experience’ or ‘legitimate knowledge’ for use in scientific theory is nearly impossible to
prescribe. So, if something like religious experience might be borne out by the best
scientific reasoning methods, (e.g., multiple attestation, argument to the best explanation,
historical evidence, reliable testimony, observable change in a person), it is questionable
whether it should be proscribed from relevant scientific data prior to investigation. The
religious experience denoted by religious epistemologists such as Rea and Alvin
Plantinga is subject to defeaters, just as with any belief acquired in a warranted manner.
Any process of reasoning or evidence can provide defeaters for a belief. This means that
scientific reasoning can act as a defeater for a religious experience, and therefore that
religious experience is subject to the process of science. If the content of the religious
experience is not self-contradictory and contemporary findings of science do not
constitute a defeater, then the believer remains warranted in his belief. In this case the
naturalist cannot act in a way contrary to the methods of science and therefore, cannot
proscribe a religious belief on the basis of science prior to applying the methods of
science.
Traditionally there have been some forms of experience that have been supposed
as ‘unscientific’ or a priori. Supposedly any theory that advocates a method of
knowledge outside the empirical tools of the sciences counts as anti-naturalistic. Such
theories have included, but are not exclusive to, (a) instrumentalism, which claims that
science is merely one of many different ways to obtain truth about the world, the others
including poetry, literature, and religion, (b) rationalism, which holds that the mind is

such as the introduction of mental content or a certain type of intellectual understanding provided by a
divine being that gives rise to holistic assent to that being’s existence and aspects of its essence.
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capable of producing knowledge without any appeal to experience, and (c)
phenomenology, which holds that, via some perception that is not sensory, the mind is
presented with truth about some aspect of the world. But according to a process of good
reasoning, to be defined in the next section and which the majority of the theoretical
sciences accept, if any of these passes the test, then they can be useful in scientific
theorizing.
2.3 Necessary Distinction
Here I must call attention to a distinction that will be crucial to my argument. The
distinction is between experimental methods and data and scientific reasoning.
Experimental methods and data involve the traditional scientific method with controls
and variables and test conditions, so that any scientist may recreate a scenario to prove or
disprove a result. As the type of organisms and test subjects under analysis become more
complex, experimental conditions are not always possible. For instance, there is no lab
experiment that can recreate the conditions surrounding the Big Bang. The same goes for
gravity. In these cases we apply scientific reasoning that has proven useful to make
relevant determinations. These include the ones I just mentioned— multiple attestation,
argument to the best explanation, historical evidence, reliable testimony— and also
simplicity. These methods may have been chosen pragmatically, but their success rate is
worthy of attention.
With this said, we must make this distinction when evaluating the claims of
naturalism. Since branches of science report both the results of experiment and reasoning,
the naturalist is appealing to both in her adherence to science. And whereas the
experimental method and data say absolutely nothing concerning what exists outside of
science, scientific reasoning may well enter that domain. To use a previous example, it is
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the claim of intelligent design theorists to show by scientific reasoning that there is good
reason to accept the existence of a non-physical creator of the universe. The naturalist, on
the other hand, thinks she has the same amount of warrant, for the same reasons and
facts, that such a creator does not exist.
Since this is the nature of contemporary science, we may not argue against
naturalism in the following way: since scientific data refer, by definition, to physical
entities, and anything beyond nature is, by definition, non-physical, then science is
incompetent to tell us that everything that exists is ‘physical’ in some loose sense, or that
the only things that can be known are known by cause and effect relations among
physical things, therefore, naturalism is, strictly speaking false. We would be arguing that
naturalism claims something that could not possibly be proven. But this would be a straw
man. Contemporary science allows for postulates of good reason to make claims beyond
what is immediately observable. This is true from cosmological physics all the way down
to particle physics. We must argue to the best explanation, based upon what we already
know physically. C. S. Lewis offers an example of how facts and reasoning work
together in theories:
Supposing you had before you a manuscript of some great work, either a symphony or a
novel. There then comes to you a person, saying, ‘Here is a new bit of the manuscript I
found; it is the central passage of that symphony, or the central chapter of that novel.
The text is incomplete without it. I have got the missing passage which is really the
centre of the whole work.’ The only thing you could do would be to put this new piece
of the manuscript in that central position, and then see how it reacted on the whole of the
rest of the work. If it constantly brought out new meanings from the whole rest of the
work, if it made you notice things in the rest of the work which you had not noticed
before, then I think you would decide that it was authentic. On the other hand, if it failed
to do that, then, however attractive it was in itself, you would reject it.45

On this account, the naturalist and the scientist who holds intelligent design are on
the same page. Both appeal to empirical data, both apply valid reasoning, yet both come

45 C. S. Lewis, “The Grand Miracle,” God in the Dock (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1970) p. 81.
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to different conclusions. Without further data the answers are to be borne out in
argument. Obviously any philosophy based on science that makes universal claims
concerning data is easily relinquished in favor of a milder, ‘best-available-contingentscience’ posture. But a ‘reasonable’ naturalism seems to be the right sort of aim for a
project that purports to follow science whole-heartedly.
2.4: Implications o f Naturalism
Since naturalism purports to follow science in its findings, implications, and
reasoning, it might seem that naturalism is merely reducible to a specific philosophy of
science. And in general, naturalism has been confused with at least three philosophies of
science: empiricism, physicalism, and pragmatism. In addition, because of many
naturalists’ tendencies to reject theism as a rational or useful position, it may seem that
naturalism is merely disguised atheism. In what follows I will indicate how naturalism
differs from these four strict assumptions that typically accompany naturalistic theories.
Some might think it obvious that naturalism could not be identical with any
purportedly analytic philosophical doctrine, since an analytic position usually involves
justification of a conceptual type that differs significantly from an empirical type.
Naturalists tend to reject affiliation with any such justification and remain solely within
the confines of scientific method and reasoning. The confusion comes when the naturalist
holds that science warrants certain universal conceptual doctrines based upon successful
local science. For instance, since science has always progressed via empirical methods
and sound reasoning, and since these methods have proven themselves successful time
after time, the naturalist may think that successful science implies empiricism—the
doctrine that all knowledge is based in a form of experience that is clearly identifiable in
experiment. But apart from this, naturalists must hold as legitimate all that science holds
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legitimate. Since science presupposes that experience is a reliable method of investigating
the world, and more than that, since it has proven this, then the naturalist is committed to
the reliability of experience in whatever way science characterizes experience.
The naturalist does not attempt a reduction or reconstruction of language by
which we can identify relevantly empirical data or concepts, but follows science in
whatever it finds rational or useful. As with empiricism, the naturalist may find an
affinity for physicalism or pragmatism as the implication of a scientific method or set of
findings. But the naturalist cannot hold these philosophies analytically, since, if science
moves in a different direction or discovers something that refutes these doctrines, the
naturalist is committed to science over and above any philosophy that might be inferred
from it at a particular place in history. The following discussion will, I hope, clear up
misunderstandings concerning the relationship of naturalism to these philosophies, as
well as realism and atheism, and thereby provide the groundwork for an adequate
understanding of naturalism and the justification for a consistent naturalistic position.
2.4: Empiricism
2.4.1: Intro
It is important for our purpose in this study to understand why naturalism, while
exclusively following empirical science as its epistemic guide, does not reduce to
empiricism. This is because naturalism is sometimes identified, or at least confused, with
the doctrine of empiricism. In saying that naturalism is irreducible to empiricism I mean
simply that naturalism is not in any way logically implied by the various meanings of the
term empiricism, or the methods employed to obtain empirical data. And neither does
naturalism necessarily imply empiricism, though it may contingently do so at any given
time. Despite this, there is good reason to believe that a certain ‘moderate empiricism’ (to
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be defined) is implied by adherence to the natural sciences as currently understood, and
therefore naturalism. First we need to characterize empiricism in its larger context.
Generally, empiricism is just the normative prescription of sensory data as the
primary mode of investigation into reality. Scientists, first and foremost take their cues
from the experiential qualities of what is given to the senses as a world. This is not
without scrutiny, but it will do as an introduction. Michael Rea and Laurence Bonjour
define empiricism as, “...the view that, at most, only analytic truths can be justified a
priori.”46 But just what counts as relevant sensory experience on an empiricist
epistemology is controversial. Sterling Lamprecht, in The Metaphysics o f Naturalism, put
it this way:
Negatively, empiricists are, I suppose, all akin: they have common foes and often
embark cooperatively in campaigns against a priori judgments and transcendental
claims. But positively they often seem pretty much at odds in their basic contentions.
Experience, in the well-known phrase of Ralph B. Perry, is a “weasel word.”47

Until Hume, rationalism dominated the philosophical landscape. Locke, though he
continually considered himself an empiricist, can be charged on any number of grounds
for reverting back to a rationalist justification for the human ability to know. Though
Berkeley also considered himself an empiricist, it is fairly obvious that he was
predominantly a rationalist, though, “despite the absence of any very specific
pronouncement by him on this issue.”48 At any rate, Hume’s was the first consistent
formulation of empiricism:
It is thus not until Hume that we find a major philosopher who clearly repudiates the
rationalist capacity for insight into necessary truths pertaining to reality, insisting that a
priori justification concerns only “relations of ideas” as opposed to “matters of fact.”
Superficial impressions to the contrary notwithstanding, K ant...is in fact much closer to
a Humean version of empiricism than to rationalism, but, excepting only Mill, clear

46 Rea, World Without Design, p. 38; Bonjour, In Defense o f Pure Reason, pp. 18-19.
47 Sterling Lamprecht, The Metaphysics o f Naturalism (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1961) p. 35.
48 Bonjour, In Defense o f Pure Reason, p. 17.
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examples of empiricism are hard to find in the period after Kant until the advent of
positivism in Comte and Mach.49

The positivists offered several attempts to define experience precisely, within the
scope of empiricism, none of which succeed in reducing all meaningful language to
observation sentences or observable events. At that point in history, empiricists were
concerned with developing a criterion by which a relevant knowledge-producing
experience is theoretically viable. Positivist Gustav Bergmann identified empiricism as
follows:
...to be an empiricist means to adopt an ‘empiricist criterion of meaning’ or ‘principle of
acquaintance,’ i.e., to assert the sufficiency of a class of undefined terms that refer to the
sort of thing philosophers call the phenomenally given in contradistinction to, say,
physical objects.50

Contemporary empiricists take the failure of philosophers to develop an ‘empiricist
criterion of meaning’ in stride and claim that, loosely, all true statements about the world
must have, or be derivable from, some directly observable component. This is the
position that most naturalists feel is warranted by contemporary science.
Nicholas Wolterstorff describes empiricism as a type of view rather than a single
view, so that empiricism has several unique formulations. He says that an empiricist of
one type may reject empiricism as formulated by another.51 One fundamental type of
empiricism is “concept-empiricism” on which all concepts which can be understood or
explicated apply to some experience or are derived from some experience. Another
fundamental type of empiricism is “belief-empiricism” on which the rationality or
warrant or cognitive significance of a person’s beliefs is determined by whether the belief
has an experiential component. The empiricism referred to in this project will be closest
49 Ibid.
50 Bergmann, The Metaphysics o f Logical Positivism (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1954) pp. 67:
51 Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, “Empiricism,” The Cambridge Dictionary o f Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp. 262-63.
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to belief-empiricism. But since the requisite condition for the consistency of either
position is an adequate understanding of ‘experience,’ and the explication of ‘experience’
will serve as the basis of our analysis, the specific distinction need not be continually
made.
Contemporary naturalists typically hold the empiricist view that is associated with
the later positivists called ‘moderate empiricism,’ though they do not hold that the
position demands a criterion. ‘Moderate empiricism’ is the belief that there are two sets
of basic truths: ‘empirical,’ which are revealed in some way through our five senses and
are contingently true, and ‘logical,’ which are merely analytic, content-free, tautologies,
which are necessarily true. These are the only a priori truths acknowledged by
naturalists.52 There is a third set of basic propositions, sometimes associated with
positivism, called ‘incorrigible truths,’ that involve occurrent beliefs—such as the
experience of being presented to ‘pinkly’ in a room we know is white but which has pink
or red lights—that cannot be doubted even though we may have no obviously physical
component. These are acknowledged by naturalists as ‘true but trivial’ since they are
ultimately subject to further empirical investigation.
Moderate empiricism may be distinguished from ‘radical empiricism,’ which
holds that all knowledge, including logic is either derived from or subject to empirical
certification. Laurence Bonjour claims that radical empiricism is associated with Quine:
From a historical standpoint, moderate empiricism is clearly the main empiricist position
on the subject of a priori justification; and although full-dress defenses o f it have been
infrequent of late, it continues, I believe, to be widely albeit somewhat less openly held.
The most conspicuous recent position on the general topic of a priori justification,
however, is a much more extreme version of empiricism. Associated mainly with Quine
and his followers, this second and quite distinct version of empiricism, which I will here

52 Bonjour, In Defense o f Pure Reason, p. 18.
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refer to as radical empiricism, rather than attempting to give an epistemologically
innocuous account of a priori justification, denies outright its very existence.53

Whether Quine actually decried a priori knowledge as it referred to logical truths
is questionable. But the basic distinction remains. We might define someone like Mill,
who attempted an empirical derivation of logic, as a radical empiricist. But we will
consider a moderate empiricist one who accepts the content-less nature of logic as a
priori, and who, along with logic, accepts the content supplied by some form of
experience as basic for scientific theory.
Lamprecht indicates that empiricism has been approached in one of two ways: (1)
as a theory of things, or (2) as a method of inquiry.54 Whether empiricism is conceived as
ontologically or epistemologically, is not our concern at present. Later on, in our
discussion of physicalism, the issue of the subject matter—ontology—of empiricism will
be addressed. Also later, in our discussion of naturalism’s justification, the empirical
method of inquiry— epistemology— will be addressed. Though theoretically we may
separate the ontological question from the epistemological, our concern here is more
meta-epistemological; that is, it is concerned with the scope of what science can tell us
empirically.
Epistemologically, empiricism is a justification for the methods of science to the
effect that science provides an adequate, ever more reliable understanding of what is
empirically available. Ontologically, empiricism is used to justify the belief that all
legitimately posited entities are experientially available, in either a narrow or broad sense.
Empiricism attempts to show that something within the history of science leads to the
53 Bonjour, In Defense o f Pure Reason, p. 19.
54 “Sometimes empiricism has.been primarily an appeal to concrete things, to what I shall call one’s
“subject-matter,” as that which has final authority over one’s thinking; and sometimes it has been primarily
an appeal to a certain method, to a favored procedure, as that which will lead most happily to human
betterment.” Lamprecht, Metaphysics o f Naturalism, pp. 35-36
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conclusion that only a certain type of entity will ever actually prove to be scientific,
namely that which has the capacity to present itself to the senses, with all the provisos
concerning the states our senses would need to be in to detect them. I am concerned here
to show that naturalism is not reducible to empiricism in the sense that naturalism places
no restriction on what things or what kind of things science is supposed to discover or not
supposed to discover. Naturalism does not place any such restrictions because science
itself places no such restrictions.
The scope of empiricism is insufficient—particularly it is too narrow—to identify
with the naturalistic posture toward the nature of knowledge gained by the process of
science. Empiricism is not identical to naturalism’s claim that the methods of scientific
inquiry are the only legitimate means of knowing. Empiricism is intended as a defense
against metaphysical speculation, and it attempts to do so by delimiting the scope of
experience to those that are detectable by scientific methods. Empiricism attempts to
determine, prior to complete investigation, which entities, methods, or processes science
is or is not able to discover. Marc Alspector-Kelly highlights this element of empiricism
in his essay, “Empiricism Naturalized.”55 In the essay he intends to show the dependence
of naturalism and empiricism on one another. He says that both face insufferable
difficulties alone, but that, together they form a consistent and useful method of
approaching philosophical issues. He writes:
...whatever metaphysics is, it is, the empiricist contends, objectionable. For it transcends
the limits of experience that, the empiricist claims, cannot coherently be violated. While
empiricism’s critical function is not its sole raison d ’etre, it is certainly a fundamental
one. Recognition of the limits of experience delivers the empiricist a weapon against the
pretensions of metaphysical philosophy.56

55 Marc Alspector-Kelley, “Empiricism Naturalized,”
http://homepages.wmich.edu/~malspect/Empiricism%20Naturalized.htm.
56 Ibid., p. 2.
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Unlike empiricism, naturalism does not attempt to delimit the scope of
‘experience’ especially because contemporary science posits entities incompatible with
traditional empiricist claims. It is precisely because it is logically possible for science to
make non-empirical claims that naturalism is irreducible to empiricism. Whereas
naturalism may provide, in its adherence to the natural sciences, the context for a more
reasonable definition of empiricism, naturalism does not adhere to any thesis concerning
the nature of scientific findings prior to scientific scrutiny.
2.4.2: Naturalism’s Irreducibility to Empiricism
It seems strange to consider splitting up science from empiricism, since it is
typically considered a truism that science traditionally begins and ends with empirical
data. It begins with data taken in through various methods, not the least of which is direct
sensory experience. After different scientific reasoning processes have drawn out the
implications of some relevant experience, the end result is supposedly some reliable fact
about our world. Of course, our concern is with the universal implications of such a
conceptual system. Can we reasonably say that science is restricted to ‘empirical’
findings? We must first define our use of ‘empirical,’ and then show in what sense all
scientific findings are compatible with it. If we reject a priori theorizing it seems that we
must not say that it necessarily is bounded by empiricism. But it seems counterintuitive to
think that a method of inquiry could discover something outside the scope of science’s
intrinsic investigatory power. For example, let us say that some instrument only possesses
the capability of detecting blue objects. How could it possibly make a claim concerning
objects of other colors? How could a theory of color based on this instrument lend
support to the fact that object of other colors exist? Could it claim conclusively that
yellow objects do not exist?
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If I used this machine for investigating the world we might say that I am
warranted in only believing in blue objects. That is, of course, if no other color-objectdetecting instruments existed at the time. Empiricism treats science like a blue-object
detector, and this is not at all the way contemporary scientific theories work. In science,
we say that certain evidence “points strongly toward” a certain hypothesis, or “lends
probabilistic support to” a certain conclusion that may consist of entities or processes that
are not empirically detectable, though the effect they are attempting to describe or explain
is usually available to direct sensory experience. Since this is the case, we cannot restrict
science to the pre-conceived boundaries of a criterion for what would count as
‘empirical,’ thereby reducing science to, or justifying it by, empiricism of some sort.
Consider an argument by Michael Rea:
...w e must be careful about identifying naturalism with empiricism. Consider what
would happen if a well-confirmed scientific theory lent strong support to the view that
substantive (nonanalytic) truths can be known a priori. To suppose a priori that there
could be no such theory is surely unacceptable from a naturalistic point of view. After
all, from that point of view, the role of philosophy is to follow science, not to impose a
priori constraints upon its results. So it looks like we must admit that science could, in
principle, discover empiricism to be false. If it did, the proper naturalistic response
would be to reject naturalism.57

Notice that he says, “i f ’ a theory “lent strong support to... .” The argument itself
proves the plausibility of a non-empiricist approach, because science allows for the
possibility that data could lend such support. The empiricist could not permit that option.
In allowing that science might lend such support, Rea is being consistent with
contemporary branches of science that do not, in their methodology, restrict possibilities.
It might be the case that quantum theory lends strong support the fact that our universe is
actually made up of multiple dimensions and that something called ‘strings’ are the most
basic physical particles. Would this be a non-empiricist claim? It seems difficult to see
57 Rea, World Without Design, p. 39, emphasis his.
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how, even given that these dimensions and strings are not empirically observable. The
scientist is actually making inferences from empirical models already in place and to
empirically available data. But inferences that follow from empirical data are still broadly
empirical, at least they are intended to be in contemporary science.
But, of course Rea is not claiming that string theory would be unempirical, except
perhaps in a strict sense that very few philosophers continue to hold. He is asking us to
consider the possibility that a theory of, say, intuitionism, being supported by scientific
theory. Indeed, it seems intuition has been controversial in science for just that reason.
Russell and Frege, though not scientists, argued, against Poincare and Hilbert
respectively, that intuition is a necessary component for meaning in the axioms of
geometry.58 The result of this dispute, however, was quite ambiguous, since it did not
really seem to matter who was correct. Geometry progressed in spite of the issue. The
empiricist, however, could not accept the ambiguity of this conclusion, since for him,
non-empirical knowledge is not merely untrue as of yet, but a physical impossibility of
the scientific method, since we have no conception of what such knowledge would be. He
would say with the positivists, that, since no empirical result follows, such statements are
meaningless.59 Despite naturalism’s rootedness in the scientific conception of the world
as conceived by the positivists, naturalists do not concede a verificationist posture or any
other philosophy prior to scientific investigation. It seems, then, that empiricism could be
untenable and naturalism true.
There is a counterclaim, however, made explicit by Laurence Bonjour in his, In
Defense o f Pure Reason:
58 J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition: From Kant to Carnap to the Vienna Station (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992) pp. 113-140.
59 Cf., A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1952).
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...if it should turn out (surprisingly) that there is genuine knowledge that results from
parapsychological or extrasensory capacities such as telepathy and clairvoyance, it
seems that its justification should also count as empirical, and not a priori, from the
standpoint of the traditional distinction, whether or not it involves any sort of sensation
or sensuous imagery.60

The ‘traditional distinction’ to which Bonjour refers is between moderate
empiricism and radical empiricism. According to Bonjour, the classical understanding of
the term ‘empirical’ would not be undercut by any discovery or evidence in favor of what
are typically considered a priori ways of knowing. They would become scientific in a
non-trivial sense, since they would then be testable thereby becoming available to other
minds, and cease to be called ‘a priori.’
It seems that contemporary science could accommodate such a system, since, just
because we might not know how a formerly a priori method of knowing happens, or
occurs, or is caused, or works, its predictive ability and explanatory usefulness would
make it ‘scientific’ in a non-trivial contemporary sense. The ‘experience’ itself would
then be empirical—though not completely comprehensible— and therefore not a priori.
On Bonjour’s understanding, it seems that science could, not, as Rea claims, “discover
empiricism to be false.” Bonjour is not sympathetic to empiricism, but he raises an
important problem for anyone who wishes to retain a rationalist perspective.
I, however, agree with Rea that the problem actually falls on the shoulders of the
empiricist rather than the rationalist. Since the empiricist, if she is concerned to make her
empiricism normative, is concerned to compellingly denote what counts as legitimate
knowledge, against metaphysical claims, and to say that only that which is qualifiedly
empirical counts, she must provide a criterion of what evidence counts as ‘empirical.’
The rationalist would claim that telepathy, if true, provides a mode of inquiry that is as

60 Bonjour, In Defense o f Pure Reason, p. 8.
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legitimate as science. The empiricist can claim that, if telepathy is found true via some
contemporary scientific investigation, it is a scientific method of inquiry, and therefore
legitimate. But either way, the conclusion lands in the rationalists’ favor, since the
empiricist cannot rule out, a priori, that telepathy is impossibly detectable by science, and
can provide no criterion to the effect that it is impossible or illegitimate before she
actually investigates. The pragmatic scientific efficacy of something like telepathy would
not support any claims about the nature of telepathy itself, except perhaps that it
functions in a law-like manner.
The question goes deeper, in that the issue is one of the broader concept of
“experience,” and not the more restricted concept of “empirical.” Does one obtain
knowledge via her direct sensory apparatus, or does she obtain knowledge by
‘experience,’ broadly construed? Defining these concepts helps to clear up some of the
problem. Bonjour suggests that ‘experience’ should be understood as:
(a) being a causally conditioned response to particular, contingent features of the world,
and
(b) yielding doxastic states that have as their content putative information concerning
certain particular, contingent features of the actual world as contrasted with other
possible worlds. 61

This clarification allows that knowledge obtained perceptually may not involve
the sensory apparatus per se, but that the knowledge gleaned would be a posteriori, in
that it was a result of causal process and deals with purely contingent subject matter. In
the same way, introspection, memory, and kinesthesia would become instances of
epistemic experience in this broad sense, while having nothing to do with sensory
apparatus in the narrow sense. This means that telepathy was not a priori all along and
that the relevant notion of empirical retains its force, even allowing the possibility of

61 Bonjour, In Defense o f Pure Reason, p. 8.
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positivist convictions concerning meanings. “Telepathy is true,” would be a meaningful
proposition, although false. Bonjour claims that mathematics does not fall into this
category, because, even though it involves mental processes, it is concerned with
universal, rather than contingent, truths, and therefore remains an a priori subject.
But again, the question gets all muddled, since on Bonjour’s account, prophecy
would count as possibly empirical, since it deals with contingent truths, that may or may
not come to pass, and because of this, the claims are open to empirical scrutiny. But
religious experience would not count since a, necessary Being’s revelation of himself
would constitute knowledge of a universal truth. Though the experience itself would be a
posteriori, in the sense that the prophet somehow ‘experienced’ the message, the
noncausal (in the physical sense of causation) relation of immaterial being to material
being would be impossible to detect or explain by science and therefore a priori. If the
prophet receives a message entailing both that ‘a necessary Being exists’ and that ‘a
certain event will come to pass,’ then presumably he has been presented with an a
posteriori and an a priori truth simultaneously in an a posteriori experience. But this
doesn’t even make sense on a purely scientific worldview.
What we need is a criterion for what would constitute an empirical claim. But no
one has yet been able to adequately define of what this would consist. Any criterion that
restricts knowledge to sensory experience leaves out memory completely, and is too
narrow. Any criterion that allows for the possibility of memory also allows the possibility
of religious experience, and is too broad for most empiricists. Therefore, sensory
experience alone cannot determine what counts as scientific, since it does not have the
capacity to determine anything outside its five-fold scope, just as our blue-object
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detector. But science could feasibly detect, or at least indicate through valid scientific
reasoning, the existence of something outside of sensory experience, which would
nonetheless constitute ‘experience’ in some broadly scientific sense but which would still
not be considered significantly a priori.
Rea, however, does not say that science might ‘detect’ or ‘indicate’ that a priori
truths exist, in a way that would lead us to think of an experiment, but merely that a
scientific theory may have to concede at some level, giving “strong support to” the fact
that a priori truths exist. This goes all the distance he needs to show that empiricism
could be false, and that the naturalist has to live with that fact. The point here is not to
destroy empiricism, but only to show that empiricism and naturalism are not tied together
in any logical sense, such that, if it were the case that empiricism were, somehow, proven
false, that the naturalist would not have to give up her dependence on science or her
naturalism. As far as Rea’s argument goes, I think he is correct. But the conclusion does
not lead to any scathing critique of empiricism, nor to any substantive suggestion as to
what it might be to which science could lend support that would not constitute experience
in any reasonable sense and which would still supply some sort of intelligible content.
But it does seem clear that empiricism cannot be held normatively, in the sense of
proscribing something from the scope of science prior to the completion of the scientific
project.
Rea’s argument holds out a logical possibility that the naturalist cannot deny if
she is following any version of contemporary science. But there seem to be no
consequences for accepting this logical possibility either. This might lead us to question
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why the naturalist would hold (if she did) the rejection of metaphysics as a doctrine.

If

empiricism did turn out to be false on a scientific worldview, then anyone who held
‘empiricism’ as a doctrine would obviously have a problem, since empirical confirmation
is the bread and butter of his theory. But this is rather trivial given our previous
discussion. And what about the naturalist? It is unclear that anyone who traditionally held
a strong commitment to science as a contingent and falsifiable research program ever
held empiricism as a universal doctrine. The idea that scientific research is broadly
empirical has historically been more descriptive than normative at any given stage of
scientific research, with the criteria of what was reasonably ‘empirical’ broadening to
some extent at each stage. Normativity became an issue with certain ‘epistemologies’ of
science, but the naturalist does not seek an epistemological justification for science;
naturalism accepts science as basic, given its success.
It seems that, despite concerns about metaphysical statements and the eschewal of
a priori knowledge claims, the central tenet of most versions of naturalism, centers on
following science to whatever conclusions at which it arrives. I f through some interesting
turn of events, science ever came to conclude that empiricism was false, then the
naturalist would have to alter her stance on a priori knowledge, but would not have to
give up her belief in the effectiveness of science, just the claim that science is an
exclusively empirical discipline.

62 The naturalist may say she is warranted in rejecting metaphysics because she either thinks that no
evidence is currently available that would “lend support to” any claim of a priori knowledge, or she has
disavowed it as genuine evidence. (That is, she may not take the particular evidence for such a possibility
acceptable as a form of evidence in her doxastic system.) She may claim that if any such evidence did
indeed present itself, she would follow it wholeheartedly, and thus alter her conception of naturalism,
which seems detrimental to the concept itself, or give it up completely.
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If it turned out that empiricism was false, and that this was indicated by some
scientific investigation, then, though naturalism would not have to be rejected, it would
certainly suffer certain consequences. The most severe is that naturalism would not be
offering any substantial perspective concerning inquiry. If there are other modes of
inquiry, aside from empiricism, that also hold science to be effective, and which science
warrants, then the naturalist, who holds that science is a particularly privileged method of
knowing (since it was through science that these other methods were warranted, but not
discovered), then we would merely say he was being naive, or at least overly nostalgic. In
this case, the naturalist would not be offering anything philosophically significant. He
would merely be pointing out the efficacy of the scientific method, with which even those
who held the other possibly warranted method of inquiry probably agreed anyway. So,
even though naturalism is not tied logically to empiricism and therefore does not have to
hold the doctrine as a universal truth (since it seems to be without empirical justification
anyway), if science shows empiricism to be false, then naturalism ceases to be
naturalism. Something has proven epistemically reliable apart from science, thereby
undercutting the naturalist’s belief in the sole authority of science.
Again, these are pretty trivial concerns. But because of this, naturalism cannot be
reduced to empiricism. If empiricism is false, it does mean the obliteration of naturalism,
though it is not clear, at this point, how empirical data would show that something other
than empirical data was efficacious. This would have to be a process of scientific
reasoning. And since the argument is merely a logical possibility, any competent
naturalist may still say that she is warranted in holding the truth of empiricism until it is
proven otherwise. And we have to agree.
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The only argument that would tell against such warrant is a proof of the
irrationality of empiricism itself. This is a task to which I am not equal. This obviously
does not affect its epistemic warrant, but it should make us a little uneasy if we conjoin
the thought that ‘science tells us something about reality’ with that of ‘science is all that
is ultimately justified empirically.’ For the most part I agree with C. S. Lewis when he
wrote:
It is clear that everything we know, beyond our own immediate sensations, is inferred
from those sensations. I do not mean that we begin as children, by regarding our
sensations as ‘evidence’ and thence arguing consciously to the existence of space,
matter, and other people. I mean that if, after we are old enough to understand the
question, our confidence in the existence of anything else (say, the solar system or the
Spanish Armada) is challenged, our argument in defense of it will have to take the form
of inference from our immediate sensations. Put in its most general form the inference
would run, ‘Since I am presented with colours, sounds, shapes, pleasures and pains
which I cannot perfectly predict or control, and since the more I investigate them the
more regular their behavior appears, therefore there must exist something other than
myself and it must be systematic.’ Inside this very general inference, all sorts o f special
trains of inference lead us to more detailed conclusions.63

I take it that this is the intuition that inspires adherence to science and its manifest
success. The leap to naturalism from here is obvious. The problem naturalism will face in
chapter four is that of its normative claim that the only legitimate form of knowledge is
‘scientific’ rather than broadly ‘experiential,’ since science presupposes the truth of the
latter. This is because of another insight from Lewis a few sentences later, based on the
previous quote:
All possible knowledge, then, depends on the validity of reasoning. If the feeling of
certainty which we express by words like must be and therefore and since is a real
perception of how things outside our own minds really ‘must’ be, well and good. But if
this certainty is merely a feeling in our own minds and not a genuine insight into realities
beyond them—if it merely represents the way our minds happen to work— then we can
have no knowledge. Unless human reasoning is valid no science can be true. It follows
that no account of the universe can be true unless that account leaves it possible for our
thinking to be a real insight.64

63 C. S. Lewis, Miracles (New York: Harper Collins, 1947) pp. 20-21.

64 Ibid., p. 21, emphasis his.
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The issue appears to be the classical one about whether thought alone can provide
content. But in fact it deviates from that broad question to focus specifically on whether
we can make correct judgments concerning the experiences through which we encounter
reality and whether science can determine the answer. This is an issue that I will address
in section 2.7 on realism.
2.5: Pragmatism
2.5.1: Intro
Since naturalism follows the success of science for indication of success in
theorizing, it might be tempting to view naturalism’s commitment to science
pragmatically, even reducing naturalism to pragmatism. Given John Dewey’s attempt to
promulgate naturalism through a pragmatic rendering of warranted assertability, it may
seem a short jump. Pragmatism inevitably involves some sort of conventionalist view of
reality. Conventionalism in philosophy of science is the doctrine that theorists design
consistent models, constructions, that we apply to reality and from which we may derive
useful knowledge and/or practices. These models can be based upon social practices and
institutional values.65 Generally, and admittedly simplistically, pragmatic methods are
designed to find what is useful and not what is true, per se. The findings may actually be
true, but pragmatism does not make room for justified views concerning whether they are
true, so that we cannot determine the nature of the physical world outside of its
usefulness for some indicated goal. Since many contemporary naturalists, having
departed from a Deweyan formulation, reject a pragmatic rendering of science,66
pragmatism is inconsistent with naturalism as I am characterizing it.

65 A well-known contemporary proponent of conventionalism in science is Bas C. Van Fraassen who puts
forth what he calls “constructive empiricism.” Cf. Bas C. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford:
Clarendon Oxford Press, 1980).
66 For example, Philip Kitcher, Alexander Rosenberg, Jerry Fodor, and Michael Dummet.
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It is not that pragmatists decry ‘truth,’ they just want to distinguish their version
of ‘truth’ from that of the traditional discussion concerning what is meant by ‘agreement
with reality.’ For example, William James agrees that the pragmatist conception of truth
is ‘agreement with reality’ but defines the relevant scope of reality as that which is given
in sensory perception, because that is all that we have for which to make use in daily life.
He asks, “What, in short, is the [traditional] truth’s cash-value in experiential terms?”67
Our true ideas of sensible things do indeed copy them. Shut your eyes and think of
yonder clock on the wall, and you get just such a true picture or copy of its dial. But
your idea of its ‘works’ (unless you are a clock-maker) is much less of a copy, yet it
passes muster, for it in no way clashes with the reality.68

If we continue following James, the pragmatic criteria for “truth” is determined as
follows: “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify.
False ideas are those that we can not.”69 This notion of truth seems to reduce to
reliabilism rather than truth, but we will discuss the distinction between reliabilism and
truth in section 2.7 on realism.
Pragmatism, as a movement, developed as a specifically American project. It was
first formulated by C. S. Peirce in the early 1870s in Cambridge, MA, and further
developed in the work of other American philosophers such as William James, John
Dewey, and Jane Addams. Pragmatism holds that knowledge is purely instrumental.
Charlene Seigfried explains:
Concepts are habits of belief or rules of action. Truth cannot be determined solely by
epistemological criteria because the adequacy of these criteria cannot be determined
apart from the goals sought and values instantiated. ... According to pragmatic theories
of truth, truths are beliefs that are confirmed in the course of experience and are
therefore fallible, subject to further revision. True beliefs for Peirce represent real
objects as successively confirmed until they converge on a final determination; for
James, leadings that are worthwhile; and according to Dewey’s theory of inquiry, the

67 William James, Pragmatism, p. 88.
68 Ibid., p. 87.
69 Ibid., p. 88.
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transformation of an indeterminate situation into a determinate one that leads to a
70
warranted assertion.

Most naturalists are realists and therefore hold to truth as correspondence with
reality, rather than coherence among sensations. But even with the qualification
‘correspondence’ there is ambiguity. If, as we will see later, arguments for reliability of
cognitive faculties that can be deduced from evolutionary theory indicate some
correspondence, the type of correspondence indicated may prove too narrow for
determinations about reality as a whole, or the scope of the truth-value present in the
organism’s cognitive mechanism. The methods of empirical science seek answers to the
way reality is; they want to know the ‘truth’ of the matter. Therefore, even though one
may choose empiricism on pragmatic grounds, the “usefulness” of the tool must be found
adequate for determining what constitutes reality within the scope of an investigation,
which translates to success. The naturalist desires to go beyond the scope of any specific
scientific discipline and to make claims concerning the nature of reality as a whole, or all
of science as a whole. So, while certain aspects of scientific theory may be chosen
pragmatically, it makes little sense to claim that naturalism is merely pragmatic with
regard to scientific findings.
2.5.2: Naturalism Irreducible to Pragmatism
Alex Rosenberg explains the point of departure for naturalism and pragmatism:
To appeal to the practical, technological, applied success of science might solve the
naturalist’s justificatory problem. But the result would not be naturalism. Science does in
fact have a magnificent track record of technological application with practical,
pragmatic success. But why should this provide a justification for its claims to constitute
knowledge or its methods to count as epistemology? It does so only if we erect a prior
first philosophy. Call it pragmatism, after the early twentieth-century American
philosophers—William James, C. S. Peirce and John Dewey— who explicitly adopted
this view. This philosophy may have much to recommend it, but it is not naturalism, for
it begins with a philosophical commitment prior to science, and may have to surrender
those parts of science incompatible with it.71

70 Charlene Seigfried, “Pragmatism,” in The Cambridge Dictionary o f Philosophy, 2nd ed., p. 730.
71 Rosenberg, Philosophy o f Science, p. 155.

Rosenberg identifies the nature of pragmatism as a philosophical position that is
independent of science to the extent that science may disagree with a pragmatic finding
depending upon the pre-set goal of the pragmatic project, and so the pragmatist would
have to depart with science. Since this posture is unthinkable for the naturalist, it cannot
be a tenet of naturalism. Pragmatism’s status as a first philosophy would deter any
consistent naturalist from adhering to it, though the methods of the naturalist and the
pragmatist may be very similar. In addition, the naturalist may concede the limits of
empiricism as an analytic thesis, and conclude with Dewey and James that pragmatism
“is merely empiricism pushed to its legitimate conclusions.”72
My supporting argument here is similar to the previous one concerning
empiricism. If naturalism is reducible to pragmatism, then it cannot say anything
significantly different than pragmatism. But naturalists do, in fact, make claims different
from pragmatists. They claim to be accessing reality and they make claims concerning
the nature of reality or science as a whole. Therefore, the naturalist has the additional
burden of providing a reason to accept science as providing knowledge about reality
broader than any specific scientific discipline.73
As Rosenberg indicates, pragmatism is also a philosophy that is prior to science, a
status that naturalists reject. Characterized this way a naturalist could never be a
pragmatist. Pragmatism accepts that certain goals are always evident (some epistemic
need) and that scientific methodology should follow evidence to a certain conclusion
72 Dewey, “The Development of American Pragmatism,” p. 7.
73 Here I am merely referring back to naturalism’s desire for a unified ontology based on scientific findings.
The naturalist must be able to point out how branches of science individually or together indicate
something about reality as a whole. Dallas Willard writes concerning the branches o f science, “They never
even attempt to determine what it is to exist or what existence is, and cannot by the nature of their content
provide an exhaustive list of what ultimate sorts of things there are,” “Knowledge and Naturalism,” in
Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, p. 28.
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adequate to the need; epistemic success is determined by conformity to these goals. It is
these goals that make pragmatism a prior philosophy.
But pragmatism may not need to be characterized as a prior philosophy. The
pragmatist may, like the naturalist, allow that science justifies itself and presents us with
the problems, and therefore the goals, to which further experiment should be directed.
Therefore, as a program of inquiry, naturalism and pragmatism may be very similar.
Michael Rea explains:
The idea [of pragmatism], roughly, is that instead of taking derivability from a priori
necessary principles as the distinguishing mark of a good philosophical theory, and
instead of looking toward such principles as the foundations for our theories, what we
ought to do is to build theories that have practical (empirically detectable) consequences
and to evaluate our theories on the basis of their consequences. This sounds very much
like the naturalistic approach described above— an approach wherein one abandons the
quest for answers to foundational questions and strives to develop theories that will in
some way impinge upon primary experience.74

Rea’s comment here may sound like a description of science. But remember,
science does not proscribe a priori necessary principles, only theories that attempt to
provide an epistemology for science or to base an epistemology on science, do that. In
addition, pragmatism is empiricist only to the extent that it conforms to the ‘empiricism,’
or successful nomenclature, of its day, hence the general qualification ‘primary’
indicating some relevantly foundational experience, as opposed to sensory experience or
a verifiability criterion. Pragmatism involves, however, a normative claim, which is
central to both it and naturalism. The pragmatist claims we should do what works, and in
many cases up till now this is science; the naturalist claims that we should follow science
above all else because it is the most pragmatic of all intellectual disciplines. The sciences
do not support either in any specific manner. A newly discovered process may provide no

74 Rea, p. 40.
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desirable or useful information, yet science values discovery in and for itself as much as
it values useful and desirable results.
Pragmatists and naturalists differ concerning the interpretation of results of the
scientific program. Both naturalists and pragmatists think that science is self-determining
and self-justifying, and want to allow science to follow whatever path the evidence
indicates at any given time. But naturalists claim more for the findings of science than do
pragmatists. Therefore, a naturalist needs something in addition to pragmatic methods to
substantiate the claim that science is the relevant method and that predicting and
manipulating the world is the relevant goal. This something must be a consequence of the
scientific program. If the scientific program produces this something in way that can be
used as a justification for a naturalist epistemology—that is, something concerning the
truth values of scientific propositions—then pragmatism, unless something else is added
that connects what is useful to what is true, can be dismissed as the epistemic guide for
the scientific project.
But the problem for pragmatism is intrinsic to its claims. Pragmatism, as an
epistemic guide, could determine that its focus should be changed from manipulating and
predicting the world to, say, making people feel good about themselves. In this case the
pragmatist may find out that science is not the most useful tool, but that say Yoga or
pornography is. Or pragmatists may determine that human feeling about the world is
more important than manipulating the world, in which case it would also deviate from
traditional science. The pragmatist may also come to believe that theoretical physics has
‘gone too far’ and that string theory is absolutely unuseful to the human enterprise and
excise the whole field from relevant “scientific” discourse.
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The naturalist, on the other hand, has a commitment first and foremost to science,
not what it feels is, or defines as, the relevant scope of discourse. There are not
predetermined goals for the naturalist. Because naturalism claims more for the findings of
science than pragmatists, and because naturalists adhere to science absolutely regardless
of what is useful for any specific goal, naturalism is not derivable from or identical with
pragmatism.
The idea that naturalism is irreducible to pragmatism also solidifies naturalism as
independent of any incompleteness within pragmatism as an epistemology. Since they are
theoretically distinct (if for no other reason than in their differing interpretation of
scientific findings), even if pragmatism fails as a holistic program, it might still serve
well as part of a larger program. Pragmatism is certainly not problematic as part of the
methodology of certain other programs. Michael Rea even notes that, “the methods of
pragmatism and naturalism are virtually identical.”

ne

And here, it would depend upon the

larger program as to whether pragmatism was an implication of or for naturalism at any
given contingent stage of scientific progress. But even still, naturalism, as a generally
realist program is not identical with pragmatism and its claims must be judged on the
basis of what is considered good science at the time of the judgment.
2.5.3: Problems with Pragmatism
The problems with pragmatism for a scientific theory mainly center on its non
committal posture toward the relevance of the findings of scientific methods. It leaves us
questioning whether these findings actually explain something significant about the
world, or are merely internally consistent systems whose implications for reality are
unclear, as on certain geometric models of space. Wilfrid Sellars describes his

75 Rea, p. 40.
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perspective on pragmatism, as developed through his father’s (Roy Wood Sellars)
understanding:
I cut my teeth on issues dividing Idealist and Realist, and indeed, the various competing
forms of upstart Realism. I saw them at the beginning through my father’s eyes, and
perhaps for that reason never got into Pragmatism. He regarded it as shifty, ambiguous,
and indecisive. One thinks in this connection of Lovejoy’s ‘thirteen varieties,’ though
that, my father thought, would make too tidy a picture. 76

W. Sellars says just after this, that pragmatism “seemed all method and no
results.” Since pragmatism makes no pretensions regarding differing ontological theories,
it useless as a thesis for the naturalist. Therefore, though the naturalist may claim some
pragmatic methods in various places as they agree with scientific methodology, it would
not be consistent to claim it in any significant sense.
The consequences of the lack of ontological commitment run mainly along the
question of claiming anything beyond immediately given data. Pragmatism leaves the
philosopher with a vague instrumentalism without room for rich scientific theories.
Normative judgments are out of the question and the theorist has only recourse to
statements something like: “I have a system that works for X purposes, and I am sticking
with it.” The ‘X ’ may be defined as ‘systematic accord with experience,’ but this
presupposes predetermined goals to which the systematic accord is directed. Pragmatism
cannot establish these goals alone. They must be directed by questions left over from
previous investigation. But there is nothing that specifies that an investigation is
specifically scientific. A normative claim must be introduced for that. This is what the
naturalist proposes. This is what the naturalist needs for a robust adherence to science,
and what the naturalist must justify to establish legitimacy.
2.6: Physicalism and Causal Closure Principles
2.6.1: Intro
76 Sellars, Naturalism and Ontology, p. 1.
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The axiom that the universe is closed to causal forces other than natural laws is
nearly ubiquitous in philosophy of science. The idea, very roughly, is that causal laws
necessarily hold (contingent upon a qualified conception of necessity) regardless of what
occurs within the system, and that nothing will interfere from outside it. This is not to say
that they are necessary in the sense that natural laws necessarily exist and therefore never
came into existence, depend on nothing for their coming into existence, and so forth.
They could have been otherwise. But, in this initially conditional formula, if
nature/physics is complete, then the governing laws that exist do so necessarily and hold
unconditionally. Causal closure principles are defined in reaction to claims of
nonphysical causation, or causation that interrupts or suspends natural law. This is
especially the case in the field of philosophy of mind, where the mind-brain problem is
contentious if it is still considered at all. If anything nonphysical can possibly cause a
physical event or interact with a physical object, then causal closure principles are not
true. The construction of the principles allows for the postulation of causation within the
boundary of natural laws, and therefore provides a justification for predictability in
theoretical and scientific systems. But there is a connection between them that must be
determined in order for causal closure to be true.
The position that holds causal closure principles is typically called physicalism.
This is basically the same position traditionally termed ‘materialism.’ The change in
terminology is usually taken to indicate the broadening conception of science'to include
things like mental events that are not strictly reducible to physical events and are not
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therefore purely ‘material.’77 William Alston offers his take on the development of the
terms’ uses:
I will not distinguish between 'physicalism' and 'materialism'. However I must
distinguish between more and less extreme forms. The more extreme form holds that
nothing exists except what is entitled to be termed 'material' or 'physical'. Whereas the
less extreme form holds only that nothing exists except the physical and what
supervenes on that. (Use your favorite definition o f supervenience at this point.) It may
be that 'naturalism' has historically (in twentieth century history) been used for the less
extreme form. In any event, the crucial problem in getting clear as to what physicalism
or materialism is, is to clarify what it is for something to be physical or m aterial.78

Physicalism is grounded in arguments for the causal closure of the physical
domain. Scott Sturgeon says that it is grounded in the “simple” idea that, “Physicalism
flows directly from current scientific and common-sense knowledge of the world’s causal
structure.”79 But what form does this “common-sense” causal knowledge usually take?
Jaegwon Kim offers an example:
Pick any physical event, say, the decay of a uranium atom or the collision of two stars in
distant space, and trace its causal ancestry or posterity as far as you would like; the
principle of causal closure o f the physical domain says that this will never take you
outside the physical domain. Thus, no causal chain involving a physical event will ever
cross the boundary of the physical into the nonphysical: If x is a physical event and y is a
cause or effect of x, then y, too, must be a physical event. Another (somewhat weaker)
way of putting the point would be this: If a physical event has a cause at time t, it has a
physical cause at t. 0

Kim’s explication here should not be taken as an argument, but it does make some
assumptions that should be recognized. He assumes that, every causal chain is necessarily
complete, such that every physical event could not have a cause or effect that ‘crosses the
boundary’ from physical to non-physical. Despite the explicit determinism and the
implicit introduction of an infinite regress, Kim offers an example that invites analysis.
Again, this is not an argument and so I am not complaining that he does not go on to

77 Robert Pennock, Tower o f Babel: The Evidence against the New Creationism (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1999) pp. 189-90.
78 William Alston, “What is Naturalism that We Should Be Mindful of It?” p.
79 Scott Sturgeon, Matters o f Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature (London: Routledge, 2000) p. 121.
80 Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy o f Mind (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996,1998) p. 147.
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provide one. I will offer an analysis from David Papineau in this section to just that
effect. But we cannot merely accept this definition as self-evident, even if it does make
up part of our commonsense conception of the world. From the proposition that,
‘Whatever begins to exist must have a cause of its existence,’ Kim wants us to assume
additionally that, ‘Whatever begins to exist that we can ‘see,’ must have a cause of its
existence that we can ‘see’.’ We will see shortly that this is too big a crevasse to assume,
given the current state of physical theory.
2.6.2: Naturalism’s Relationship to Physicalism
“Many people continue to think of the scientific world view as being exclusively
materialist and deterministic, but if science discovers forces

and fields

and

indeterministic causal processes, then these too are to be accepted as part of the
naturalistic worldview.”81 The problem with comparing naturalism and physicalism is the
divergence of normative claims involved in both. Like naturalism, physicalism is not
derived from a finding of natural science. It is inferred from a conception of the structure
of causation. A definition of causation is given, and then the claim is made that we know
no other causation than this, therefore all causation is physical causation.
Causation is typically understood as a relation that takes place between two
objects over time based on an exertion of force of the one object upon the other, the effect
of which is determined by the relation of physical properties of the objects in
correspondence (mass, shape, density, etc.) in a context of gravitational pull and inertia.
If a metal sphere of 6 kg is rolled across a smooth table that is situated on a plane surface
perpendicular to the gravitational pull at a speed of 3 km/h toward another metal sphere
of 6 kg then, if nothing impedes the path of the first sphere, it will have a causal effect on

81 Pennock, Tower o f Babel, p. 190.

67

the second sphere; namely, the first will cause the second to move in the same direction
as the first. From this example it would seem that this view of causation is able to exhaust
explanation of physical objects in relation to one another. But one question it leaves
unanswered: who got the ball rolling?
From what we have seen of naturalism, the naturalist would be completely
content with physicalism so long as natural science supports its dictates. But since
nothing in the natural sciences immediately substantiates universal claims, it might seem
strange to think that the naturalist would make the jump and accept physicalism. It would
seem that a much more pragmatic version of physicalism would be needed to fit the
naturalist paradigm.82
Michael Rea highlights the fact that, since physicalism is an ontological thesis
about every type of event or type of entity in the world, it can only be justified for the
naturalist empirically:
What is important to note...is that adherence to materialism (reductive or not) is not an
article of faith for the naturalist. Rather it is an empirical matter. ... Materialism is a
definite ontological thesis - a particular view about what there is. Naturalism is not that;
and being a naturalist carried commitment to materialism only insofar as science itself
carries such a commitment. ... Naturalism (like science) might tentatively commit one to
a particular ontological view, like materialism; but where science goes, there go the
naturalists.83

However, many philosophers of science argue that, in fact, a rational conception
of physical laws does support belief in physicalism as a direct consequence of certain
scientific discoveries, if for no other reason than that they are explanatorily powerful. In
Thomas Kuhn’s famous treatise on the history of science, he writes that any particular set
of scientific theories to which we are committed can become methodological and
82 This is not a retraction of the previous sections concerning pragmatism’s relation to naturalism. If science
finds it pragmatically useful to accept a certain view of causation, then the naturalist will follow the lead of
science. Here pragmatism is imbedded in a larger epistemology that is not tied to the justification of either
naturalism or science.
83 Rea, World Without Design, p. 40, emphasis his.
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metaphysical theses. Concerning the corpuscularianism that followed from Descartes,
Kuhn writes:
That nest of commitments proved to be both metaphysical and methodological. As
metaphysical, it told scientists what sorts of entities the universe did not contain: there
was only shaped matter in motion. As methodological, it told them what ultimate laws
and fundamental explanations must be like: laws must specify corpuscular motion and
interaction...84

Because of the belief that science can determine an ontology, naturalism’s
relationship to physicalism is not the same as its relationship to empiricism or
pragmatism. As we saw early in this chapter, physicalism is one of the methodological
dispositions of naturalism. A philosopher could only hold physicalism normatively based
upon what is called, “the causal argument for physicalism.” If a philosopher regards the
causal argument as determinative for physicalism, then the philosopher is not a naturalist.
The naturalist is committed to science for determining the warrant for physicalism. But
since the naturalist wants to claim that the physical world is all there is, and that science
does or will support this, then if physicalism proves false scientifically, naturalism would
lose its rational ground.
If the naturalist does not claim that the physical world is all there is, but instead
that, all that exists is an object of scientific inquiry, then this would change the picture.
The naturalist might not need physicalism to be coherent. If it turns out that mental events
or states are really not physical at all, but are still relevant scientific objects, then the
naturalist may continue to adhere to science in spite of the demise of physicalism.
Naturalism is tied to physicalism only to the extent that it presupposes the universe to be
only physical objects. However, without physicalism, the naturalist needs another story to
substantiate the rejection of purportedly nonscientific methods of obtaining knowledge.
84 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962,1996) p. 41.

To prevent the need for this, a philosopher might accept the causal argument for
physicalism, but then she would stop being a naturalist, since the causal argument is a
piece of first philosophy.
I need not change my characterization of naturalism from that presented earlier
that physicalism is a methodological disposition of contemporary naturalism. It is true
that many philosophers feel inclined to mention their affinity for the doctrine as part of
their naturalistic position. But I have just demonstrated that it is not necessary for a
specifically naturalistic position. However, without it, the naturalist is still just arguing
for other philosophers to accept science as a legitimate method of inquiry, which is trivial
since most philosophers do, and not naturalism in a substantive sense. Without
physicalism it is difficult to compel the additional belief that science is the only legitimate
method of inquiry, since causal closure is enough to substantiate the doctrine on its own.
The result of the falsity of physicalism would be a philosophical position without
the distinctives of naturalism. Yet this still does not warrant a reduction of naturalism to
physicalism. Since both are independent philosophical theses, it is possible that one be a
physicalist without being a naturalist, though it is difficult to see how it could go the
other way, without some other system of scientific explanation that does not appeal to
causation. If naturalism fails on grounds other than those physicalistic, then physicalism
remains open to question of its own legitimacy. Both naturalism and physicalism need
independent arguments to secure their rationality, however, since naturalism’s claims are
intricately tied to physicalism, these must be added to the naturalist’s justification,
whereas the physicalist need not provide justification beyond his narrow causal claims.
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First we will look at the most common argument for physicalism, called by
Papineau the “causal argument for physicalism.”85 Then I will examine the burden placed
upon both the proponents and opponents for the proof or disproof of the argument. In
conclusion I will just note the extent to which naturalism is attached to physicalism and
raise the points of contention. Due to the exceptionally technical nature of the field and to
the fact that it takes us far afield, I will not attempt the difficult task of showing that the
argument for physicalism is unsuccessful, but will merely raise the issues in such a way
to indicate that it is a philosophical rather than an empirical question. This makes the
issue more complicated for the naturalist, though not insurmountable.
2.6.3: Four Propositions in the Causal Argument fo r Physicalism
If naturalism is not identical with physicalism, then for physicalism to be held
rationally it must be justified independently. For the naturalist to hold the principle of
causal closure consistently it must be justified empirically. E. J. Lowe tells us, “,..[F]or it
to have any persuasive force, the causal closure principle must be one for which some
measure of empirical support can plausibly be mustered...”86 The rejection of a priori
philosophy prevents the naturalist from making use of the sketchy inference from the fact
that we have no empirical knowledge of any other type of causation, to the conclusion
that no other type of causation exists. And since causation is defined in empirical terms,
this reasoning would be either circular or tautological. But the naturalist takes it that
contemporary science warrants a claim beyond circularity to empirical substance in favor
of physicalism. I will not recount the interesting history of the development of the
scientific shift toward physicalism, but would direct the reader to the comprehensive
85 David Papineau, “The Rise o f Physicalism,”
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/davidpapineau/Staff/Papineau/OnlinePapers/Risephys.html.
86 E. J. Lowe, “Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism,” Philosophy, vol 75, no. 294, October 2000, p.
572.
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accounts in the literature, not the least of which is David Papineau’s “The Rise of
Physicalism.”87 Empirical data leaves the philosopher with four principle propositions to
determine whether physicalism is true.
E. J. Lowe says that the problem for causal closure principles is formulating them
in such a way that they are not too strong or too weak. The necessity of the empirical
element places a limit on how strong they can be, but they cannot be so weak that they
are invalid.
According to Lowe, a “causal closure argument” has three premises:88
(a) a physical causal closure principle [or, more commonly, the principle of the
completeness of physics]
(b) the claim that at least some mental events are caused by physical events
(c) the claim that the physical effects of mental causes are not, in general, causally
overdetermined

These are then thought to entail the anti- ‘metaphysical dualist’ conclusion:
(d) At least some mental events are identical with physical events.

This is the classic argument, usually called the Overdetermination Argument.89 Lowe
provides examples of attempts to formulate principles of the completeness of physics, or
premise (a):90
(e) Papineau: All physical effects have sufficient physical causes.
(f) Sturgeon 1: Every physical effect has a fully revealing, purely physical history.
(g) Noordhof: Every physical effect has its chance fully determined by physical events
alone.
(h) Sturgeon 2: No physical effect has a non-physical cause.
(i) variation Papineau: Every physical event which has a cause has a sufficient physical
cause.

A specific explication of what it means for physics to be closed would be
important if I were attempting a more in-depth analysis. For now, we may allow for a
broadly construed physics that, in principle, accomplishes its desired goal: to explain the
87 See fn. 53.
88 E. J. Lowe, “Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism,” p. 572.
89 Lowe, Sturgeon, Papineau.
90 Lowe, “Causal Closure...” pp. 573-74.
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world in purely scientific terms. A physicalist might say that physics is the attempt to
explain the world in purely physical terms, but as we have seen, there is no reason to
conflate the two. However, the causal closure of physics, as explained by physicalists, is
intended to proscribe broadly nonphysical or nonscientific causal explanations like that of
a supreme being or a substance like a soul. With Papineau, we might blanket the realm of
physics the realm of “non-mental.”91 Since the problem of mental events is the most
empirically obvious, the argument usually takes place at this level. On Papineau’s view,
mental events are identical with something non-mental (physical), which allows them to
hold causal relations with non-mental (physical) effects, but that whatever the objects of
the ‘mental’ turn out to be, these are supposedly not causal forces in and of themselves.
Problems are compounded when we see that the principles used in support of
causal closure against interactionist dualism are themselves formed with language
entailing a prior ontological commitment. Each statement makes claims about “Every
physical effect or event” or “No physical effect or event”. The problem is not the
ontological commitment itself, but the inability to justify a universal commitment by
empirical means. We may agree, at the outset, with Papineau, who explains that:
As a preliminary, note that contemporary physicalism is an ontological rather than a
methodological doctrine. It claims that everything is physically constituted, not that
everything should be studied by the methods used in physical science. This emphasis on
ontology rather than methodology marks a striking contrast with the "unity of science"
doctrines prevalent among logical positivists in the first half of the century.... The
logical positivists were much exercised by the question of whether the different branches
of science, from physics to psychology, should all use the same method of controlled
observation and systematic generalization. They paid little or no attention to the question
of whether everything is made of the same physical stuff.92

There is a question about what might be reasonably construed as ‘physically
constituted’ at any given time, since physicists add entities and expand definitions over

91 Papineau, “The Rise of Physicalism,” pp. 8-9.
92 Ibid., p. 1, emphasis mine.
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time. But Papineau says that it is much less important to determine what is physical than
what is not.
We might not know enough about physics to know exactly what physics does include.
But as long as we are confident that it excludes such-and-such special categories, then
we can use the causal argument to conclude that these special categories are in fact
identical with other kinds. I shall suppose this indirect understanding of "physics" in
what follows: it should simply be understood as that set of properties which can be
specified without appeal to whichever special vocabularies (mental, biological,. . ) we
are interested in. Correspondingly, the completeness of physics will be the doctrine that
such non-special effects are always fully accounted for by non-special causes. (Cf.
Papineau and Spurrett, 1999.)93

Papineau does not specify what categories are to be excluded, but he hints that
these are the classes of things that purport to introduce nonphysical causation into the
physical realm. It might be something that, as Kim noted earlier, takes us out of “the
physical domain.” This is still vague. For now, we must follow Kim and Papineau and
conclude that there is an intuitive notion a type of causation that is possibly empirically
unavailable, some sort of nonphysical causation, but which the empirical sciences have
shown to be false. But proponents cannot just say that the empirical sciences have not
shown this to be true, and that therefore we may assume that it is false. This is because, if
the sciences are only directed toward physical causation, they may not be able to
determine nonphysical causation as false, and therefore it would be an argument from
silence. The physicalist must make the additional claim that scientific reasoning shows
nonphysical causation to be false, since such reasoning permits us to say something
beyond the purely physical.
In addition, we should qualify any statement of physicalism as a statement
concerning causal relations, and not ‘existence’ per se. This seems odd in light of

93 Ibid., p. 9.
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Papineau’s claim that physicalism is an ontological doctrine. But consider Papineau as he
concedes a little later:
Physicalism is the doctrine that everything, including prima facie non-physical stuff, is
physical. But the completeness of physics [just one of the necessary propositions]
doesn't itself say anything about non-physical things. It is purely a doctrine about the
structure of the physical realm. It says that, if you start with some physical effect, then
you will never have to leave the realm of the physical to find a fully sufficent cause for
that effect.94
I myself think that this limitation to the causal argument constitutes a genuine boundary
to the proper ambitions of physicalism. I think that physicalism is best formulated, not as
the claim that everything is physical, but as the significantly weaker claim that
everything which interacts causally with the physical world is physical. This leaves it
open that there may be non-causal realms of reality which are not physically constituted,
such as the realm of moral worth, or of beauty, or of mathematical objects. ...
Of course, there may be other problems with such non-physical realms. For example, it
is not clear how we may come by knowledge of such realms, if they can have no
physical effects on our sense organs. But these further arguments are by no means clearcut, and there is no special reason why they should be accepted by everybody who
accepts the causal argument. Because of this, I shall use "physicalism" in the rest of this
paper specifically for the doctrine that everything with causal powers is physical,
whatever may be true of non-causal realms.95

Therefore, when physicalists, or naturalists for that matter, make universal claims
concerning what exists or what is knowable, they are referring specifically to the
structure of causation and those entities that can causally exert physical effects. This does
not change the tone of the argument, but it does make it more explicit, preventing straw
men arguments concerning claims that an existence claim tout court is implied by
physicalism. The physicalist stance on causation here will be the same as the naturalist’s,
as we will see in our review of naturalism and theism, for, as long as God, or any
supernatural being, remains causally constrained from interacting with the universe, then
no controversies arise from positing them. However, since those who typically are
interested in supernatural entities also think that it makes a difference to reality whether

94 Ibid., p. 5
95 Ibid., p. 8.
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or not they exist, and since this is the heart of many of their arguments, the issue of
causation remains the relevant concern in such arguments.
In looking back at the propositions in Lowe’s argument, it is important for us to
understand that, though the Overdetermination Argument is the most prominent argument
siructure in favor of physicalism,96 it is actually the result of some larger-scale reasoning
concerning the four propositions involved. Science and common sense offer us four
logically independent propositions concerning the nature of causal events. These include,
again:
(1) The completeness of physics (whatever this completeness turns out to be)
(2) The fact that the mind is involved in at least some physical effects.
(3) That physical effects usually do not have or need more than one specific cause (that
is, “The physical effects of mental events are not generally overdetermined.”97).
(4) Mental events are not commonly thought to be identical with physical events
(dualism).

And we might allow a fifth to enter the question, since the denial of (4) is the typical
conclusion of the Overdetermination Argument,
(5) “Mental occurrences must be identical with physical occurrences.”98

The issue is whether we want to allow (1) - (3) to tell against (4). There are
obviously Other ways of dealing with these propositions. We might allow (1), (2), and (4)
to argue against (3), in what Sturgeon calls the “anti-No-Overdetermination” argument.99
Or we might allow (1), (3), and (4) to argue against (2), resulting in mental
epiphenomenalism. Or, we might go with the traditional dualist route and allow (2), (3),
and (4) to argue against (1), claiming that there is no good reason to think that physics is

96 Again, since most of this discussion takes place in philosophy of mind, the Overdetermination Argument
is typically employed to show the reducibility of the ‘mental’ to the ‘physical.’
97 Scott Sturgeon, Matters o f Mind: Consciousness, reason and nature (London: Routledge, 2000) p. 123.
98 Papineau, “The Rise of Physicalism,” p. 6.
99 Sturgeon, p. 123.
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complete in a significant way. This last option brings into relief the need for developing
an adequate ‘completeness of physics’ claim.
Since epiphenomenalism has been out of vogue for some time, and since the
“anti-No-Overdetermination” argument leads us to reject Occam’s Razor concerning
causes and leaves room for any number of explanatory claims, without the tools to
discern between them, the original option and the last option have taken center stage, and
many contemporary philosophers also reject the last. Yet, since the question remains on
the table, the argument, for anyone still interested, revolves around defending the
completeness of physics.
Papineau takes up this defense with all seriousness and shows why we are
historically warranted in accepting the completeness of physics in his, “The Rise of
Physicalism.” He begins his historical analysis with a concession that science has not
always told a coherent picture with regard to the completeness of physics.
To my surprise, I discovered that some people didn't agree. They didn't see why some
physical occurrences, in our brains perhaps, shouldn't have irreducibly mental causes.
My first response, when presented with this thought, was to attribute it to an insufficient
education in the physical sciences. Sometimes I went so far as to communicate this
diagnosis to those who disagreed with me. However, when they then asked me, not
unreasonably, to show them where the completeness of physics is written down in the
physics textbooks, I found myself in some embarrassment. Once I was forced to defend
it, I realized that the completeness of physics is by no means self-evident. Indeed further
reading has led me to realize, far from being self-evident, it is an issue on which the
post-Galilean scientific tradition has changed its mind several times.100

At the end of a lengthy historical analysis, Papineau offers two “empiricallybased” arguments for the completeness of physics, and both with the same conclusion
that “there are no special mental or vital forces.”101 The arguments look like this:
(6) The Argument from Fundamental Forces. The first argument is that all apparently
special forces characteristically reduce to a small stock of basic physical forces which
conserve energy. Causes of macroscopic accelerations standardly turn out to be

100 Papineau, “The Rise of Physicalism,” pp. 9-10.
101 Ibid., p. 20.
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composed out of a few fundamental physical forces which operate throughout nature.
So, while we ordinarily attribute certain physical effects to "muscular forces", say, or
indeed to "mental causes", we should recognize that these causes, like all causes of
physical effects, are ultimately composed of the few basic physical forces.
(7) The Argument from Physiology. The second argument is simply that there is no
direct evidence for vital or mental forces. Physiological research reveals no phenomena
in living bodies that manifest such forces. All organic processes in living bodies seem to
be fully accounted for by normal physical forces.

I take these arguments to be fairly obvious, and do not wish to dwell on their
explication. Papineau does take some time to expound, but mostly to the effect that since
there are regular causal “law” effects whose causes are physical and empirically
detectable, then we are warranted in assuming that all physical effects similarly have
physical causes. And since we have never had any evidence to the contrary, we can
assume that this is confirmed by the fact that current scientific procedures continually do
not find evidence to the contrary.
There are huge assumptions here. First concerning the nature of empirical tests
and their ability to detect causes other than physical. Though we do not regularly have
perceivable effects without causes, we certainly have plenty of effects for which we are
ignorant of the cause, or at least ignorant of the coincidence of an event and an apparently
independent effect, e.g. laboratory tests on the efficacy of prayer. But, let us grant this
conceptually and agree that warrant remains.
Many naturalists hold a neo-Humean view of causation.102 Because of this, the
casual assumption is only broad enough to cover non-intentional causes. For any physical
effect with an intentional cause (e.g., raising my arm) we might ask ‘why’ and expect a
reason, which we may or may not accept as ‘causal’ in the relevant sense. In the same
way, if the intervening influence was intentional, say, because some non-physical ‘being’

102 Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), chapter 1.
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wanted it that way, then there need be no relevant physical causal chain, leading to our
ability to predict this being’s existence. For instance, knowledge of causal regularity is
never based upon one event that may or may not ever happen again, but upon several
events, sometimes with relevant controls employed to isolate effects in order to determine
a relevant physical cause. But say I raise my arm once and never raise it again— a
f
relevant possibility if we suppose that I am in control of my own actions. The probability
of my raising my arm prior to my actually doing it is nil, since I have never done so in the
past, and past events are necessary for accurate probability assessments. The probability
of my doing it again is raised after I do it once. But no physical causal explanation may
ever be given for why I raised my arm in the first place.
On the other hand, if I am a court bailiff and am asked to ‘swear people in’ on a
regular basis, then there may be relevant physical causal explanations for why I raise my
hand at certain times on certain days. But these (statistically) presuppose that I have done
it more than once, and that we can isolate the relevant controls such that it is predictable
whether I will do so again; perhaps I am fired from the job, or get a promotion. The same
can be true for any non-physical being who chooses to act differently, though regularly in
a physical causal context, or one who chooses to act upon mental states rather than brain
states. For instance, if a wind-up mechanical toy with an on-off switch, which is wound
up and set to ‘off,’ sits for eternity, there is nothing internal to its mechanism that will
cause it to start unwinding. If it had a timer that was counting down to the time when the
switch would click to ‘on,’ we would just turn our attention to the mechanism of the
timer rather than the wound spring. It might be logically possible for the counter to count
down from eternity, but this would assume that an infinite set of numbers could be
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counted down in reverse. In addition, any given moment would constitute an instance of
the completion of an actually infinite number series composed of finite indicators.
Because there is no initial corresponding goal for which an infinitely distant starting point
is designed, there remains no ‘explanation,’ causal or otherwise for the start of toy, for
the Neo-Humean. Since many naturalists claim to hold a neo-Humean version of
causation, their naturalistic explanations are limited by these examples.
On the other hand, if a man was sitting from eternity, motionless, but
kinesthetically capable, he could, at any given instant (presupposing the existence or
creation of a time structure) choose to stand. There would be no physical causal
antecedents that could act as an explanation for his standing. But the fact that this is
possible, even if it constitutes an arbitrary act, falls outside the scope of Papineau’s
argument. For these reasons Papineau’s arguments, though perhaps completely true, do
not provide a reason to accept the completeness of physics, as delimited by causation, and
therefore physicalism.
Scott Sturgeon goes a step further and offers two reasons that the argument as a
whole is problematic. Sturgeon says the problem comes with defining physicality in a
relevant sense. If ‘physical’ is defined as microphysical, then our completeness claims
gets reduced to quantum completeness:
(j) Quantum Completeness: Every quantum effect has a fully disclosive, purely quantum
history.

But this then changes the second proposition from earlier, what Sturgeon calls “mental
impact” clause, reducing it to quantum causation:
(k) Quantum Impact: Mental events have quantum effects.
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But this claim is not scientific or commonsensical. “This claim is not part of extant
science; nor is it part of everyday experience. No working scientific theory postulates a
pervasive link between mental events and quantum events. And neither does common
i rn

sense.” ‘ Therefore an extra argument is needed to show this link if the
Overdetermination Argument is to prevail. Another route might be to take physical as
meaning broadly physical, or macro-physical, including “handshakes, hiccups, and the
felling of trees.” 104 Doing so would change the impact claim to something acceptable:
(1) Broad Impact: Mental events have broadly physical effect.

But then the completeness claim becomes problematic:
(m) Broad-Completeness: Every broadly physical effect had a fully disclosive, purely
broadly physical history.

Again, (m) is not part of either science or commonsense. “Quite the contrary: both
macro-science and everyday experience rely upon mental causes for broadly physical
effects.”105 Therefore, the problem that Sturgeon raises is the same problem that has
vexed physicists between quantum physics and relativity theory for years: attempting to
identify a relevant link between the micro- and macro-physical structures of the world.
Sturgeon offers several possible solutions to the problem as he’s couched it, but
ultimately ends his entire book with the “Wait-and-See” policy.
‘What’s the take-home message of your book?’, asked a good friend and colleague.
‘TheWait-and-See view’, I relplied, ‘Oh,’ he said helpfully, ‘you’ll never get famous
pushing that view.’ Fair enough. But there’s nothing to be done for it. The facts support
the view. When it comes to the Mind-Body Problem, the reasonable position is Waitand-See.106

Papineau agrees, to an extent, at the end of his paper saying:

103 Sturgeon, p. 124, emphasis his.
104 Ibid., p. 125.
105 Ibid, p. 125.
106 Ibid., p. 155.
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O f course, as with all empirical matters, there is nothing certain here. There is no knock
down argument for the completeness of physics. You could in principle accept the rest
of modem physical theory, and yet continue to insist on special mental forces, which
operate in as yet undetected ways in the interstices o f intelligent brains. And indeed
there do exist bitter-enders of just this kind, who continue to hold out for special mental
causes, even after another half-century of ever more detailed molecular biology has been
added to the inductive evidence which initially created a scientific consensus on
completeness in the 1950s.107

My point in all of this is just to note that naturalism is tied inextricably to the fate
of physicalism, (though not vice versa) and that this fate is yet to be determined. In fact,
much analysis is left concerning what constitutes a relevantly physical state or event, and
much empirical evidence is needed to determine the extent to which the brain is involved
with intentional states. Naturalists must be able to make a compelling case for
physicalism to sustain their belief in the causal closure of the universe and the
nonexistence of a priori knowledge. But while the direct empirical evidence is not in
either way, the philosophical analysis continues and creates some interesting obstacles for
naturalists and physicalists alike.
2.7: Scientific Realism
2.7.1: Intro
Growing discontent with verificationist theories of meaning lead philosophers in
the 70s and 80s to raise again the question of realism vs. antirealism. On the
verificationist framework, both terms were meaningless. Positivist Moritz Schlick writes
in response to those who claim ‘There is only the given,’ that “We must insist, however,
that whoever states this proposition seeks to establish an assertion which is metaphysical
in exactly the same sense and degree as its apparent contradictory: ‘There is a
transcendent reality.’”

10ft

Naturalists after Quine, on the other hand, began to think that

naturalism could secure the necessary criteria that enable a realist perspective of science.
107 Papineau, “The Rise of Physicalism,” p. 24.
108 Moritz Schlick, “Positivism and Realism,” in A. J. Ayer, Logical Positivism (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1996). Of course, Schlick is referring to the negative part of the statement, the ‘only,’ rather than
denying that science can tell us anything about t h e ‘given.’
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But the conjunction of naturalism and realism is not as die-cut as we would initially
think. The idea behind realism is that science expresses the world as it actually makes
itself known to us through experiment. And naturalism, with its reliance on science as the
only legitimate form of knowledge, seems to agree nicely. The gap comes with the
introduction of the concept of ‘truth as correspondence.’
Realism says that we can have truth about reality because the various data of
science corresponds to the various features of reality. Alex Rosenberg defines it as, “the
thesis that our scientific theories are approximately true, and increasing in their
approximation to the truth.” 109 The question then is how knowledge is construed on a
naturalistic framework. If the naturalist holds a correspondence theory of truth, then her
naturalistic claims must agree with scientific realism. If the naturalist does not hold this
view of what counts as truth, say, if she holds a coherence theory, then the naturalist
holds some form of antirealism and the strict adherence to science is to an end other than
truth; say, constructivism, for instance. Both programs seem to be prima facie acceptable,
and everyone within the conversation seems to divide the issues this way.110 I will briefly
review both, but since many more naturalists claim realism than antirealism, I will
explain the conditions upon which this relationship between naturalism and realism rests
and offer some suggestions as to why naturalism cannot provide the necessary conditions
for a realist perspective.
This conception of realism is a little different from its original form, whereon the
question centered on whether objects exist outside the mind or inside the mind only. In
109 Alex Rosenberg, “A Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism” British Journal of Philosophy of
Science”, 47 (1996): pp. 5-6.
110 Antirealists in this discussion include Daniel Dennett and Larry Laudan; and realists include, Michael
Loux, Richard Boyd, and Alexander Rosenberg. Philip Kitcher flip flops on the issue, remaining undecided
as to what is supposed to count as realism.
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laying out our conception of science, we have identified certain events and entities that
are reasonably held to exist and which are useful in scientific processes. These included
mental events, memory, and theoretical entities such as those posited in theoretical
physics. What we might add to this reasonable conception is the existence of other minds.
While there are no logical proofs against solipsism, epistemologists have gone a long way
toward showing why we are warranted in believing in the existence of other minds, that
we are not brains in vats, that the world is more than five minutes old, etc.111 Though I
will not argue the point, I will assume that the point has been made that the existence of
other minds is relatively uncontentious. Since we are rational in holding that something
exists outside of our mind the realist question changes face slightly, from whether
anything exists, to whether I am accurately representing that which does exist. Depending
upon the structure of my cognitive faculties it may be the case that I have representations
that are reliable for pragmatically true beliefs but not for beliefs that correspond to
reality. As an instance of such a case, consider Moritz Schlick’s excellent example. After
considering that his personal experience of two different green pieces of paper is identical
and therefore, he has verified a proposition that they are identical, he considers his beliefs
concerning another person who, after viewing the same data, comes to the same
conclusion:
Now I show one o f these two pieces o f paper to a second observer, and ask the question:
does he see the green as I do? Is his color experience like my color experience? This
case differs in principle from that just considered. While there the statement was
verifiable by the experience of color sameness, here, brief reflection shows, such a
verification is simply impossible. Of course the second observer, if he is not color blind,
calls the paper green, and if I describe this green to him more closely by saying: it is
yellower than this carpet, but bluer than the billiard cloth, darker than this plant, etc., he
will find the same to hold in his experience, i.e. he will agree with my statements. But
even if all his judgments about color agree entirely with mine I cannot infer from this

111 Cf. especially Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study o f the Rational Justification fo r B elief in
God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967).

84

that he experiences this same quality. It could be the case that on looking at the green
paper he would have a color experience which I would call “red,” that on the other hand,
when I see red he would see green, calling it “red” of course, and so on. ... The
proposition that two experiences of different subjects not only occupy the same place in
the order of a system but are, in addition, qualitatively similar has no meaning for us.112

Schlick is arguing that we cannot verify correspondence-type truth. Since, “It
could be the case that only looking that the green paper he would have the color
experience which I would call ‘red,”’ then the observer seems to have no way of
objectively identifying whether his perception corresponds to reality or just the
perceptions of another observer in a practical way. The first question that such an
example might raise is: so what? If we do not have warrant for such truth-statements, but
retain the capacity for efficacious judgments, why does it matter that we cannot verify
correspondence-type truth? My answer is simply the normative knowledge claims
intrinsic to so many philosophical systems, especially naturalism. If the extent of our
knowledge concerns only those claims that we are efficacious in making, then we cannot
judge the truth or falsity of another system except insofar as it is efficacious to the one
who holds it. We are left without normative knowledge claims, though some systems
would be more reliable than others for accomplishing certain goals. On the other hand, if
there’ was something that we were rational in believing, that at the same time, gave us
warrant to think that our cognitive faculties represented correspondence truth, then we
could make certain normative and even universal (because justifiable) claims, so long as
they remained within the boundaries of the original warranted belief about those
faculties.
As a descendent of the scientific conception of the world first constructed by the
late positivists (Carnap, Schlick, Hempel), naturalists hold science as the all-determining

112 Moritz Schlick, “Positivism and Realism,” p. 93.
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factor for all inquiry into reality, whether it be further scientific research or philosophical
clarification. But naturalism differs from positivism in several important respects. The
most conspicuous is naturalism’s realistic view of science as opposed to the late
positivists’ constructivist approach.

ijO

Where positivists saw science as a pragmatic

enterprise for efficient manipulation and prediction within the given of experience,
naturalists, for the most part, accept science as providing a more-or-less accurate picture
of the world as it objectively exists in itself. This is not true for all naturalists as we shall
see, but realism remains the dominant conception of science for contemporary
naturalism.
Another respect in which positivism and naturalism differ is the content of their
projects. Whereas positivism rejected, for the most part, traditional philosophical
projects, many naturalists remain committed to traditional questions of ontology,
epistemology, mind, and ethics. Naturalists approach these questions in different,
particularly scientific, ways, but they do not reject the questions altogether. The question
of realism rose again to the fore in the face of the rejection of positivism.
Between the time of Kant’s Critique o f Pure Reason and Quine’s “Two Dogmas
of Empiricism,” “scientific realism” was considered a metaphysical position that could be
excised with all projects concerned with “speculative subjects” such as religion. Early
positivists like Comte and Moore wanted a verificationist criterion of meaning that
indicated truth in the form of certainty. But certainty implies realism, just as necessarily
true propositions imply realism. Even though early positivists like Mach rejected realism,
since he still sought a form of certainty, which asks for a specific realist justification. But

113 Constructivism was not true o f positivism across the board, as we will see, with certain positivists, like
Gustav Bergmann, pushing for a version of realism in science.
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later positivists rejected realism as the same type of project as transcendental knowledge.
This rejection is the logical consequence of certain positivist claims, namely the
unempirical natural of the issues involved in realism. One interesting problem is that the
claims that made realism problematic for the positivists also make them problematic for
naturalists, though many naturalists claim a realist ontology. The central difference on
this topic is that, where the positivists called the ‘realist’ project meaningless, naturalists
call it ‘true,’ and therefore a meaningful question.

Some naturalists, such as Larry

Laudan,114 choose to claim that realism is false, but since the “fall” of positivism it has
been re-opened as a legitimate question.
The push for realism in the face of logical theory and verificationism actually
came into relief in the midst of positivism, despite its all out rejection of the concept.
Positivists rejected ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ and the argument surrounding them as a(n)
(empirically) meaningless project, so it seems odd to hear that a positivist actually pushed
for a realist version of the verificationist thesis. But not all positivists were convinced
that verificationism proscribed the question of realism. Schlick began his investigations
as a realist, but then changed his position as he saw that it did not follow from the rest of
his claims. One member of the Vienna Circle actually argued in favor of shifting the
positivist project in the direction of realism. Wilfird Sellars called Gustav Bergmann,
“one of the most coherent, drive down the road to the bitter end, ontological realists in
the world today.”115 Bergmann’s argument, however, does not end up beyond a mere
“stuff’ ontology that follows from his admittedly pragmatic project, and only redefines
‘realism’ for positivist use.

114 Larry Laudan, Science and Values (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984a).
115 Wilfrid Sellars, Naturalism and Ontology, p. 48.
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Bergmann, in his influential TheMetaphysics o f Logical Positivism,116 argues for a
shift from the conclusion that a statement is ‘meaningful because it is verifiable,’ to the
conclusion that ‘a statement is verifiable because it is meaningful.’

117

Think about the

drastic nature of this shift! Bergmann rejects all “philosophical statements” as
meaningless metaphysics and wants all inquiry to begin with common sense
experience,

118

yet his proposed shift belies all indication of this. In the first claim,

experience, or the possibility thereof, is allowed to define the scope of meaningful
statements. In the second claim, experience is secondary to the existence of something
that can be, qualifiedly, verified. The existence of something’s being able to be
experienced is logically and epistemically (and physically for that matter) prior to the
experience of that something and is therefore a non-empirical claim. This is certainly a
drastic shift for a positivist.
Bergmann, however, claims to arrive at his realist thesis in a different manner
than the traditional realists. And it is the limitation of his argument that is relevant for a
critique of naturalism and therefore this project. He says that traditional realists,
“ ...instead of founding existence upon experience, they want to found experience (among
other things) upon existence. To be sure, this is but a bare and crudely formulated schema
of an issue that has been argued for a long time.”119 But didn’t Bergmann say just this
same thing? Later he says, “ ...I shall arrive at this conclusion within the framework of
my own positivistic position.”120

116 Bergmann, The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1954).
117 Ibid., pp. 154-55.
118 Ibid., pp. 156-158. Bergmann talks about reconstructing common sense on terms different from that of
Carnap’s reconstruction. Bergmann does not want to strictly reduce all experience to observation
statements, but he wants to begin “qualities of relations” as a general common sense-based starting point.
119 Ibid., pp. 153-54.
120 Ibid., p. 155.
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We have just cause to be confused. Bergmann is content by the end of his chapter
that he has arrived at a realist thesis, whereon a proposition is verifiable because it is
meaningful, by using the principle that a meaningful proposition is only meaningful
because verifiable. He walks through the exact same arguments as his counterpart
positivists to show why some concepts are meaningless and how others reveal material
objects, although he adds some interesting insights to the positivist position concerning
sensory perception, memory, and intentional states. But where his argument ends up is
still positivistic to the core, in that a meaningful statement is one which is verifiable just
in case it “does something” in an empirical system, even if not directly testable, e.g.,
memory.121 The questionable element of the positivist analysis of linguistically factual
statements with regard to realism is their logical conclusion concerning material objects.
For the positivist, no “real” material object exists, or can meaningfully be said to exist,
and Bergmann acknowledges just this. “Physical Objects are not particulars, not, at least,
according to the view here taken or, as I had better say, not in a sense data
language...physical objects are patterns.”122
A material object is merely “a pattern [of sense data] that is never fully
apprehended.” 123 “As a pattern, a physical object is much more complex than a
symphony, so complex indeed that nobody can, other than in principle, write out its sense

121 Though memory, for Bergmann, is not empirically testable, it is directly perceivable and as such holds
the same status as sensory perception. “I am, in fact, inclined to believe that memory is a direct and
irreducible source of knowledge about the past in exactly the same sense in which perception may be said
to be such a source for knowledge of the present,” (p. 162). However, the reliability of perceptions and
memories relies upon correlation with other minds’ conceptions of them, for which Bergmann only has a
“pattern” of instantiated properties, which we shall examine presently. “.. .for I can with a partially
colorblind man talk about colors beyond his acquaintance in a sense in which I cannot talk with a blind man
about color,” (p. 170).
122 Ibid., p. 163.
123 Ibid., p. 165.
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data score.” 124 But patterns of sense data, if we accept the belief that something other
than ourselves exists, do not produce physical objects, but merely “stuff’ in certain
relations. The sense data received, again, take a pragmatic function within the cognitive
system for whatever goal to which they are attuned. Therefore the fundamental question
as to what our cognitive faculties are attuned arises. As we will see, current scientific
theory, namely evolutionary theory, has a very narrow answer to this question. But, as the
naturalist is confined to the methods and findings of the natural sciences, she might be
bound to the pragmatic fate of the positivist. The positivist typically accepts this logical
conclusion. Bergmann merely redefines ‘realism’ for his purposes. The naturalist needs a
world of material objects to make his realism clear and justified.
Let me quickly clarify what I mean by a “stuff’ ontology in contrast with an
“objects” ontology. A perennial philosophical question concerns whether we can, through
our senses or scientific inquiry, identify the relevant aspects of what constitutes an
‘object’ in distinction from other objects. If we merely rely on our senses, we experience
the world as a seamless conjunction of colors, textures, sounds, and tastes all in relation
to one another in different ways. We are left wondering whether there is something
about, say, this flat, smooth, surface that supports this round, smooth, red circle, that
distinguishes it from the circle. Is there an ‘essence’ of ‘chaimess’ or ‘appleness’?
Science has not indicated that there is such an essence, only relations among data. We are
left with a world full of ‘stuff rather than a world full of ‘objects.’
One aspect of Bergmann’s project is to explicate the “common-sense” notion of
the reality of material objects within the positivist program. He makes the claim (but does
not argue for it), that, “If one’s aim is to reconstruct the common-sense notion of physical
124 Ibid., p. 165.
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object as it refers to walls, chairs, and tables, then one will include a good measure of
spatial and temporal coherence, persistence, and continuity, and, besides the obvious
‘sensory qualities,’ not much else.”

iflC

However, it is precisely (though not exclusively)

the “persistence” conditions that he cannot define within a positivist framework. This is
because the common-sense notion of material objects comes prepackaged with the notion
of certain intrinsic modal properties concerning the conditions on which an object
persists through a length of time. In other words, we generally know what changes an
object can and cannot survive. For example, we know that Gustav was such a thing that
could survive a trip to Africa, but could not survive a trip through a meat grinder. We
must ask if there is any “fact,” then, at all about what Gustav can and cannot survive.
Michael Rea explains further:
Many are willing to accept some indeterminacy in persistence conditions. Thus, for
example, one might think that if we were to annihilate Socrates’s constituent atoms one
by one, there would be no fact about which atom was the one whose annihilation finally
did him in. But accepting this kind of indeterminacy is not the same as accepting the
view that Socrates lacks persistence conditions altogether. I know of no one who would
say that there is no fact about whether Socrates could survive the simultaneous
annihilation of all of his constituent atoms; and, again, similar remarks could be made
with respect to any material object.

Rea’s ultimate point is that we come to acquire these modal beliefs in some way,
but that way is not explicable by any known science. Science specifically identifies
extrinsic properties and how these properties behave and most philosophers of science
eschew essences on this basis. Therefore, for Bergmann, or any salient naturalist, to be
justified in ‘realism’ as here construed, then something must be introduced to the
argument to warrant such a claim. We do not typically want to be left with a “stuff’
ontology. This “problem of material constitution” might plague any significant

125 Ibid., p. 165.
126 Michael Rea, World Without Design, p. 82, emphasis his.
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philosophy of science, but I will not raise it again. I employed it merely as a tool to
highlight the difficulty of any realist thesis.
Though realism is drastic jump for a positivist, it is not supposed to be a jump for
a naturalist at all, for whom realism is supposedly a consistent implication of scientific
methodology. The problem is that the naturalist has not indicated in what sense that
science is compatible with material objects, much less the nature of their relation to the
human mind. Many naturalists still assume material objects and realism without
examining the issues. Wilfrid Sellars, in defending his status as a naturalist, says that
/

naturalism, “...if it does not entail scientific realism, is at least not incompatible with
it.”

127

As we will see in William Ramsey’s argument below, the developments in

evolutionary theory may have provided an interesting door through which realism and
reliabilism might enter, though it is unclear that they provide any help with regard to
material objects.
2.7.2: Justifying Realism
To justify any philosophical position the philosopher may appeal to either logical
necessity or natural science. The case is no different for naturalists concerned to defend a
realist position for science. With logical necessity a conclusion cannot be otherwise
whether the entity or does not exist or whether the event took place or did not take place.
With broadly logical necessity, if a condition is such and such then a conclusion could
not be otherwise that an entity or event is other than the condition necessarily implies.
We are then left with the burden of proving the condition with a reasonable amount of
evidence. Some think that all logical necessity involves tautologies and offers no content
to the effect of telling us with certainty whether something is ‘real’ in the relevant sense.

127 Wilfrid Sellars, Naturalism and Ontology, p. 2.
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This seems to be the case and with this consequence we are relieved of the burden of
certainty. We can therefore believe that some condition or other provides a reasonable
amount of assurance that we are perceiving ‘reality’ rather than some narrower
conception of the world such as what is pragmatic or instrumental.
An example of broadly logical necessity involves the kalam cosmological
argument for the existence of God. It runs as follows:
(1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
(2) The universe began to exist.
(3) Therefore the universe had a cause of its existence.

The argument merely attests to the effect that if the condition is such that the
world had a beginning, then it necessarily had a cause. If it were not the case that
everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence, then the argument does not
work. Since most people intuitively grant (1) we have to question the second premise.
How do we know the world began to exist? Scientific evidences such as the Doppler
effect, the density of background microwave radiation, and others indicate that our world
began from a finite or infinitesimally small point. But this is a contingent scientific
discovery, since it could be the case that the universe is a cyclical universe, expanding
and then collapsing back into a singularity at the end of each cycle, infinitely into the
past. The evidence stands with empirical parity with both theories, though perhaps not
epistemic parity. But there is another broadly logical necessity that is appealed to in the
kalam argument. If it were the case that an actual infinite number of things or events is a
logical impossibility then, since, if the world existed infinitely into the past, any present
state of the world would complete an actually infinite number of moments, the world
could not have existed infinitely. This argument looks like this:
(4) Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite:
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(4.1) An actual infinite cannot exist.
(4.2) An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
(4.3) Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
(5) Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by
successive addition:
(5.1) A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite.
(5.2) The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive
addition.
(5.3) Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite.

The logical consistency of transfinite mathematics makes us question whether our
intuition can indicate that an actual infinite cannot logically exist. But the argument
stands such that, if it were the case that an actual infinite number could not logically be
formed, then the world necessarily had a beginning and then that beginning had an
indeterminate cause.
The point is to show that broadly logical necessity could offer a reason to accept a
realist hypothesis, if such an argument could be constructed. But since these types of
arguments are dependent upon the proof of the truth of the premises, some of which are
intuitive rather than logically necessary, and since they rely on deductive arguments, they
are still too strict of a demand as an account of reasonable knowledge. As we will show
in chapter 4, many of our regularly held beliefs are justified on much lower standards, yet
are still considered rational.
We might then turn to scientific investigation itself to see if anything has been
discovered that would lead us to think that our cognitive faculties are sufficient for the
task of determining whether we perceive reality as it is, or merely as a function of the
scope of our faculties, and therefore pragmatic. Since the major shift of the last hundred
years or so in scientific understanding of cognitive functions is derived from biological
evolution, this is where we shall begin our inquiry. Interestingly, Darwinian evolution
might provide the largest defeater for the thesis that we actually perceive reality the way
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that it is. In fact, in order to hold a realist version of naturalism consistently, the naturalist
must introduce some scientific evidence, in addition to evolution, that would support their
realist claims.

2.7.3: Problem with Realism: Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism
One reason that naturalism might not be compatible with evolution concerns
evolution’s scope of inquiry. At the end of his 1993 work defending a reliabilist
epistemology, Alvin Plantinga offered what he calls the ‘evolutionary argument against
naturalism.’128 Evolution proceeds by the mechanism of natural selection with the sole
scope of protecting and populating individual organisms. If evolution increases human
functioning only in the direction of survival and reproduction, there is no reason to think
that truth, or correspondence with reality, has anything to do with our capacity for reason
or

investigation. In his famous explication of the argument, Alvin Plantinga quotes

Patricia Churchland as an example of why natural selection has the potential to be
problematic with regard to truth:
Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four
F ’s: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems
is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may
survive....Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a
fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism’s
way o f life and enhances the organism’s chances o f survival [Churchland’s emphasis].
Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.’29

Plantinga’s argument goes as follows. For any statement of current evolutionary
theory E, conjoined with the metaphysical naturalistic claim that only “natural objects,
kinds and properties are real,” N, then any subject S has a defeater for the proposition R,

128 Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993b), ch. 12.
129 Patricia Churchland, Journal o f Philosophy 1987, p. 548, cited in Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper
Function, p. 218.
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that “Human cognitive faculties are reliable,” as well as many other rationally held
beliefs.
(6) P(R/N&E) is either low or inscrutable.
(7) If S accepts N&E and (I), she has a rationality defeater for her belief in R.
(8) S has a defeater for all of her beliefs, one of which is N& E.130

Notice that we do not have to be so restrictive as Plantinga’s original account of
naturalism, that it is an ontological statement. We might just as well detail any
contemporary theory of naturalism, all of which adhere to contemporary science for all
legitimate knowledge claims, of which evolutionary theory is a branch. Any substantive
theses, such as ontological restrictions or causal definitions, that result from naturalism
are merely by-products of the central belief in the all-sufficiency of science. This
qualification prevents counter-arguments to the effect that Plantinga’s argument does not
affect all versions of naturalism.
Since no claims can be made to the effect that natural selection produces any
development apart from increasing an organism’s ability to survive and reproduce,
leaving aside any evolutionary foul-ups that might have occurred of which we could have
no knowledge, and since “truth claims” make up no specific part of survival and
reproduction, as emphasized in Churchland’s quote, then any theory of cognition based
upon evolutionary development is entirely unfounded. And so if our cognitive faculties
developed by evolution, we are lead to question our ability to cognize ‘truths’ at all. Jerry
Fodor responds, ‘Talk about biting the hand that feeds you!”131
Even if it were possible to know the structure of natural selection, that it was
tailored to its two specific goals, then it would not be possible, or rational, to make

130 James Beilby, Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002) p. vii.
131 Jerry Fodor, “Is Science Biologically Possible?”in Naturalism Defeated? p. 31.
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knowledge claims beyond the scope of survival and reproduction. In this case, evolution
would at least be at odds with scientific realism.
D efense o f N aturalism : R a m se y's E volutionary A rgum ent A gainst P la n tin g a ’s E volutionary
A rg u m en t

William Ramsey responds to Plantinga by defending what he calls “evolutionary
reliabilism,” which is the thesis that “natural selection tends to favor reliable beliefproducing mechanisms.” 132 Obviously, if his defense is successful, Plantinga’s argument
will not work. Ramsey begins by claiming that truth is a relational property between the
content of a belief and a state of affairs. This qualification alone, he argues, makes it
doubtful whether truth-values are relevant to adaptive behavior.
...a beliefs truth-value does not supervene on the beliefs intrinsic/neurophysiological
properties; truthfulness can vary while the neurophysiological properties remain the
same. Hence, a beliefs truth value, though partly dependent upon what is going on
inside the head, is not reducible to neurological matters.

However, while he notes that truth-values are irreducible to mental properties,
Ramsey quickly points out that truth-values are certainly “causally salient” to adaptive
behavior. Though truth-values take on a “non-supervenient” relation to “intrinsic
physical features,” in that they are not reducible to physical features, they are similar to
other non-supervenient attributes such as camouflage, which is causally salient for
adaptation. He argues that truth and reliability are exactly the needed causal structures for
the success of adaptive behaviors.
Suppose we have ten creatures competing for a scarce resource such as food, and
suppose that only one of the creatures (Bob) possesses accurate beliefs concerning the
whereabouts of the food. If all we want is an explanation of Bob’s immediate motor
behavior, then we needn’t appeal to the truth or falsehood of any of his beliefs. But if we
want to know why Bob’s behavior proves successful while his cohorts die out, then it
clearly does matter that his behavior is generated by true beliefs.

Ramsey continues:

132 William Ramsey, “Naturalism Defended,” in Naturalism Defeated? p. 16.
133 Ibid., p. 18.
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So the naturalist has a very plausible and compelling account of the relation between
beliefs and behavior which makes truth (1) a causally relevant feature of beliefs and (2)
causally relevant in a way that enhances reproductive fitness. ..,[E]voIutionary
reliabilism claims that cognitive mechanisms come to be adaptive, in part, by generating
desires that correspond with reproductive fitness (e.g., a desire to reproduce, a desire to
stay alive, etc.) and accurate representations that enable the organism to get around and
satisfy those desires. On this view, the truthfulness of our beliefs actually helps explain
their adaptiveness. 134

Ramsey is showing that even if our cognitive faculties are reliable in the narrow,
pragmatic scope o f avoiding predators and reproducing, then we are warranted in
believing that our cognitive faculties are sufficient for whatever task to which we put
them, or at least warranted in believing that they are reliable more-often-than-not.
Plantinga attempted to preemptively deal with this issue, offering examples of erroneous
beliefs that would still produce adaptive behaviors. It is not necessary to reproduce these
examples, for I agree with Ramsey that they are merely specific instances of cognitive
failure, with which no naturalist would disagree, and that in order to be convincing,
Plantinga would need to produce systematic examples, whereon it would be the case that
systematic reliability were implausible. Since it seems that Ramsey is correct in
concluding that a creature would have to have cognitive faculties that were, at the very
least, accurate more-often-than-not in order to make decisions that increase survival and
reproduction, Plantinga’s argument is in danger.
We might turn to a definition of truth and attempt to make the logical distinction
between a ‘true’ belief and one that is ‘useful’ within the scope of a system designed for
only two specific functions. But, as we have seen, such logical reductions are too strict a
requirement on belief-forming structures. We must at least have the room to be warranted
by certain evidence to make certain assumptions in given situations, where we have
reason to believe these assumptions have proven accurate or useful or whatever, in the
134 Ibid., pp. 18-19, emphasis his.
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past, and still be considered rational. In this case we have to show that Ramsey’s
argument fails outright, in order to preserve Plantinga’s initial claim. Ramsey’s
argument, schematized, would look something like:
(9) Beliefs can be causally relevant for behavior.
(10) Behavior must respond accurately to the environment more-often-than-not, to be
adaptive.
(11) Therefore, beliefs, when they direct behavior, must be reliable more-often-than-not
to be selected for.
(12) Therefore, natural selection must produce beliefs that are reliable more-often-thannot.

If this argument proves an adequate defeater of Plantinga’s argument, then the
naturalist is warranted in holding that most of her beliefs are reliable more often than not,
and has a scientific justification for epistemic warrant. If there is a scientific justification
for epistemic warrant, then the argument that naturalism is unjustified as analytic thesis
will not be damaged in its entirety, since justification for its claims are what is at stake,
and a realist thesis concerning science still may be unable to justify claims concerning all
legitimate methods of inquiry. But justification for epistemic warrant for a realist view of
science will certainly strengthen science’s status as a basic belief for naturalism in
chapter 4. As I made explicit in the section on empiricism, if a philosopher wishes to
justify claims of science concerning the real world, as opposed to some constructivism,
she must provide an adequate explanation. Richard Boyd actually adds this very thesis to
his defense of realism:
(13) Suppose some principle of scientific methodology contributes to the reliability of
that methodology in the following minimal sense: that its operation contributes to the
likelihood that the observational consequences of the accepted scientific theories will be
(at least approximately) true. Then it is the business of scientific epistemology to explain
the reliability of that principle.135

135 Richard Boyd, “Realism, Underdetermination, and a Causal Theory of Evidence,” Nous, 1973, p. 3,
emphasis his.
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Ramsey’s argument seems to be an example of (13). The question is, can
evolution explain the thesis that an animal X perceives the world accurately, or truthfully,
given the conditions necessary for natural selection to take place?
Plantinga argues that the central concern of this argument is whether the content
of the belief enters into the causal chain leading toward or away from adaptation. If the
content does enter into the equation then we have a reason to think that adaptive
behaviors are largely true. If they do not, then we have no idea whether ‘truth’ is being
obtained or not. Plantinga explains:
Natural selection, of course, operates on behavior in a broad sense; it rewards behavior
that enhanced fitness and punishes behavior that does not. Thus it shapes behavior in the
direction of greater fitness. In so doing it also shapes the sorts of structures that generate
behavior in the direction of greater fitness, greater adaptiveness. Now if content did
enter the causal chain that leads to behavior— and if true belief caused adaptive behavior
(and false belief maladaptive behavior)—then natural selection, by rewarding and
punishing adaptive and maladaptive behavior respectively, could shape the mechanisms
that produce belief in the direction of greater reliability. There could then be selection
pressure for true belief and for reliable belief-producing mechanisms.136

Ramsey’s argument against Plantinga begins with the fact that it is not
unreasonable to think that a non-supervenient trait (like belief states) could influence
behavioral adaptation. The problem is obviously that we have no empirical idea as to
whether and when the content of a belief enters into the selection process. On Ramsey’s
qualification, content is a non-supervenient factor in belief formation, but it is also
irreducible to directly accessible physical structures such as neurophysiological
properties, so that belief content does not directly figure into selection.
But under the hypothesis in question, the content of a belief, as opposed to its
neurophysiological properties, does not enter into the causal chain leading to behavior.
And then it is not the case that a belief produces adaptive behavior by way of being true,
or maladaptive behavior by being false. So natural selection can’t, directly, at any rate,
mold belief-producing mechanisms in the direction of the production of reliability by
rewarding adaptive behavior and penalizing maladaptive behavior.137

136 Plantinga, “Response to Ramsey,” in Naturalism Defeated? p. 257, emphasis his.
137 Ibid., pp. 257-58.
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Whether belief content can be introduced into the selection process is certainly a
philosophical question that the naturalist, in virtue of his strict commitment to the natural
sciences as prior to philosophy must leave aside. But the argument does not end there.
The naturalist may still claim that, given the argument that mostly false beliefs
concerning the world of predators and mates could not reasonably prove effective for
selection, then he is warranted in holding that natural selection produces truth-producing
cognitive mechanisms more often than not.
This highlights the reason that the question of content is so important to the
argument. A creature may not act on a belief at all; it may simply react to an
environmental pressure without a belief concerning that pressure ever coming into play,
just as with classical or operant conditioning. Here we must separate reliable beliefforming processes from truth-approximating belief-forming processes. If it just so
happens that a creature was predisposed to moving a certain way when it perceived a
threat (whether or not this perception is accurate), and this movement proved successful
in avoiding certain attacks, then belief concerning a threat did not play a significant role
in the species’ survival. This merely pushes the question back. If and when an evolved
creature forms beliefs, she does so on the basis of her perception. And for her beliefs to
determine a course of action, those beliefs have to be in accord with a perception that has
proven reliable for certain actions more often than not.
However, the concern for content comes into play when we question exactly for
what it is that the perception is reliable. If the perception is merely reliable for increasing
the organism’s ability to find a suitable mate, the question of the perception’s truth
cannot enter the equation, at least not in a correspondence sense. If the perception is
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‘reliable’ for avoiding predators, this does not equal reliable for indicating truth. The
belief goes in, whatever it may be, the behavior comes out, and coherence is determined,
but correspondence remains left out. As long as this connection remains unattended, there
is no guarantee (1) that beliefs enter into selective equations, or (2) that beliefs, if they do
enter in, are selected on the basis of their truth, as opposed to pragmatic reliability.
The separation of reliability from truth makes it plausible that Ramsey can be
correct in claiming that we are warranted in holding evolutionary reliabilism while
remaining consistent Plantinga’s argument. Actually, this is not entirely correct.
Plantinga’s argument as formulated here only specifies reliability in general, and we may
assume, in toto. But Plantinga specifically indicates that his concern is with reliable truthapproximating cognitive faculties. And it is easy to see the breadth of the difference.
Therefore, Ramsey could identify our cognitive faculties as reliable for producing ‘truth’approximating beliefs, where ‘truth’ is defined-in the narrow sense of ‘reliable for a
specific purpose,’ that is useful for survival and reproduction. But he certainly cannot
imply ‘truth’ in the wider scope of an faculty’s producing true representational beliefs
and then extrapolate the content of these beliefs to the wider environment. This is the
explication of the point that Churchland was attempting to emphasize in the earlier quote.
William Hasker, an avid anti-naturalist, claims that Plantinga’s attack on
naturalism is unsuccessful.

He says that it offers what has been called a ‘Skeptical

Threat.’ The Skeptical Threat argument attempts to show that a logical implication of a
theory is that we can have no knowledge at all, and are thus left with skepticism. Hasker
says that Skeptical Threat arguments are unconvincing primarily because of the “G. E.

138 William Hasker, “What About a Sensible Naturalism? A Response to Victor Reppert,” Philosophia
Christi, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2003, pp. 53-62.
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Moore Shift,” which says, “If you present me with an elaborate argument which has as its
conclusion that all of my faculties are unreliable and all of my beliefs are unjustified, I
ask myself whether I am more certain that your argument is sound than I am than its
110
conclusion is false.” ' This is probably the most gut-level explanation for most reactions
to Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. But it should not really be that
hard to swallow. Plantinga is not arguing that evolution is false. He is not arguing that we
have no true knowledge about the world. He is not an anti-realist about science. He is
merely arguing that within a purely scientific understanding of the world, which takes
evolution as its base explanation of cognitive development, no claims of truth acquisition
can be made. Something must be added to the scheme to make realism and truth-values
available.
And so, without adding an additional component, which, given the state of current
scientific theory, would have to be metaphysical, the naturalist has trouble combining a
commitment to evolution and acceptance of realism. But one might say this is “true, but
trivial,” since we can have a ‘useful’ knowledge of our surroundings. The problem with
such a statement is that we hold, in everyday usage, a higher weight to true statements, as
opposed to merely useful ones. And we claim that a true statement is more legitimate,
and deserving of credence, than a merely useful one.
Consider two brief examples. The first is from logic and the second is from
evolutionary biology’s explanation of altruism. When we say that a logical truth is
necessarily true, we do not mean that its truth-value is a by-product of evolutionary
development in the sense that it could have been otherwise, if conditions and natural
selection had taken a different course. Rather, we say that it is true regardless of what
139 Hasker, p. 60.
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type of development even possibly occurs. Even our definition of what circumstances
could possibly have arisen is grounded in our definition of what is logically possible, and
therefore what necessarily could not have happened. Someone might object that logical
statements themselves are trivial, and therefore the example fails to identify a significant
development outside of evolution that would be relevant. But logical ‘truisms’ are the
ground of all rational thought and discourse. Without them identity statement would be
meaningless and we could not determine a contradiction from a necessity. We might try,
along with a recent author,140 to derive logical truths from the mechanism of evolution,
by way of utilitarian economic models, but we would find ourselves trapped in a vicious
circle applying necessary logical truths to models in order to determine the contingent
truth of logical necessity. And there is no possible explanation as to why certain logical
laws cannot be broken. This is certainly a throwback to the Millian project of
determining logic empirically. But nothing empirical indicates to us the implication that
no possible state of affairs could produce the consistency of a logical contradiction. So
logical truths are a strangely defiant system that challenges the development of cognitive
functions by way of natural selection.
Also, the concept of altruism is a constant problematic for evolutionary theory. In
most cases altruism lessens the ability of an organism to survive, since it places the needs
of another, which are specifically survival, food, and offspring, above his own. In
determining when to sacrifice personal needs, we might say that the creature is
employing some form of objective utilitarianism with an innate knowledge of
teleological consequences that will turn out better in the long run. But this is merely

140 Cf. William S. Cooper, The Evolution o f Reason: Logic As A Branch o f Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004).
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speculation. Basic evolutionary theory is a defeater for the rationality of altruistic
behavior. The implications of this are so specific that evolutionary psychologist Herbert
Simon claims that any behavior directed by beliefs or reactions associated with altruism
are actually “bounded rationality,” and exhibit a malfunction in evolutionary
development.141
If we ask what makes someone like Mother Theresa act in the role that she did,
Simon’s answer is the combination of “docility” and “bounded rationality”:
Docile persons tend to learn and believe what they perceive others in the society want
them to learn and believe. Thus the content of what is learned will not be fully screened
for its contribution to personal fitness (p. 1666).
Because of bounded rationality, the docile individual will often be unable to distinguish
socially prescribed behavior that contributes to fitness from altruistic behavior. In fact,
docility will reduce the inclination to evaluate independently the contributions of
behavior to fitness
By virtue of bounded rationality, the docile person cannot acquire
the personally advantageous learning that provides the increment, d, of fitness without
acquiring also the altruistic behaviors that cost the decrement, c. (p. 1667).

The problem is, of course, that we do not, on the whole, recognize Mother
Theresa’s work as irrational or cognitively defective, even if we are not just being nice
because she is a “good person.” We actually call her morally praiseworthy. Plantinga
explains the implications of Simon’s theory:
The idea is that a Mother Teresa or a Thomas Aquinas displays bounded rationality; they
are unable to distinguish socially prescribed behavior that contributes to fitness from
altruistic behavior (socially prescribed behavior which does not). As a result, they fail to
acquire the personally advantageous learning that provides that increment d of fitness
without, sadly enough, suffering that decrement c exacted by altruistic behavior. They
acquiesce unthinkingly in what society tells them is the right way to behave; and they
aren't quite up to making their own independent evaluation of the likely bearing of such
behavior on the fate of their genes. If they did make such an independent evaluation (and
were rational enough to avoid silly mistakes) they would presumably see that this sort of
behavior does not contribute to personal fitness, drop it like a hot potato, and get right to
work on their expected number of progeny.142

141 Herbert Simon, “A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism,” Science 250 (December,
1990) pp. I665ff.
142 Alvin Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism, P t;l,” Origins & Design, 18:1, May 1997, p. 3.

The implications are actually quite far fetched. If we decided to alter our
perspective and become the most efficient Darwinian we could be we would regard any
behavior that did not act in an efficiently naturally selective manner as irrational and
encourage people to alter their behavior, even if their cognitive faculties convinced them
of something different. We would decry homosexuality, altruism, charity, voluntary
military service, and many others as cognitively deficient, bounded rationality and
encourage people to maximize their evolutionary potential. This is not to say that there
could not be long range, objectively utilitarian outcomes from these behaviors, but that,
for the most part, they would be localized and not widely acceptable as rational.
Let me review why this argument is important for our project as a whole. If it
were the case that scientific findings could substantiate a realist perspective on the world,
then a naturalist would be warranted in holding realism concerning natural objects. But if
science could not substantiate such a perspective, then naturalism would not be tied to
realism in any way significant enough to warrant the rejection of naturalism. The
naturalist, upon finding no sufficient warrant for a realist perspective among scientific
theories, could simply continue her strict adherence to science as the only legitimate
method of knowledge, but claim a much narrower, or more restricted, definition for what
is considered, non-classically, knowledge, or at least, contemporary scientific knowledge.
However, since the majority of naturalists desire a realist justification for what they
perceive as the effects of the scientific program, a defeater for naturalistic realism is a
significant, if not damning, threat. Plantinga’s argument is a threat of that nature since, if
correct, the naturalist has a defeater for the truth-values of all beliefs, especially those
concerning relations among objects within the world.
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2.8: Naturalism and Theism
2.8.1: Intro
Many popular and academic works of philosophy claim that a major tenet of
naturalism involves an explicit rejection of God, especially Christian theism. However,
there are those who accept the possibility that theism and naturalism are compatible.
While it is true that most philosophers do not accept theism and some even state that their
naturalism precludes the existence of God, the central issue that seems to unite naturalists
concerning religion is not the postulate of a God specifically, but the rejection of
supernatural causation. The reason many Christian philosophers think of naturalism as an
explicit rejection of God is that their theism is tied to the notion that God interacts in the
physical world.
Sterling Lamprecht, in his Metaphysics o f Naturalism,143 describes a theory
whereon religion and naturalism are compatible. But upon reading his description, one
quickly realizes that it absolutely precludes any supernatural beings from enacting
physical effects from some concept of nonphysical causation. Clearly many theists will
be turned off by such a notion, and will continue to characterize naturalism as strictly
atheistic. It should be noted, however, that naturalism does not strictly preclude
‘supematuralism’ in the sense of the existence of a god. It merely states that even if there
are such realities, they are unknowable by any legitimate methods; they do not act
causally in the physical realm, and are therefore irrelevant to any serious inquiry into the
world.
Michael Ruse, a naturalist and non-Christian, attempts to bring naturalism within
the purview of religion by qualifying certain claims of both parties. In his book, Can a

143 Sterling Lamprecht, The Metaphysics o f Naturalism, chapter 12.
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Darwinian Be a Christian?,144 Ruse attempts to show the ways in which Christians and
evolutionists ‘talk past’ each other, because of a misunderstanding of the issues. There is
nothing specific within evolution that denies the tenets of classical Christianity. The only
thing that a Christian might have to release is a literal reading of Genesis chapters 1 and
2. Several Christian philosophers, including notoriously Richard Swinburne,145 find no
discontinuity between evolution and miracles, making the specific question of evolution
and Christianity irrelevant. But where Christianity and science conflict, Ruse rightly
points out, is on the question of nonphysical interactionism. The reason Christianity and
evolution can feasibly get along is that everything that has been specified as religious in
nature could have been “programmed” into the created “system” with no need for
miracles. This does not constitute an apologetic for Christianity but Ruse thinks it gives
the Christian a reasonable position that is continuous with the best available science.
C. S. Lewis, in the 1940s, adeptly picks up on this subtle element. He claims that
naturalists are philosophers who claim that, “nothing exists except Nature,” roughly
reducing naturalism to physicalism. Since it is physicalism that constitutes the rejection
of nonphysical causation for the causation ‘given’ in nature, he takes careful steps to
define “Nature”:
In all the examples Nature means what happens ‘of itself or ‘of its own accord’: what
you do not need to labour for; what you will get if you take no measures to stop it. The
Greek word for Nature (Physis) is connected with the Greek verb for ‘to grow’; Latin
Natura, with the verb ‘to be born’. The Natural is what springs up, or comes forth, or
arrives, or goes on, o f its own accord: the given, what is there already: the spontaneous,
the unintended, the unsolicited.
What the Naturalist believes is that the ultimate Fact, the thing you can’t go
behind, is a vast process in space and time which is going on o f its own accord.™6

144 Michael Ruse, Can a Darwinian Be a Christian? (New York: Oxford University Press: ).
145 Cf. almost any work by Swinburne, Peter Forrest, or Howard J. Van Til.
146 C. S. Lewis, Miracles, p. 7-8, italics his.
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With this depiction of a major tenet of contemporary naturalism, Lewis can
explain the relationship of theism and naturalism that follows from it:
The difference between Naturalism and Supernaturalism is not exactly the same as the
difference between belief in a God and disbelief. Naturalism, without ceasing to be
itself, could admit a certain kind of God. The great interlocking event called Nature
might be such as to produce at some stage a great cosmic consciousness, an indwelling
‘God’ arising from the whole process as human mind arises (according to the
Naturalists) from human organisms. A Naturalist would not object to that sort of God.
The reason is this. Such a God would not stand outside Nature or the total system, would
not be existing ‘on his own’.147

The main point that Lewis is making is that there is no necessary incompatibility
of theism and naturalism, as long as you hold to a god or other religious objects that are
part of the natural order of things. It must be something not causally separated from the
natural processes with which we are familiar. Lewis’s God does not fit this description
and he goes on to defend the coherence of miracles as the introduction of events into a
created system of an unimpeachable lawful structure that acts upon whatever is
introduced into it but cannot explain the circumstances of the introduction. Such a God, it
seems, all naturalists must reject.
2.8.2: Naturalism and Theism in Contemporary Use
It is important for a robust critique of naturalism to understand that naturalism
does not preclude theism absolutely, but it does preclude any supernatural interference in
what is termed the ‘causally closed’ system of the natural universe. Therefore, any theism
that is necessarily linked to claims of miraculous intervention is indeed excluded from
naturalism.
It should also be noted that even some of those who reject certain tenets of
naturalism and seemingly fall outside the scope of naturalism are not necessarily
supematuralists. There is at least one other option, though it is not entirely clear that it is

147 Ibid., p. 11.
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coherent. Some philosophers, such as Frederick Olafson claim that the natural sciences
cannot account for the ‘presence’ involved in perception.148 He extends his notion of
presence to an explanation of the role linguistic structures play in the system of inquiry.
For Olafson, phenomenological experience that includes ‘presence’ is undetectable by
scientific theories, since science, he says, can only detect objects and not states of affairs.
If this is the case, then science cannot determine the reason for the truth-value of the
relation of two empirical objects, and cannot, therefore, be a realist program in any
logically possible sense. Whether Olafson’s position is coherent, he certainly falls outside
of the naturalist camp. He describes himself as holding a ‘natural attitude’ exemplified by
nontheistic philosophers before the 19th century. This is not a dualist position, but
arguably not a materialist theory either, given his acceptance of entities not detectable by
science. But he does hold that all entities are available to us within the world
phenomenologically, though not scientifically. Whereas not all antinaturalist positions are
theistic, they are not completely devoid of naturalistic tendencies either. But, for the most
part, within Anglo-American philosophy, if a position is scientifically based, whether
naturalist or not, it tends to be atheistic.
An interesting phenomenon of this discussion is the way in which some theists
hold their theism as compatible with science. Peter Forrest, for example, claims that he is
a theist who defends a personal deity who cares for his creation, but at the same time he
holds that his view is neither naturalistic nor supematuralistic. He claims that, as he
construes them, naturalism and supematuralism are not contradictories but merely
contraries and that anti-supematuralism is really the contradictory of supematuralism.
But consider the way he construes the terms of the debate.
148 Olafson, Naturalism and the Human Condition, ch. 3.
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For every research program, there exist criteria for determining what counts for
evidence and how that evidence counts as explanation. Forrest says that, “The idea for
naturalists is to provide explanations that satisfy two constraints: (i) no entities are
posited unless well-confirmed scientific theories provide a precedent for them; and (ii) no
well-confirmed law of nature is violated.”149 Now, contrast this with his criteria for
supematuralists and anti-supematuralists, respectively (using my own numbering):
Supernaturalists... resort, in their explanations, to either or both of
(iii) entities for which nether the familiar entities around us nor those mentioned in the
natural sciences establish a precedent; and
(iv) violations of laws of nature.
[For anti-supematuralists:] ...all explanations [are] in terms of entities that
(v) have a precedent in either the ones we are familiar with or the novel kinds posited by
the sciences; and
(vi) operate without violating the laws of nature that scientists have discovered.150

On these criteria alone, it seems absurd not to consider Forrest a naturalist. The
definitions of (i) and (ii) are almost identical to those of (v) and (vi), except for the caveat
“or the novel kinds posited by the sciences” which we seem to have no reason to doubt
the non-reductive naturalist would accept wholeheartedly. Forrest expresses doubt,
legitimately I think, that Christianity is compatible with this view, but maintains that this
is the absolute starting place for a rational theism. The question here, then, is what type of
God is compatible with naturalistic theism? Forrest says that the,
...theocentric understanding of things...requires a God who is personal and who also has
sufficient power to create the physical universe with the characteristics it has. Again,
God must have sufficient knowledge to create. Beyond saying that God is personal,
sufficiently powerful, and sufficiently knowing, I have little need to specify the divine
characteristics. Thus I am not committed to the classical doctrines of the necessity,
eternity, and simplicity of God.151

The interesting thing is that, for Forrest, after the structure of the universe is
designed, it is unclear that this God can be ‘caring’ in the way that he wants, without a
149 Peter Forrest, God Without the Supernatural (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996) p. 3, emphasis
his.
150 Ibid., p. 3.
151 Ibid., p. 9.
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predetermined sort of caring, ‘built-in’ to the system through evolution. But this means
that, though God is personal, he is personally innocuous after the creation of the world.
Apart from justifying the existence of a God, the question that concerns us is, why try to
justify a God that is necessarily innocuous? In Forrest’s account we have a unique
version of deism that translates into a contemporary epistemological naturalism, which
says that science is neutral with regard to the existence of God and that God is not
introduced into the discovering of phenomena but that he might be introduced as a kind
of unmoved mover to get the whole thing off the ground. The obvious implication is the
paucity of interaction between this God and humanity. There is necessarily no prayer
(supplication or intercessory), no healing (no miracles of any kind), no revelation (or
inspiration or divine commands), not really much of anything ‘religious’ outside of a kind
of humanistic-everything-happens-for-the-best optimism. Although Forrest does seem to
hold some version of a resurrection, how this or its necessity is made known to him is
unclear, and without a Christ-figure to justify or necessitate it, the situation looks less
than hopeful.
The reason Forrest posits such a God becomes clear as he continues. He says that,
while science can provide all the answers to how the universe works and what exists
within it, thereby eliminating a god-of-the-gaps theology, it is unable to answer questions
of value or satisfy the curiosity of uniquely rational capacities. God allows the
introduction of value and rationality, through the fact that his existence would have to be
necessary and the standards of his character absolute. This guarantees a moral realism
and the human capacity to grasp it. Therefore, that God exists is enough to establish
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everything he wants to establish. Interestingly, this sounds very much like the ‘religious
naturalism’ I will examine in the next chapter.
It is clear that Forrest’s aim is to make theism approachable for those who have a
strong belief in natural science and hold a theory of truth for which science is the best
indicator. But far from justifying antisupematuralism against supernatural occurrences,
Forrest sets up conditions for the understanding that a miracle has taken place. Let me
explain.
Many arguments against miracles take the form of causal closure arguments, as
explained in the section on physicalism. In addition, some naturalists claim that the
following insights add warrant to the belief against miracles:152
(vii) You have to begin from what you know.
(viii) There are no identifiable things outside natural things.
(ix) There are no identifiable forces outside natural forces.
(x) If we feel there are things in the universe like ‘grace’ or ‘createdness,’ then they must
be revealed rather than discovered.

Without getting into the details of presuppositions concerning what it is to
“know” or how, and disregarding the attempt to define “identifiable,” we will merely
accept them as they are traditionally considered within moderate empiricism and accept
them as possessing some sort of relevantly determined notions. Many would question
(viii), given that ‘religious experience’ is a type of experience that has the property of
revealing something to exist outside natural things. But for now we may allow the
naturalist stipulation to apply. We cannot say all ‘detectable’ things since that would
leave put some normal scientific entities, and we cannot say ‘experiencable’ things, since
that would place us back in the last sentence. The reason that Forrest’s conception, and
152 Thanks to Albert Borgmann of the University of Montana for pointing these out'
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any naturalist’s conception of physicalism for that matter, gives us the conditions for
understanding a miracle, are the same as they give for their description of natural laws.
We first have to have a grasp of regularity and law-like behavior of a system before we
are even able to detect an anomaly. Richard Dawkins writes that, “If a marble statue of
the Virgin Mary suddenly waved its hand at us we should treat it as a miracle, because all
153

our experience and knowledge tells us that marble doesn’t behave like th a t”

An

anomaly, of course, without context, is absolutely uninterpretable. Dawkins goes on to
say that the coincidence of his saying, ‘May I be struck by lightning’ and the occurrence
of being struck by lightning would be considered a miracle. “The only thing miraculous
about my hypothetical story is the coincidence between my being struck by lightning and
my verbal invocation of the disaster.” 154 So what Forrest does, and what every naturalist
does inadvertently, is provide the necessary conditions on which their naturalism can be
overturned, and a normal common-sense, even scientific process for determining the truth
of the matter, if a miracle is suspected. C. S. Lewis gives a lively analogy to this situation
in a short article called “Religion and Science.” When speaking to a friend Lewis asked,
‘Suppose you put sixpence into a drawer today, and sixpence into the same drawer
tomorrow. Do the laws of arithmetic make it certain that you’ll find a shilling’s worth
the day after?’
‘O f course,’ said he, ‘provided no one’s been tampering with your drawer.’
‘Ah, but that’s the whole point,’ said I. ‘The laws of arithmetic can tell you what you’ll
find, with absolute certainty, provided that there’s no interference. If a thief has been at
the drawer of course you’ll get a different result. But the thief won’t have broken the
laws o f arithmetic—only the laws o f England.’155

It should be clear by now that naturalism is not reducible to, or identifiable with,
atheism. Neither does naturalism give direct support to atheism. On the contrary, a

153 Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York: Norton, 1986) p. 159, emphasis mine.
154 Ibid.
155 C. S. Lewis, “Religion and Science,” in God in the Dock (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1970) p. 73.
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naturalistic understanding of the world provides all the conditions necessary for the
possibility of naturalism’s falsity. This accords with the open-ended nature of scientific
progress and the naturalist’s willingness to follow science wherever it may lead. The
question that will arise in chapter 5 is whether there are any good reasons to reject
naturalism based on the evidence from science itself.
2.8.3: Conclusion to Chapter 2
If naturalism were reducible to any position it would most likely be scientism—
which claims that, “on the one hand, the goals of scientific inquiry include the discovery
of objective empirical truths; and, on the other hand, that science has come pretty close to
achieving this goal at least from time to time.”156 This allows it to be consistent with its
adherence to science as a successful method of inquiry while preventing it from falling by
the way if science ever discovers anything contrary to one of the above positions covered
in this chapter. But even this would not be Science—unified, whole, complete— since it is
not data or methods that tell us anything about our world, but scientists. Therefore, the
scientific worldview in question would be more scientism than science. The question
would then be: on what grounds is science justified in telling us the truth of reality, and
how far does this justification go toward supporting a worldview? Specifically does it go
toward supporting naturalism’s central claim that science is the only legitimate method of
inquiry? Over the next two chapters I will examine some major formulations of
naturalism and argue that naturalism cannot survive characterization as a philosophical
thesis.

156 Jerry Fodor, “Is Science Biologically Possible?” in Bielby, ed., Naturalism Defeated?, p. 30.
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If necessities of thought force us to allow any one thing any degree of independence
from the Total System— if any one thing makes good a claim to be on its own, to be
something more than an expression of the character of Nature as a whole—then we have
abandoned Naturalism.
(C. S. Lewis, Miracles, 1947)

Chapter 3: Contemporary Characterizations of Naturalism
3.1: Varieties o f Naturalism
I will construe ‘strict analytic thesis’ to mean any theory defined primarily in
terms of a deductive or narrowly inductive argument intended to justify it. By narrowly
inductive I mean an argument consisting of a type of evidence that is widely accepted
construed in such a way that offers probabilistic support to a conclusion based on that
evidence. Narrow induction is closer than broad epistemic warrant to what scientists use
in inferring results from empirical data. An analytic thesis is consistent only if its basic
tenets and the implications that follow from them do not conflict with one another or with
the justification of the thesis itself. Such a thesis is viable just in case it is not trivial, that
is, if it offers something useful or significant to philosophical or scientific understanding
or methodology. Naturalism faces a problem if construed as such a thesis because it relies
upon the findings and methods of science and not a foundation that could not be
overturned by science. Michael Rea explains:
As I see it, the problem lies in the fact that (a) those who call themselves naturalists are
united at least in part by methodological dispositions that preclude allegiance to views
that cannot be called into question by further developments in science, but (b) no one
seems to think that developments in science could force someone to reject naturalism.157

The problem here is that the conjunction of (a) and (b) seems to be a
contradiction. If naturalists cannot hold views that cannot be called into question by
science, yet naturalism cannot be called into question by science, then a philosopher
cannot hold naturalism. But it does not seem that contemporary naturalists necessarily

157 Michael Rea, World Without Design, p. 52.
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hold (b). Just as naturalists regard physicalism as contingent based on the findings of
science, it seems they hold that naturalism could as well. The only time a naturalist would
have a problem with this contradiction is if she claimed that her naturalistic position was
justified by the hypothetically completed natural sciences, implying that there is at least
one philosophical position guaranteed by science, which science can never overturn. In
this case she would be making a universal claim about the scope of science, which few
scientists are willing to do. But more reasonable naturalists do not have a problem
claiming that contemporary science warrants the belief that science is the only legitimate
method of inquiry. Though circular, the claim is self-defeating only if the naturalist
cannot provide a scientific reason for allowing only the knowledge claims of science to
be considered legitimate. If the naturalist claims to be broadly inductively warranted in
the assertion, rather than narrowly inductively warranted, then plausibility goes up.
The naturalist needs to show that science warrants belief in its own absolute
epistemological efficacy. Because naturalists must own up to some sort of justification in
order to compel rational assent they face a dilemma: (1) Accept the consequences of a
thesis that might be unwarranted (either broadly or narrowly) by science, by appealing to
science, or (2) concede that naturalism itself is contingent upon the findings of science. If
a naturalist cannot justify his claims on a scientific finding or method, then (1) is selfdefeating. Nothing scientific would substantiate naturalists’ claim. (2) seems to be just
what the naturalist wants but is relatively innocuous, since it is tautologous with the
process of science. But many philosophical positions accept the process of science, even
those contrary to naturalism. This means that (2) would not be an option that is
identifiably naturalism.
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Naturalism holds the scientific method in the highest regard and it seems
ridiculous to think that science could overthrow adherence to naturalism without also
overthrowing itself.

1

The problem hides in the nature of the naturalist’s claims. If the

central claim (that science is the only legitimate method of obtaining knowledge) is
unjustifiable by any known scientific method, finding, or reasoning, then naturalism is
devoid of support as a thesis. If the claims are a recapitulation of the success of scientific
methods, then naturalists are merely philosophers making claims consistent with
scientific findings. In this case the naturalist is not exemplifying tendencies different
from positions contrary to naturalism, thereby gutting naturalism of viability. In a strict
sense, if the naturalist were merely recapitulating the claims and methods of science, and
making claims that these then led to belief in naturalism, then the naturalist would have to
define the epistemic value of science to a degree commonly rejected in contemporary
epistemology. This would, of course, place science in the uneasy guise of epistemic
authoritarian, subject to overthrow with new epistemic data. But since part of the success
of the the methods and findings of science is that they can never overthrow the methods
and findings of science, then naturalism, construed this way, is vacuous. It just means the
same thing as the process of scientific inquiry, and therefore cannot justify normative
claims concerning the sufficiency of science for epistemic roles. These are the only two
options that I see are available to a philosopher with naturalistic tendencies. The question
that will be asked at the end of this chapter and in the next is whether the naturalist is
warranted in a significant way in holding science as the only legitimate source of
knowledge.

158 Michael Rea, p. 52.
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Naturalism has been given more than a dozen qualifiers in order to make it an
intelligible position or goal: global, local, strong, weak, linguistic, conceptual, scientific,
dialectic, theological; not to mention the six that I will identify. Sometimes these
qualifications have been stacked on top of one another, as in “methodological
epistemological naturalism.” And as if the sheer number of qualifiers wasn’t enough to
confuse the best in the field, the terms themselves are not consistent from one
philosopher to the next. What Alvin Plantinga calls ‘ontolgical naturalism’ is arguably
not specifically naturalistic, since he claims that it only refers to ‘provisional atheism’ or
‘materialism.’ Robert Pennock claims that when Philip Johnson uses the term ‘scientific
naturalism,’ he is “really” referring to ‘methodological naturalism.’ In spite of all of this,
we are able to get the gist of what is going on so long as philosophers clarify their terms.
Sometimes they do, sometimes they do not. And it would be nice if they were consistent,
but hey, it is hard to stand out if you just follow the leader.
When construed as an analytic thesis, naturalism can typically be characterized in
one of three ways: metaphysical or ontological naturalism, epistemological naturalism, or
methodological naturalism. In addition to these three, three others have gained attention
in the recent literature. Though these three typically arise out of one or more of the first
three, their controversies take on a character of their own. These include evolutionary
naturalism, religious naturalism, and ethical naturalism. They are peripheral to the
concern of the justification for naturalism central to this work. However, many times the
issues in one of these three are misrepresented as the central issue for naturalism or its
justification. For this reason I will give a brief exposition of each and explain how they,
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while useful in their own right, are blind alleys for providing naturalism the warrant it
needs as a substantive thesis.
3.2: Evolutionary Naturalism
Evolutionary naturalism can be described as naturalism with the addition of
Darwinism as a central thesis or disposition. Evolutionary naturalism can take the form of
ontological, epistemological, or methodological naturalism depending on the role that
Darwinism plays in each individual theory. Typically Darwinism will take the place of or
be attached to the central tool or method of inquiry in individual positions. For example,
in Rosenberg’s naturalism, which I take to be a project denoting an evolutionary
ontology, Darwinism and scientism are central presuppositions of the project of science
and therefore predetermine which entities actually exist to be investigated. For Michael
Ruse the situation is somewhat different. On his “methodological naturalism”—that is, a
position intending to limit all modes of explanation to scientific ones— evolution is a
central scientific thesis open to the progressive posture of scientific inquiry as dialectic
between data and the best-respected theories of explanation, which, for Ruse, constitute a
presupposition of the only legitimate methods of inquiry. Both Rosenberg and Ruse hold
presuppositions as to the nature of inquiry, but they differ in where the emphasis of
inquiry is placed in their respective theories. Rosenberg’s emphasis is on a pre
determined (by appeal to evolution) guiding ontology; Ruse’s is on pre-determined (by
appeal to evolution) guiding methods of explanation. The difference between them will
become more apparent as we progress.
To begin, Rosenberg’s versions of naturalism takes the three methodological
dispositions we have defined— (i) strict adherence to authority of science, (ii) causal
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closure of the physical world, and (iii) rejection of a priori insight—and augments them
with Darwinian insights. This is his schema for what constitutes a naturalistic position:
1. The repudiation of ‘first philosophy’. Epistemology is not to be treated as a
propaedeutic to the acquisition of further knowledge.
• 2. Scientism. The sciences— from physics to psychology and even occasionally
sociology, their methods and findings— are to be the guide to epistemology and
metaphysics.
3. Darwinism. To a large extent Darwinian theory is to be both the model of
scientific theorizing and the guide to philosophical theory because it maximally
combines relevance to human affairs and well-foundedness.
4. Progressivity. Arguments from the history or sociology of science to the nonrationality, or non cumulativity, or non-progressive character of science, are all either
unsound and/or invalid.159

(4), Rosenberg says, is specifically an element for philosophers of science. It is
unclear exactly what he means by this and he does not elaborate. But (4) has little
relevance for us, since our concern is finding warrant for naturalism rather than
questioning the efficacy of science. An immediate concern arises, specifically over
number three. If we follow Rosenberg, what’s a theorist to say about evolution—for or
against? If Darwinism is the model and guide to which scientific theorizing is subject,
while yet Darwinism is a discovery of science and subject to the falsification of science,
there is a serious circularity problem. It is never enough to simply appeal to ‘Science,’ we
need to know why only this finding, why only these methods. This is especially the case
here, since Darwinism is typically accepted as a scientific finding. But Rosenberg
apparently wants to forget justification for Darwinism and introduce it as the justification
for scientism. In doing so he has left little room for development or falsification of
Darwinism, but this does not seem to bother him. He practically admits as much:
...many contemporary naturalists have become hedgehogs [from Isaiah Berlin’s simile].
They have concluded that there is one big thing that makes almost everything else
coherent. They share a Darwinian approach to philosophical theory so thoroughly that it
would be easy to synthesize their views into a traditional philosophical system.160

159 Rosenberg,, “A Field G uide...,” p. 2.
160 Ibid., p. 3.
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If naturalism is to replace a priori first philosophy with scientific theory, then at least for
the present the theory in question will be Darwin’s . 161

The problem here is that Rosenberg has turned Darwinism, which is a corrigible
scientific finding, into an analytic thesis. He concedes that Darwinism could be proven
incorrect by further science in his qualification “at least for the present,” and
consequently that he would follow science over Darwinism. However, since he has
introduced Darwinism as a statement within his naturalism, his naturalism is contingent
upon the findings of science, but since the findings of science can never overturn the
findings of science, then his thesis is vacuous.
Rosenberg could object that, Darwinism has proven itself in that it has given us a
great deal of explanatory power in scientific theorizing, and that we are warranted in the
conclusions drawn from it, including the existence of only physical things. He might go
so far as to say that no other method of obtaining knowledge has room to compete. But at
the same time, he must acknowledge that he is still unable to disprove the intuitionist’s
claim that there are necessarily modal properties of material objects or that there must be
a set of all sets. This is because the scope of the evidence that he considers valid is
restricted to the sciences. An acknowledgment of this would reduce Rosenberg’s
naturalism into a worldview rather than an analytic thesis. But I do not find that he has
made such a concession. We will consider Michael Ruse’s position in further detail in the
later section on methodological naturalism.
Some Darwinists have turned their affection for evolution into reification. In
Philip Johnson’s famous book Darwin on Trial, Johnson quotes paleontologist Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin as saying the following concerning evolution:

161 Ibid., p. 4.
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Is evolution a theory, a system, or a hypothesis? It is much more— it is a general
postulate to which all theories, all hypotheses, all systems must henceforth bow and
which they must satisfy in order to be thinkable and true. Evolution is a light which
illuminates all facts, a trajectory which all lines of thought must follow— this is what
evolution is.162

Teilhard has apparently turned evolution into an analytic-thesis-cum-naturalisticcult. Interestingly, some have claimed that Teilhard’s Darwinian ‘religion’ pushed him to
falsify evidence in favor of evolution in his supposed discovery of Piltdown Man. In fact,
fellow naturalists Steven Jay Gould and Louis Leakey were among his prominent
accusers. ' This leads us to our second version of naturalism.
3.3: Religious Naturalism
3.3.1: Fideistic Naturalism
Of recent interest, naturalists have been accused of holding merely a “religious”type fervor, based on their reification of scientific methodology. If this were merely an
accusation I would not even raise the issue. However, it seems that there are philosophers
and scientists who exemplify this position and, though it is philosophically devoid of
content, it should be mentioned for contextual purposes. There are actually two versions
of what I will call it a priori or religious naturalism. The first is that which was just
mentioned—the radical, universal nod to the sciences as the ‘be all, end all’ answer to
every human question. Statements of this kind are usually reactionary and made in lessthan-academic contexts, even if they are sometimes made within an academic report, or
by an academician. The second version of religious naturalism is actually a legitimate
form of philosophical naturalism, but less known and less controversial than the first. It
argues that scientific research does not have to produce a product entirely devoid of
meaning and awe, but can inspire practically ‘religious’ feelings in response to its

162 Philip Johnson, Darwin on Trial (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993) p. 132, and cf. Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon o f Man (New York: HarperCollins, 1959).
163 Johnson, Darwin on Trial, p. 203.
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accomplishments and the intricacy of the world. It is intended to be religion without a
personal deity that makes claims consistent with natural selection. It also attempts to
explain the psychological tendencies of religions that do posit deities.
The first version of religious naturalism might just be the guttural reactions of
intelligent people who are, no doubt, entitled to their own opinions, but who are upset
over some supposedly anti-scientific affront to their life’s work or worldview. My
examination of this version of naturalism is merely a warning signal for the type of
responses that are not legitimate expressions of academic positions, but which are
nonetheless made by academics.
In his book, Darwin on Trial, Philip Johnson quotes William Provine as
expressing a kind of religious naturalism based on evolution:
Modem science directly implies that the world is organized strictly in
accordance with mechanistic principles. There are no purposive principles whatsoever in
nature. There are no gods and no designing forces that are rationally detectable...
Second, modem science directly implies that there are no inherent moral or
ethical laws, no absolute guiding principles for human society.
Third, human beings are marvelously complex machines. The individual human
becomes an ethical person by means of two primary mechanisms: heredity and
environmental influences. That is all there is.
Fourth, free will as it is traditionally conceived— the freedom to make
uncoerced and unpredictable choices among alternative possible courses of action—
simply does not exist...There is no way that the evolutionary process as currently
conceived can produce a being that is truly free to make choices.164

Provine has obviously made statements that many scientists, even those not
sympathetic to religious belief, would find disturbing. For one, he makes broad, universal
claims about every entity that exits, which is unjustifiable scientifically. Second, he
claims that ethical laws are either non-existent or by-products of development, which
certain ethical naturalists might deny on evolutionary terms. And third, he makes
absolutist statements concerning free will, which no branch of science has come to the
164 William Provine, “Evolution and the Foundation of Ethics,” MBL Science, Vol. 3, No. 1,1987?, pp. 2529.
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plate to proclaim and which, according to some evolutionary theorists, is quite
compatible with the free choice of an organism, at least compatibilistically. My point is
not to directly contradict Provine, but to show that his view is certainly not
uncontroversial within the field of science, much less philosophically, even among fellow
naturalists. Statements like there are merely emotive fluff.
Another explicitly unscientific statement comes from Harvard biologist Richard
Lewontin in the New York Review o f Books:
We take the side of science in spite o f the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in
spite o f its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite o f
the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we
have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and
institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the
phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to
material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce
material explanations, no matter how counterintuitive, no matter how mystifying to the
uninitiated, [original emphasis]165

This is arguably not a naturalist statement. Lewontin is claiming a strict adherence
to something like science, but he is admitting a prior philosophical commitment to
materialism. A seasoned naturalist might have turned the statement around and claimed
these radical beliefs for materialism because of the compelling nature of science.
However, it is odd that he should claim a priori adherence to “material causes” and their
ability to “create.” I assume he meant this to be no more academically respectable than
the position he is defending against, but the language is philosophically muddled.
Fideism is unrespectable in all academic circles, and even more so in branches of science.
The point is, again, to warn against naturalistic—if we may call it naturalistic—rhetoric
and emotivism.

165 Richard Lewontin, The New York Review o f Books, emphasis his, cited in William Dembski’s, “W ho’s
Got the Magic?” in Robert T. Pennock, ed.’s, Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 2001) p. 643.
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Alvin Plantinga cites a myriad of philosophers who speak unscientifically about
the world or what science can tell us about the world. Two hold special interest for us:
George Gaylord Simpson:
Although many details remain to be worked out, it is already evident that all the
objective phenomena of the history of life can be explained by purely naturalistic or, in a
proper sense of the sometimes abused word, materialistic factors. They are readily
explicable on the basis o f differential reproduction in populations (the main factor in the
modern conception of natural selection) and of the mainly random interplay of the
known processes of heredity. ...Man is the result of a purposeless and natural process
that did not have him in mind.166
Richard Dawkins:
All appearances to the contrary, the only watchmaker in nature is the blind forces of
physics, albeit deployed in a very special way. A true watchmaker has foresight: he
designs his cogs and springs, and plans their interconnections, with a future purpose in
his mind's eye. Natural selection, the blind, unconscious automatic process which
Darwin discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the existence and
apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It has no mind and no
mind’s eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If
it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind watchmaker.167

Plantinga responds appropriately with:
...we might say that strictly speaking, when these people make such declarations, they
are neither speaking as scientists nor doing science. They are instead commenting on
science, drawing conclusions from scientific results—conclusions that don't follow from
the scientific results themselves, requiring extra and extra-scientific (perhaps
philosophical) premises. Perhaps this is true, although it has become increasingly
difficult to draw a sharp line between science and such other activities as philosophical
reflection on science.168

Scientists and explicators thereof, hold a special place in the hearts of lay people.
They bring science down to the masses. They explain the whys and wherefores of
medicinal and astronomical feats of genius in bite-size, PBS chunks. We respect these
people for their diligence to learn and discover, and their ability to teach and inform, as
well we should. But with this responsibility must come some tact. A scientist speaking
unscientifically is still a scientist sounding scientific, even if a layperson cannot tell the

166 Simpson,77!e Meaning o f Evolution (rev. ed., 1967) pp.344-45.
167 Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (London and New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1986) p. 5.
168 Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism, Pt. 1,” pp. 7-9.
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difference. These quotes flag a problem in ‘popular’ science, and one that we can
hopefully avoid in this project if we are very careful.
We obviously do not blame philosophers when they make belief statements;
Plantinga, as you might have guessed, makes no apologies for his. But the line between
their belief statements and their axiology needs to be clear for a project of this kind or for
science. It is not clear whether Simpson or Dawkins hold these kinds of statements as
justifiable philosophical or methodological positions in their research, but for our
purposes, given the lack of justification offered for their part, we will assume at present
that they hold some defensible form of naturalism.
3.3.2: Naturalistic Religion
The second major version of religious naturalism is much more interesting. Here
we find what we might call two ‘sub-versions’ of religious naturalism seriously held by
philosophers and, oddly, some theologians. J. Wesley Robbins, in his essay “Religious
Naturalism: Humanistic vs. Theistic,” describes these two varieties of religious
naturalism, calling them, respectively from his title, ‘pragmatic humanism’ and ‘theistic
radical empiricism.’ The first of these types locate their tradition in the pragmatism of
John Dewey and William James. The second finds its roots in the empiricism of the
modern era.
Dewey, in formulating his pragmatic program, attempted to provide functional
translations of all human beliefs and worldviews so that, those who hold beliefs like, that
a God exists, may do so, but with a qualified definition of that to which the term ‘God’
refers. The ‘God’ that has inspired moral acuity and human dignity and scientific
innovation is human creativity and intellectual progress. We shift paradigms (to borrow a
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Kuhnian term), we trade old ideas for new ones, and we pride ourselves on the
increasingly ingenious profitability of the discoveries of the human mind. Robbins writes:
John Dewey made a religion out of the ingenuity that Americans prize and this Jamesian
account of it. He described human creativity as part of an ongoing process that does
endlessly what the God of classical theism supposedly did once and for all, bring ideal
values and actuality together. This artistic reworking of existing conditions for the sake
of imagined and hoped for futures is Dewey's functional replacement for the God who
eternally unites Being and value.169

In rejecting the God of classical theism and placing all his faith in the human
intellectual enterprise, Dewey exemplifies humanism. Richard Rorty places himself as a
successor in the line of this Deweyan ‘religion,’ and claims that all the things that were at
one time considered necessarily the product of a deity, e.g., morality and creativity, can
now be understood as an evolution in human cognitive capacity.
Richard Rorty calls Dewey's religious function "poetry." Both of them locate this
creativity, once thought to be the prerogative of the gods, in human communities rather
than in extra-human nature. That makes them humanists, They also recognize that the
natural world is the place in which the values associated with human creativity are
embedded. For, although art or poetry has a "human abode," this abode itself occurs in a
larger environment that produced it and sustains the creativity occurring there. This
connection of human creativity with its surrounding world is what natural piety
celebrates.170

Robbins, who identifies his own position with this subvariety of religious
naturalism, emphasizes the fact that religious humanism is not a self-centered position. It
might be perceived as an individualistic doctrine, whereupon being ‘given’ such a rich
intellectual history and prowess, an individual may use it to the best of his abilities or for
what she perceives as her own good. The idea is that progress presents the ultimate
opportunity for an ‘exercise of power,’ so to speak. But Rorty says that we should
recognize the community around us that fosters intellectual progress and express
gratitude to the context in which we are able to communicate and understand other beings

169 J. Wesley Robbins, “Religious Naturalism: Humanistic vs. Theistic,”
http://mvpage.iusb.edu/~wrobbins/Essavs/reiigiousnaturalism.html. p. 1.
170 Ibid.
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because of this “gift.” This leads to the central tenets of religious humanism, the
predecessor of what Robbins calls pragmatic humanism. Robbins explains his religious
humanism through Rorty’s depiction:
...Rorty explicitly endorses the key elements of Deweyan religious humanism. These are
(i) reliance on the religious function, conceived of as linguistic creativity, in its human
abode and (ii) celebration of the connection of human life with the larger natural
world.171

Dewey highlights both the sense of awe felt in the face of genius, or poetry, or
technology, and a moral scope that involves communities rather than individuals.
Robbins explicates Rorty’s larger position as a contemporary combination of the
religious humanisms of Dewey and William James. The central idea is that religious
language need not be rescinded from discourse, but the meaning of the language must be
continuous with facts revealed by the natural sciences. It operates much like Dewey’s in
that it is a functional construction out of language that already exists. The language is just
redefined in naturalistic functional terms and explanations. To this James’s conception of
the evolution of intelligence and political change is added.
I will call Rorty's position "pragmatic humanism" to indicate that it consists of two
distinct components, an intellectual self-image and a religious stance. The pragmatic
intellectual self-image derives from James's account of the role of human creativity in
social change and of the adaptation of our thoughts and words to the environment. The
humanist religious stance derives from Dewey's reworking of Christian faith into a
reliance on our own creative powers in pious recognition that they and we are in a larger
environment on which we depend for support of our efforts to realize ideal values.172 J.
Wesley Robbins “Religious Naturalism” p. 4(document file)

Little else needs to be said about this subvariety of religious naturalism. It does
not attempt to justify its adherence to the sciences as the only legitimate method of
knowing, but it proscribes religious tendencies that persist outside of scientific discourse,
that is, the ones that cannot be reduced to functionalist terms. Whereas moral norms are

1/1 Ibid., p. 2.
172 Ibid., p. 4.
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acceptable, for example, the divine command theory as an explanation for the norms is
out.
The second variety of religious naturalism is identified by Robbins as ‘Radical
Theistic Empiricism.’ Whereas pragmatic humanism derives from early American
pragmatism, radical theistic humanism is derived from the Modernist empirical project. It
is a constructivist program in that it acknowledges, with pragmatic humanists, that our
intellectual contact with the world is a process of selective interest.
William Dean is a contemporary proponent of this subvariety of naturalism. He
appeals to the radical empiricists of the Modem period, but focuses specifically on the
moral and aesthetic experiences of the affective states, which give rise to the belief in a
naturalistic god. This god is very similar the God of classical theism in that it has power
beyond that of human creativity, as on the pragmatic humanists’ religious naturalism, but
is very different in most other respects.
Dean agrees with pragmatic humanists that values develop, along the lines of
Darwinian evolution, around those things in which humans have a vested interest. So far
we have run of the mill naturalism. But Dean wants to include, additionally, that the
constructions of value that humans help to evolve, as intellectual creatures, are not tied to
purely physical entities. This means that value can develop throughout nature as a kind of
creative force, revealing legitimate value in different and new aspects of nature. Robbins
says this is just “panpsychism with a different name.”173 Dean’s god is an evolutionary
development centered on the bestowal of meaning and morality.
A problem Dean faces in claiming that his position is naturalistic is continuity
with the sciences. Pragmatic humanists object that radical theistic empiricists propose
173 Ibid., p. 7.
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many entities and experiences outside of the causal structure of the physical sciences.
Mechanistic natural theories lead pragmatic humanists to hold that nature is indifferent to
human moral valuations. They take it that this is the only reasonably scientific
conclusion. But radical theistic empiricism, in postulating experiences like “divine
tropisms” of moral feeling that emanate from nature, clearly blur boundaries that typical
naturalists would not approach.
Dean’s response to such criticisms is more esoteric than philosophical. Robbins
questions Dean’s descriptions as naturalistic in any sense:
In American Religious Empiricism, Dean explains the silence of the natural sciences
about a natural power predisposed to create ever more beautiful things in terms of the
abstractness of scientific descriptions. The concrete immediacy of causal efficacy and
the divine tropism felt therein are beyond scientific descriptions because the latter are
abstract. This epistemological dualism between knowledge by acquaintance and
knowledge by description calls the naturalistic credentials of radical empiricist theism
into question for pragmatic humanists. There is no difference that makes a difference
between a theological dimension of the natural world and the God of classical theism.
Both are beyond the descriptive capabilities of the physical sciences. Given their
common transcendence of scientific description, there is no more reason to locate Dean's
divine tropism in the natural world of things that have scientific descriptions than in the
supernatural world of things, like the God of classical theism, that do not.174

Interestingly I think Robbins’s position is subject to his own critique. When he
defends his ability to find meaning in a mechanistic world he writes, “We are aware that
the rain falls on the just and the unjust. We are impressed also with the silence of the
natural sciences about entities in the inanimate realm that are value oriented in their
1 "1 C

nature or operations.”

Quoting William James he continues, “My belief in a universal

tropism toward greater complexity, ‘based on the good it does me, must run the gauntlet
of my other beliefs.’”176

174 Ibid., p. 12.
175 Ibid., p. 12, emphasis mine.
176 Ibid.
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The classical theist surely says the same thing in some respects. “I experience a
significant change in my life when I have accepted a belief in God. This belief must run
the gamut of my other beliefs, that is, it must be consistent with the reality that I
encounter daily and the experiences with which I' am familiar. It must make a meaningful
difference if I am to accept it as true.” If Dean can say even this much, then he has
fulfilled everything Robbins asks for in a rational scientific epistemology.
This is enough to identify the features of religious naturalism in its more
philosophical guise. Religious naturalists seem to take it as self-evident that the natural
world exudes a moral aspect. They do little to justify this belief through the sciences. It is
almost what might be called an appeal to Veblen-type evidence. Sociologist Thorstein
Veblen argues that there is a type of evidence that is known by “preference...drawn from
everyday life, by direct observation or through common notoriety, rather than from more
recondite sources at a farther remove.”177 This type of evidence is circumspect and
arguably spurious. When applied as justification this evidence is only viable in broad
examples accepted by most communities of discourse, e.g., Hitler was a bad man. The
central point is that religious naturalism does not emphasize the major tendencies of
philosophical naturalism and does not provide support for a justification of naturalism’s
claim that science is the only legitimate method of inquiry.
To be sure, religious naturalism has other connotations, especially in the New Age
movement. The naturalism exemplified here is closer to that of popular writers and poets,
as when John Muir called himself a ‘naturalist.’ There are societies that make statements
that sound very close to naturalism as I am characterizing it. For instance, on the website

177 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory o f the Leisure Class (New York: Dover Publications, 1994) p. XX.
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called Religious Naturalism Online,178 the homepage contains their creed statement. It
reads as follows:
We find our sources of meaning within the natural world, where humans are understood
to be emergent from and hence a part of nature. Our religious quest is informed and
guided by the deepening and evolving understandings fostered by scientific inquiry. It is
also informed and guided by the mindful understandings inherent in our human
traditions, including art, literature, philosophy, and the religions of the world.
The natural world and its emergent manifestations in human creativity and community
are the focus of our immersion, wonder, and reverence. We may describe our religious
sensibilities using various words that have various connotations — like the sacred, or the
source, or god — but it is our common naturalistic orientation that generates our shared
sense of place, gratitude, and joy.

Notice that the scientific element is here, as well as the humanistic element, when
meaning is described as being derived from the natural world. The deviation from
philosophical naturalism comes with the addition of ‘guides’ and sources of ‘information’
beyond the natural sciences. This is obviously not a version of contemporary naturalism
as I am characterizing it.

3.4: Ethical Naturalism
Ethical naturalism has become popular for at least two reasons: (1) the increasing
application of evolution to moral questions, and (2) the increasingly apparent flaws of
traditional deontological, utilitarian, and virtue ethics. The flaws with traditional ethical
theories involve either vast incompleteness, as with utilitarianism with regard to
measurement and population scope, or an increase in basic understanding of human
dignity and practicality, as with virtue and Kantian ethics given their propensity to
universalize out of the context of humanity. Ethical naturalism is the intent to shift the
focus of ethics to just those situations where individual humans matter contingently and
in the real world, without concern for a transcendental justification or measurement

178 www.religiousnaturalism.org
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strategy. This intent is enacted by appeal to the natural world through the sciences. John
Post writes that,
...ethical naturalism holds that moral properties are equivalent to or at least determined
by certain natural properties, so that moral judgments either form a subclass of, or are
(non-reductively) determined by the factual or descriptive judgments, and the
appropriate moral justification and explanation are continuous with those in science.179

This, of course, does not mean very much without some sort of content supplied
by science concerning a morally relevant “natural property.” The ethical naturalist will
appeal not to physical things themselves, though physical things are still considered the
only relevant type of object to which an appeal can be made, but to certain properties of
physical things that express an emergent or irreducible moral dimension.

These are the

philosophers who take it that science has the ability to inspire awe and moral excellence,
especially with regard to stewardship of all living things, including, of course, humans.
The challenge for the ethical naturalist concerns whether there exists what John
Hare calls a Moral Gap.181 Hare claims that morality has traditionally had three aspects:
(1) a moral demand to which we, as rational agents, feel compelled, (2) natural capacities
which are unequal to the moral demand, whereupon we need some sort of assistance to,
“do the right thing,” and (3) a divine or holy being that is the source and reconciliation of
the moral demand. The challenge for the naturalist is to overcome the gap between (1)
and (2) without the addition of (3), or by replacing (3) with a natural form of assistance.
The naturalist may attempt to, according to Hare, “puff up the capacity” of
humans and say that all humans are capable of moral excellence; they just need to be
properly motivated. The question then, is what type of motivation is required. Most
attempts have involved the making explicit of the consequences or stakes involved in
179 John F. Post, “Naturalism,” Cambridge Dictionary o f Philosophy, p. 596.
180 Ibid., p. 597.
181 John E. Hare, “Naturalism and Morality,” in Craig and Moreland, Naturalism: A Critical Analysis.
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each moral decision. The question is whether complete and explicit knowledge of a moral
consequence is enough to overcome the greed and personal satisfaction that such
knowledge could enable the agent to enact against the dignity of another person. The
answer is unclear and beyond our scope here, so I will not pursue it.
The naturalist may, instead, attempt to reduce the demand so that our capacities
are fit to the demand. This has taken the form of ethics as care for those around and
closest to us, reducing any responsibility to our greater world, since we can only do so
much. But the reduction of moral concern to our scope of interaction does not and cannot
fit or explain our moral feelings toward those far away who have suffered from some
tragedy or catastrophe, and whom we feel ‘deserves’ our special giving or care. It has
also taken the form of allowing people to determine their own personal scope of moral
concern. This would be the employment of some evolutionarily prescribed relativism.
The problem here is that the scope of care for loved ones or ourselves cannot just be to
meet whatever standard people, or we, set for themselves, or ourselves. To be healthy
each of us needs an “impartial sense of justice” and to be treated with a “base line of
respect.”

i <>2

Again, naturalism’s ability to overcome this difficulty is unclear and I will

not pursue it.
The third strategy is to replace the divine assistance with something from the
natural world. This is where a specifically naturalist ontology distinctly comes to bear.
Philosophers has answered this question in one of three ways, rational choice theory (a
kind of invisible hand arranging our choices somehow rationally), an appeal to history as
guiding our moral norms, and evolution as biologically ‘building-in’ our moral
constraints, and guiding evolutionary moral development. The third tends to be the most
182 Ibid., p. 198.
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popular of late, even though there is nothing obviously moral about the process of natural
selection.
Evolutionary ethicists have attempted to explain moral feelings in terms of
selective population attitudes that have proven successful survival tools, such as the
1M

appropriate times to respond to a pressure with anger or guilt. ‘ Others have attempted to
define moral attitudes as nature’s attempt to counterbalance organism egoism with
altruistic traits. Though these traits are not immediately selectable, their overall pull on
the natural system exerts enough altruism to be selective for the population.

184

The evolutionary solution to the third part of the moral tri-lemma is more of a
descriptive explaining away of the moral demand, than an ontological assistance in doing
the right thing. It merely explains the moral demand as those socially selectable traits
and, if so-and-so does not exemplify them, too bad. They could guide moral decision
making if we could identify the relevantly selective behaviors. But then again, for
humans this might paint a picture more like the Saturday Night Live character Leon
Phelps, rather than the altruistic and/or humanistic exemplifier of moral excellence that
we cherish so deeply.
Whether the naturalist can develop a consistent moral picture and whether
evolution is the key to that development is beyond the scope of this project, but it helps to
see that the relevant issues for such a picture are irrelevant to justifying the conjunction
of naturalism’s claim of strict adherence to science with the claim that science is the only
legitimate method of knowing. It should be noted that many naturalists find the theory of
183 Alan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) p. 260 cited in
John Hare, “Naturalism and Morality.”
184 Donald Campbell, “On the Conflicts between Biological and Social Evolution and between Psychology
and the Moral Tradition,” American Psychologist, 30 (1975), pp. 1103-26, cited in John Hare, “Naturalism
and Morality.”
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ethical naturalism undesirable. They claim that it is unclear that any property included in
a scientific ontology displays properties that could be described as ‘value-laden.’ These
naturalists tend to feel that naturalism, nature, and science are morally neutral concepts
and that any act we may perceive as ‘moral’ has its explanation in something definable in
terms of nonmoral, physical processes. We can now move on to the three most common
characterizations of naturalism.
3.5: Metaphysical/Ontological Naturalism
Ontological naturalism is naturalism intent upon determining the contents of the
scientific ontology or the methods by which those contents are delineated, using the
methods and findings of the natural sciences. It is the strongest form of naturalism as an
analytic thesis. Ontological naturalists typically make universal claims about every object
that exists or could possibly exist in the universe, sometimes based on a conception of
science as hypothetically complete. Claims concerning the hypothetically complete
sciences mean that regardless of the current state of scientific methods and findings, we
can know that there are certain things that science will never discover, and that are
therefore not real in any significant sense. Metaphysical naturalism primarily excludes
entities or events that purport to employ a conception of causation that is undetectable to
scientific investigation. Systems that claim both rational support as well as the existence
of nonscientific causation include, but are not restricted to, mind-body dualism, classical
theism (whether Jewish, Christian, or Islamic), certain polytheistic religions such as
Hinduism, and many varieties of New Age beliefs. This is typically expressed by phrases
like the “causal closure of the universe.” Immaterial substances such as souls or minds
are rejected, thus any form of Cartesian dualism is rejected, though some philosophers
accept emergent properties. Naturalist Hilary Komblith writes:
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It is no surprise, of course, that anti-naturalists have defended metaphysical claims
which are at odds with the best available scientific views. Well known are accounts of
consciousness, human action, and mentality generally which appeal to occult forces:
immaterial stuff, agent causation, the “subjective ontology” of the mental. It is of little
concern to defenders of such views that there is no more place for these things in
185
contemporary scientific theory than there is for phlogiston, entelechies, or telekinesis.

These types of causes are rejected because science accepts only one type of
causation as legitimate: that is, physical to physical. It is the properties of an object that
determine whether or not it can be influenced by another object. This rules out early
conceptions of causation as a priori dispositions of certain objects to act on others.
Naturalists agree with Timothy O’Conner that, “Causality, we might say, is nonhaecceitistic: objects do not have a primitive disposition to act on certain other individual
objects; they are instead disposed to
characteristics.”

1 Stfi

act on

any objects having the right

Therefore, even if an immaterial substance exists, there is no reason to

believe, given our current scientific conception of causation, that it has the potential,
given its lack of physical properties, to influence a physical object. Therefore, immaterial
forces and beings are causally impotent to a physical world. Since only one type of
causation is possible on this definition of causation, then to posit any entities other than
physical is merely superfluous.
Some philosophers go a step further with ontological naturalism making claims
that only extended physical objects, or particulars, exist. In this case properties or
universals, numbers, sets, and propositions are denied existence. Proponents of this view
include D. M. Armstrong, who accepted universals (as physical relations) but denied the
existence of numbers or sets, and Wilfrid Sellars who claimed that, “...a naturalist

185 Hilary Kornblith, “Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological,” Midwest Studies in
Philosophy: Philosophical Naturalism, vol. XVIII (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1993) p. 40.
186 Timothy O’Conner, “Causality, Mind, and Free W ill,” Soul, Body, and Survival (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2001) p. 45, emphasis his.
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ontology is necessarily a nominalist ontology.”187 However, contemporary science tends
to reject these strict philosophical positions because they are too narrow for relevant
scientific data. In fact, causation can be extended to theoretical entities, just in case they
exert explanatory power in a theory. For example, gravitation is that mechanism we
invoke to describe the way mass in the universe affects other mass. Gravity is not an
empirically detectable entity, except in that it is a concept to which we can attribute
certain physical properties, and this set of properties as opposed to any other set, defines
“gravity” so that it explains the relevant empirical data concerning the behavior of mass.
Regardless of what they ultimately conclude the sciences imply ontologically,
ontological naturalists hold that only entities definable within science and usually those
terms associated with mathematics actually exist. This is held to stronger and weaker
degrees from naturalist to naturalist. Some claim that the hypothetically completed
natural sciences indicate that, in fact, nothing else exists.

1RR

Some claim that, given our

method of analysis, we are warranted in believing that nothing else exists, or that, if it
did, it is either reducible to, or emergent from, some scientific concept, or is
superfluous.189 The process of defining an ontology relevant for scientific by appealing to
science is controversial as well. Hilary Komblith says that science, given its current
stance on the higher level relations among mental states, “does not support
reductionism,” 190 and therefore the naturalist cannot reasonably hold a reductionist
position. On the other hand, Jerry Fodor implies that naturalism necessarily involves
reductionism. Fodor writes,
187 Wilfird Sellars, Naturalism and Ontology, p. 109, as cited in Moreland, “Naturalism and the Ontological
Status...” in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis.
188 Pennock, Tower o f Babel, p. 190.
189 David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, chapter 1.
,9° Komblith, p. 41.
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.. .what we want at minimum is something of the form ‘R represents S’ is true iff C
where the vocabulary in which condition C is couched contains neither intentional nor
191
semantic expressions.

Commenting on this quote Michael Tye writes, “ ...according to Fodor, we must provide
reductionist necessary and sufficient conditions.”192
Historically, the attempt at a scientific conception of the world was intended to
eradicate the metaphysical project from modes of legitimate inquiry. Since naturalism
seems to be a descendent of these programs, it seems inconsistent to use the title
“metaphysical naturalism” for the position that is marketed in this section. It seems the
reason that some naturalists still use the term is that it merely indicates the current
conception of metaphysics as the field of “meta-theories” of scientific progress and
justification, since there is obviously, on their conception, no transcendent reality to
which the term could refer. But with the rise and success of philosophy of religion since
Plantinga’s publication of God and Other Minds in 1967, the term “metaphysics” has
taken a turn back toward the rationalist implication of a transcendent realm. Because of
this, to use the term here might occlude certain intentions by naturalists. Given that this
version of naturalism specifically identifies claims as to what exists or possibly exists—
that is, “ontological” claims—I will only use the term “ontological naturalism,” except in
direct quotes.
The task of naturalistic ontology takes one of two possible routes: (1) to “draw out
the metaphysical implications of contemporary science;”193 or (2) to investigate
traditional metaphysical questions in light of the scientific ontology. After the demise of

191 Fodor, “Semantics, Wisconsin Style,” reprinted in A Theory o f Content and Other Essays (Cambridge,
MA, 1990), p. 32, originally published in SYNTHESE, 59, 1984, p. 32.
192 Michael Tye, “Naturalism and the Problem of Intentionality,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy:
Philosophical Naturalism, vol. XIX, p. 125.
193 Kornblith, p. 40.
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positivism and Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction many philosophers
gave up metaphysics as a philosophical pursuit. Some even went so far as to reject the
term “philosophy” since it held such deep roots in metaphysical projects.
As for the first route, naturalism claims that there is “no extrascientific route to
metaphysical understanding,”194 thereby rejecting first philosophy altogether. This is
obviously not an absolute rejection of philosophy or metaphysics, but a significantly
qualified version of them. The qualification is derived specifically from the sciences.
Therefore the only subject available from which to begin an adequate philosophy is the
empirical results of the natural sciences. This route is designed specifically to keep all
relevant philosophical and scientific discourse within a relevant, sometimes called a
‘public,’195 set of boundaries.
As for the second route, philosophers attempt to evaluate the arguments of past
philosophical eras to determine the worthy elements that may be gleaned from them. This
project involves applying the sciences to questions such as the mind-body problem, the
question of universals and particulars, and idealism and realism. Philosophers like Hilary
Putnam claim to have discovered that these dichotomies are really too stark to capture
reality and that a scientific conception of them allows a greater understanding of what is
involved in the claims involved.196 This route obviously presupposes the first, that
science is the only legitimate route to understanding the world.
Ontological Naturalism in Contemporary Use
It is difficult to see the implications of a version of naturalism without seeing it
used in the literature. In this section I will analyze several contemporary explications of
194 Ibid.
195 ‘Public’ here refers to the idea that scientific findings are absolutely open to any trained observer
because the entities are observable and the experiments are such that they can be reproduced.
196 Cf. Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces o f Realism (New York: Open Court, 1990).
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ontological naturalism. Jeffrey King explains that ontological naturalism is the belief that
“scientific theories or subtheories give us an ontology with which to work.”

107

Robert

Pennock concurs, but also claims that it implies physicalism. He explains, “The
ontological naturalist makes substantive claims about what exists in nature and then adds
a closure clause stating ‘and that is all there is.’”

Philip Johnson, an avid anti

naturalist, has defined naturalism with an ontological character:
Naturalism assumes the entire realm of nature to be a closed system of material causes
and effects, which cannot properly be influenced by anything from “outside.”
Naturalism does not explicitly deny the mere existence of God, but it does deny that a
supernatural being could in any way influence natural events, such as evolution, or
communicate with material creatures like ourselves.199

Keith Parsons agrees with Johnson’s definition, calling it ‘metaphysical
naturalism,’ and accepts it as his own with the following two amendments:
I would only amend this definition by noting that what it says about God would apply
equally well to other putative supernatural beings such as devils, angels, souls, spirits,
and so forth.200

and
Naturalism per se does not entail physicalism. Naturalists do not even have to admit that
the causal order is closed. They could be epiphenomenalists who hold that there is one
way causation from the physical to the mental. Still, to obviate long, boring semantic
quibbling, I shall simply accept Johnson’s definition.201

The first qualification is trivial for our concerns. The first part of the second
qualification, concerning physicalism, merely reflects what we have seen concerning
naturalism’s logical relationship to physicalism. The last qualification, however, is quite
radical. Parsons, in claiming that a naturalist could be an epiphenomenalist, thinks that a

197 Jeffrey C. King, “Can Propositions Be Naturalistically Acceptable?” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy:
Philosophical Naturalism, vol. XIX (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993) p. 54
198 Robert T. Pennock, Tower of Babel, p. 190. This may be the most common conception of ontological
naturalism. Dallas Willard calls it “a form of monism,” ... Robert Koons says it means that “the world of
space and time is causally closed,” ... Stewart Goetz follows David Papineau in claiming that it means “a
commitment to the completeness of physics,” ...
199 Philip Johnson, Darwin on Trial, pp. 116-17.
200 Keith Parsons, “Need Reasons Be Causes?” Philosophia Christi, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2003, p. 63.
201 Ibid., p. 63 n. 2.
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naturalist could hold some form of one-way interactionist mental dualism, provided that
the ‘one-way’ direction occur only from the physical to the mental, rather than the other
way around. This would be an interesting route for the naturalist to take! It would first
concede to the existence of non-physical, non-logical (not tautologous) entities. It is not
clear that such an ontological addition could be warranted by empirical methods. David
Papineau agrees that epiphenomenalism is successful in avoiding physicalism,
“Epiphenomenalism satisfies supervenience, since it rules out the possibility of mental
variation without physical variation. But it isn't a physicalist doctrine, since it explicitly
specifies that mental properties are quite distinct from physical ones.”202 The problem is
that it also assumes some sort of causal interaction between the physical and non-physical
objects, without recourse to empirically warranted explanatory power. Therefore, it
seems difficult to think epiphenomenalism could be a naturalist doctrine. Permit me to
wander a moment in order to explore the viability of this option.
How would a naturalist warrant such a move? It seems he would have to take
several spurious steps away from naturalism only to come right back. He would have to
accept that some theory held greater explanatory power for scientific data by positing a
metaphysically different realm of the mental, rejecting causal closure principles. If the
naturalist made this move based on a purely logical argument, then he would be
accepting an a priori justification for the theory, and would thus cease to hold naturalism.
But if there were empirical data that were better unified by the explanatory posit of a
realm metaphysically distinct from the physical, then the naturalist would be justified in
rejecting causal closure while retaining naturalism as a strict analytic thesis.

202 David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, p. 5.
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So how lively of a possibility is this option for the naturalist? Not very, it seems.
The problem lies in the fact that, on an epiphenomenalist view of mind, mental events are
merely receptors or perceivers and are not causally efficacious. Jaegwon Kim says,
According to T. H. Huxley, every mental event is caused by a physical event in the
brain, but mental events have no causal power of their own, being the absolute terminal
links of causal chains. So all mental events are effects of the physiological processes
going on in out nervous system, but they are powerless to cause anything else, even
other mental events.203

Quoting Samuel Alexander, Kim shows the lack of possible explanatory use of such a
system:
[Epiphenomenalism] supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no
purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is
kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time, be abolished.204

In order to accept a theory as expressing some degree of truth or in order to posit
an entity as real the naturalist must base the justification, first on some empirical data
which demands an explanation; determine whether the posit would account for
everything in the current explanation (mental activity is the result of biological/chemical
evolution) plus the new data (rational thought has properties irreducible to chemical
processes); and, in the case of entities (such as metaphysical realms or minds), answer the
question, “Does it do anything?” indicating that it is causally efficacious to posit the
entity. But the epiphenomenalist holds that the mental does not do anything. It is merely a
passive receptor. Therefore, without claim to any causal efficacy, the epiphenomenalist
mental realm is innocuous and mereiy restates a problem without providing a solution.
There are further problems with this scenario including the existence of the mental realm
if it is supposed to be caused by physical events, as Huxley comments. Since nonreductive physicalism posits the same description for species of emergence, it seems hard
to see how this could constitute a metaphysically different realm. So in spite of Parsons’s
203 Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy o f Mind, p. 51
204 Ibid., p. 129. and Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity (London: Macmillan, 1920), vol. 2, p. 8.
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request to avoid quibbling I have quibbled, but we must acknowledge that
epiphenomenalism as an argument against causal closure would not even hit the
naturalist’s radar screen.
So, again, the whole general idea behind ontological naturalism is that it claims
that science implies facts about what actually exists, and with this pre-confirmed nugget
in hand proceeds to theorize about philosophical issues. In some cases this extends to
what makes something count as real, as in a theory that holds realism with regard to
mental intentionality. Although ontological naturalism is informed by natural science, it
claims either that regardless of what it is possible for science to discover, or currently of
what we know from science, we know enough to claim that only certain things actually
exist, and those things will be empirically and/or experimentally detectable in one way or
another at some point. The central point is that nothing legitimate is considered to exist
beyond the scope of science.
Sometimes the assumption of naturalism as an analytic thesis with the ontological
naturalism is not explicit. In fact, it is typically inferred from some statement concerning
the ontology determined by science. When metaphysical naturalism appears this way,
Rea calls it a “quasi-ontological thesis”.205 Some examples of this are as follows:
(1.1) Science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is and of what is not that it is
not. (W. Sellars 1963: 173)
(1.2) Naturalism...is a species of philosophical monism, according to which whatever
exists or happens is natural in the sense of being susceptible to explanation through
methods which, although paradigmatically exemplified in the natural sciences, are
continuous from domain to domain of objects and events. (Danto 1967: 448)
(1.3) Ontological naturalism is the view...that only natural objects, kinds, and properties
are real....Since ontological naturalism is supported by the success of natural science,
and success is success in recognizing what is real, it would do best to define ‘natural’ as
‘what is recognized by natural science.’ (Schmitt 1995: 343)

205 Rea, World Without Design, p. 56.
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(1.4) Naturalism imposes a constraint on what there can be, stipulating that there are no
nonnatural or unnatural, praetematural or supernatural entities....Nature comprises those
entities and constructs made of those entities that the ideal physics, realistically
interpreted, posits. (Pettit 1992: 245, 247)

These characterizations might be read as referring to the ontology of a “best” or
“ideal” science. But there is no such thing as a ‘best’ or ‘ideal’ physics. “The physics we
have now is not the best (otherwise there would be no reason to continue trying to
improve it) and it is less than ideal. But if there is no ideal physics, then there is no
ontology o f the ideal physics.”

Rea expresses that metaphysical naturalism might be

more plausible if it is held to a milder epistemological or methodological thesis for
determining an ontology, such as:
(1.5) In deciding what ontology to adopt, science (or an idealized version of science)
should be our final authoritative guide.207

This is by no means uncontroversial. For example, if science determines what
ontology to accept but makes no value claims about what should or should not be
accepted as real, how does one justify adopting (1.5)? Indeed, Peter Forrest and Michael
Ruse both consult the natural sciences to determine what exists, and while one comes up
with a non-interactionist creator God, the other comes up with a blind, deterministic
evolutionary universe. It seems even if one could justify the ‘should’ in (1.5) it is too
weak a constraint on ontology.
But perhaps the ‘best’ that Rea suggests is too strict in its scope. Perhaps the
‘best’ should refer to the ‘best available’ physics. On this account naturalism would
express agreement with the open-endedness of scientific research. Naturalism would
allow science to dictate to it a conditional ontology as it is discovered, rather than having
already done so. In this respect, naturalism cannot make any universal claim as to what
206 Ibid., p. 57, emphasis his.
207 Ibid., p. 58.
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type of objects exist, but can only say more generally what science tells us exists at any
given moment. But since ontological naturalists express doubts about the existence of
non-physical entities or causal agents, and proscribe such as explanations, the scope they
imply is the ‘hypothetically completed sciences’ rather than the conditional, ‘as it
currently is’ science.
Hilary Komblith says that science supports several ontological claims that
naturalists are therefore rational in holding. She says that there are five “metaphysical
lessons” that can be drawn from science:
(1) We should reject reductionism, both at the level of types and at the level of tokens.
The highter level sciences do not simply reduce to more basic sciences. (2) Nevertheless,
we should accept materialism. Everything is entirely physically constituted. (3) We
should acknowledge the operation of causal powers not only in the basic sciences, but in
the higher level sciences as well. (4) Natural kinds should be viewed as homeostatic
clusters of properties. ... (5) Our current understanding of causation requires that we
view causal powers and causal laws in a distinctly non-Humean way.208

To justify (1) Komblith appeals to the explanatory power of higher level states in
several sciences including scientific psychology. (3) is supported by the anti-reductivism
of (1). If there are higher level operations, there is no reason to think that they involve a
different type of causation, that is, so long as the empirical aspects do not show otherwise
and as long as one presupposes (2). (4) is necessary for (3) since causal powers, as
currently understood, cannot act on essences or natures, and (5), I take it, is a result of
successful scientific prediction, though Komblith does not address (5) directly.
I said above that Komblith ‘presupposes (2)’ because she does not attempt to
justify it. She says that she is a materialist and that “current science gives us no reason to
doubt this thesis.”209 In an endnote she mentions an article by Tyler Burge with which she
is “very largely in agreement,” with the exception of his point that, “Materialism is not
208 Komblith, p. 43.
209 Ibid., p. 42.
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established, or even clearly supported, by science.”210 She writes that she does not know
how to respond to such a statement since, “science does not currently offer any support to
dualism.” But while she says that current scientific incompleteness should give no
“comfort to dualists,” she also writes that “One cannot draw conclusions about the
existence of particular sorts of things from the fact of our present ignorance,” which
seems to tell just as explicitly against her thesis, even if we had to change “existence of
particular...” to “non-existence of particular...” There remains no scientific ‘support’ for
materialism.
Paul Moser and David Yandell do a nice job of capturing the key insights into
ontological naturalism in their article “Farewell to Philosophical Naturalism.”211
Ontological naturalism expresses what many naturalists want most: the complete
reduction of all intelligible facts, entities, and states of affairs to objects of scientific
investigation. Moser and Yandell offer three possible formulations of ontological
naturalism:
(1.6) Eliminative ontological naturalism: every real entity is capturable by the ontology
of the hypothetically completed empirical sciences, and language independent of those
sciences is eliminable from discourse without cognitive loss.
(1.7) Non-eliminative reductive ontological naturalism: every real entity either is
capturable by the ontology of the hypothetically completed empirical sciences or is
reducible to something capturable by that ontology.
(1.8) Non-eliminative non-reductive ontological naturalism: some real entities neither
are capturable by the ontology of the hypothetically completed empirical sciences nor
are reductive to anything capturable by that ontology, but all such sciences supervene on
entities capturable by that ontology.212

These definitions are controversial, since a reasonable account of naturalism
would not make universal claims based on contingent sciences. And it is unclear that

210 Ibid., end note 8, p. 50, Tyler Burge, “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice,” p. 117.
211 In Craig and Moreland, Naturalism: A Critical Analysis.
212 Moser and Yandell, “Farewell to Philosophical Naturalism,” p. 8.
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every characterization

of ontological

naturalism makes claims based

on

the

hypothetically completed natural sciences. The interesting thing about the definitions is
that they capture the alternate characterizations of phenomena that is scientific but in
some sense not directly detectable by scientific methods. Since philosophies of science
have made these various characterizations, naturalism has followed. With the relevant
changes, based on the controversial elements just mentioned, these three definitions
broadly capture any version of ontological naturalism.
The Controversy over Ontological Naturalism
The most obvious problem with any version of ontological naturalism is its
fundamental claims concerning what entities are entailed by the natural sciences. As a
strict ontological thesis it could be overturned by advancements in science. If warranted
by the current state of the sciences, then some explanation must be given for this warrant.
Since the sciences make no negative ontological claims,213 the warrant would have to be
considered a pragmatic inference based on the fact that science has proven exceedingly
successful. Very few philosophers attempt such a justification. Many just assume a
naturalistic ontology based on its epistemic parity with dualism (since neither
physicalism nor dualism can identify just “where” or “how” consciousness “is”)
conjoined with the efficacy of physical explanation. But, as we have seen, physicalism
does not imply naturalism. However, since the justification for ontological naturalism
takes place at the level of causal ontology, I will assume that the persuasiveness of the
arguments for physicalism determines the adequacy of the defining aspect of ontological
naturalism. Frederick Olafson writes, “O f course, if it is conceded that feelings are not
reducible to physical states, the main ontological thesis of naturalism has to be set
213 Some sciences make positive claims concerning what does exist, but not negative claims concerning
what does not exist or what could not exist.
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aside.”214 This, however, does not justify the naturalistic claim that accompanies this
physicalism, that science is the only legitimate form of inquiry. And since few defend
naturalism at the ontological level differently than they defend physicalism, I will move
on to the two other, more widely held version of naturalism.
An Aside Concerning the Distinctions Among Naturalistic Theories
Roughly we may say that ontological naturalism is bound to physicalism.
Physicalism, as we have seen, is the view that nothing but the observable physical world
exists and that only entities which are currently of the type to inhabit such a world, and
are therefore observable in the same way, exist, or are the only ones that are causally
efficacious. Because of this tie to physicalism, ontological naturalism implies atheism.
Several philosophers have made this connection:
Metaphysical naturalism is, roughly speaking, the view that there are no supernatural
beings— no such beings as, for example, God or angels or ghosts. Thomas Reid was a
theist and, therefore, not a naturalist.215
Naturalism eschews or rejects appeal to the supernatural and traces our origins back to
blind and uncaring forces.216

This is the basic character of ontological naturalistic theories. This is just one
implication among many. Atheism concerns a disbelief in the existence of a supernatural
causal agent, specifically the God of classical theism, but as an ontological theory it is
linked up to epistemological theories about how we could come to believe something
about the existence of entities, and methodological theories about the explanatory value
of such entities. For contemporary scientific theories everything boils down to
explanatory efficacy. Therefore, whether and specifically how something exists tends to
remain in the background. For example, ‘natural selection’ is not a thing or a tangible
214 Frederick A. Olafson, Naturalism and the Human Condition: Against Scientism (London: Routledge,
2001) p. 38.
215 Michael Bergmann, “Commonsense Naturalism,” in Naturalism Defeated? p. 61.
216 Ernst Sosa, “Plantinga’s Evolutionary Meditations,” in Naturalism Defeated? p. 98.
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constraint, but it has empirical explanatory power. Recognizing this makes it clear that it
is the scientific aspect of a theory that makes it naturalistic and not necessarily the
characterization given it in a specific argument. This is not to say that the
characterizations do not need explication. Identifying the character of the naturalism
employed prevents inadequate responses and straw man fallacies.
Before we move on to epistemological and methodological versions it is
important to distinguish among the relevant determinants for each. Naturalism, since it is
so amorphous and sometimes ambiguous, can be confused in its applications. As long as
the philosophers clarify their terms, most difficulties are eliminated. But whereas
naturalism is used inconsistently from application to application, the qualifiers employed
to distinguish it, ontological, epistemological, etc., have an arguably standard use.
As an example of how some characterizations of naturalism get confused,
consider the following statement by Robert Larmer. Larmer is discussing the causal
efficacy of a supernatural agent, which, because it is a non-physical entity, might lead us
to think of ontological naturalism. But his title, “Is Methodological Naturalism QuestionBegging?” would be misleading if this were the case. Notice that his appeal is to the
explanatory power of such a being, rather than its existence:
Regarding the doctrine of methodological naturalism, it seems that its core claim is that
no physical event should ever be explained as having been directly caused by an
nonnatural agent. Those who espouse methodological naturalism claim that it is in
principle illegitimate to posit a nonnatural cause for a physical event. If God is assumed
to act in nature He must be assumed to act through natural secondary causes. Thus,
whatever one’s metaphysical beliefs concerning the existence of God, one must adopt
methodological atheism in explaining the occurrence of physical events. Any suggestion
that a physical event might have as its direct and immediate cause a supernatural agent is
not to be countenanced.217

217 Robert Larmer, “Is Methodological Naturalism Question-Begging?” Philosophia Christi, No. 5, Vol. 1,
2003, p. 114, emphasis mine.
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After the way we characterized physicalism in chapter 2, as basing its arguments
on causal efficacy, and remaining agnostic about entities other than causal ones, this
might seem like a pretty big nit to pick. With physicalism, the focus is on the entities
themselves, and the extent to which science allows us to posit them, not the extent to
which science allows them into our explanations. Dan Crawford exemplifies the
distinction with a question:
Does evolutionary naturalism rule out the theistic God? If so, how? Is the ruling out a
metaphysical claim (that God does, not exist) or merely a methodological rule that
disallows supernatural explanations?218

If a philosopher does not use language that differentiates between the existence of entities
allowed by science and the explanation of events allowed by science, then the distinction
will be pretty easy to miss. Is there an upshot, you might ask? Probably not. If the
position is reasonably naturalistic in its central claims, then the specific type of
naturalism involved is relatively inconsequential. The real nitty gritty will come if and
with how the theory is given justification.
3.6: Epistemological Naturalism
Epistemological naturalism is naturalism intent upon determining the boundaries
of the legitimate realm of knowledge, or the legitimate methods by which knowledge is
obtained, using the methods and findings of the natural sciences. Hilary Komblith writes
that, “A proper epistemological theory must explain how knowledge is possible.”

A

naturalistic epistemology must accomplish this task through the findings and methods of
the natural sciences. A philosophical investigation of knowledge must take into account
both the cognitive machinery of belief formation and the physical machinery of
perception. Both are fallible and both are dependent upon a certain type of environment
218 Dan D. Crawford, “Does Evolutionary Science Rule out the Theistic God?” Philosophia Christi, Vol. 5,
No. 1, 2003, p. 167, emphasis his.
2,9 Kornblith, p. 43.
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for their proper functioning. But in spite of this we must begin by assuming with
Kornblith that, “Our perceptual faculties are extraordinarily well suited to providing us
with an accurate picture of the world around us.” Without such an assumption we are lost
in skepticism with no solid ground on which to stand. A naturalized epistemology does
not have to tell us that our perceptual faculties are working properly but how they do so.
Of course if we are left with the conclusion that science cannot provide an adequate
account of perception (as with Plantinga’s argument from chapter 2), we may be left with
momentary skepticism, until science determines a way to reconcile the problem.
Komblith writes:
We are not trying to respond to some imaginary skeptical opponent who doubts that
knowledge of any kind is possible at all. Rather, in recognizing the achievements of the
sciences, we are faced with a straightforward question which science itself may address.
On the one hand, a scientific psychology characterizes the cognitive faculties of human
beings. On the other, our current scientific theories give living proof of what those
cognitive faculties are capable of. We must now try to explain how creatures with the
faculties of cognitive science tells us we have could have come to understand the kind of
world which the sciences generally tell us that we inhabit.220

Naturalistic epistemology differs from traditional epistemology in that it takes its
cues specifically from the sciences and the contingent natural world rather than a priori
constraints and theories that are applicable in all logically possible worlds. The
recognition of environmental constraints on the proper function of perceptual faculties
diverges from traditional rationalist epistemologies.221 Epistemological naturalism retains
normative claims and the right to offer epistemic “advice” on improving cognitive
practice of traditional epistemologies. Its viability comes in proving itself more effective
than traditional epistemologies. “The naturalistic approach may thereby show its
superiority to traditional epistemology not only in its greater power to explain the

phenomenon of human knowledge, but also in its practical application to the project of
epistemic improvement.”222
David Shatz calls the version of naturalism I have been describing ‘conceptual
naturalism.’ Contrary to Komblith, Shatz says that the traditional task of epistemology is
to define what knowledge is. He says that a naturalistic epistemology holds that “...at
least some key epistemic locutions (S knows that p, S is justified in believing that p) can
be explicated by exclusively ‘naturalistic’ conditions.”223 In this case, only scientific
entities, events, or processes can provide grounds for justifying an epistemological
statement. This agrees with Steven Wagner’s characterization of epistemological
naturalism as taking “natural science as a paradigm of belief.”224 Wagner writes, “The
idea, roughly, is that only scientific beliefs are legitimate or that these have more
legitimacy than any others.”225 Komblith agrees that epistemologists can naturalize their
projects by defining the relevant material conditions upon which proper perception can
take place.226
Whether the task of epistemology is to define knowledge itself or explain how
knowledge is possible, a naturalistic epistemology must define its methods in such a way
that specifically distinguishes it from traditional epistemological projects. Traditionally
the task of epistemology involves two aspects, the condition a person must be in to
perceive correctly, which includes the mechanical functions of perception, and the
cognitive machinery to interpret the ‘given’ and its truth value. Traditional projects

222 Ibid., p. 44.
223 Shatz, “Skepticism and Naturalized Epistemology,” in Wagner and Warner, Naturalism: A Critical
Appraisal, p. 118.
224 Steven J. Wagner, “Why Realism Can’t Be Naturalized,” in Wagner and Warner, Naturalism: A Critical
Appraisal, p. 212.
225 Ibid.
226 Kornblith, pp. 43-49:
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assumed the sufficiency of the material conditions and focused on the cognitive.
Naturalistic epistemologies have swung the opposite direction, though they do not leave
out the cognitive element altogether.
While the task of defining material conditions is an empirical one, the cognitive
task is not. Unless the naturalist is willing to concede direct realism of some sort, the
chasm between perceptual mechanism and cognitive mechanism remains. In addition, the
problem that both Komblith and Shatz face is that of identifying what ‘conditions’ count
as ‘naturalistic.’ If the conditions task is the same for traditional as well as naturalistic
epistemologists, then there is nothing naturalistic at this stage. There does not seem to be
any well-defined set of conditions that count as naturalistic as opposed to the ‘conditions’
of other epistemological programs.227 But if epistemological naturalists restrict their
domain to material conditions, then it has sufficiently distinguished itself from traditional
epistemology, but now faces the problems of trying to define cognition scientifically.
Epistemological Naturalism in Contemporary Use
Two of the most ardent proponents of epistemological naturalism have been
W.V.O. Quine and Philip Kitcher. Although Quine was the first to suggest the idea that
epistemology be naturalized, epistemologists have criticized his description and
application of epistemology as agreement with science, especially psychology. The
controversy, of course, does not center on Quine’s adherence to the natural sciences and
thus naturalism, but the result of his attempt to ‘naturalize’ it on the task of epistemology.
Quine was the first to suggest that epistemologists wholly resolve themselves to
the methods and findings of natural science. But Quine thinks that science is not subject
to philosophy and needs no philosophical justification. For Quine questions about the
227 David Shatz, “Skepticism and Naturalized Epistemology,” in Wagner and Warner, Naturalism: A
Critical Appraisal, p. 118
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justification of empirical knowledge, whether or not they appropriate further and further
toward truth, are to be rejected. Science stands alone as testament to knowledge. Quine
writes that, “[Naturalism] sees natural science as an inquiry into reality, fallible and
corrigible but not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal, and not in need of any
justification beyond observation and they hypothetico-deductive method.” Komblith
says, for Quine, “...the only genuine questions to ask about the relation between theory
and evidence and about the acquisition of belief are psychological questions.”228 Jaegwon
Kim says that on Quine’s theory, “Epistemology is to go out of the business of
justification... Quine is urging us to replace a normative theory of cognition with a
descriptive science.”229 Alvin Goldman is more positive, “But [Quine’s] approach,
though perfectly tenable, neglects the evaluative strain pervading most of historical
epistemology.”230
This rejection of justification puts Quine squarely in the constructivist camp. “So,
put crudely, the view is that we are justified in using a certain method insofar as it helps
us to generate theories that accurately predict.”

'y'y t

Everything boils down to an

engineering problem: trial and error until prediction is satisfied. Quine says,
“...normative epistemology gets naturalized into a chapter of engineering: the technology
of anticipating sensory stimulation.”

The quest for truth has gone out the window.

Though this may sound disconcerting to contemporary naturalists who wish to remain
realists, Quine is quite content to refrain from it. “There is no question here of ultimate

228 Kornblith in Foley, “Quine and Naturalized Epistemology,” in Midwest Studies, Vol. XIX, p. 246
229 Kim in Foley, “Quine and Nat. Epist.,” p. 246.
230 Goldman in Foley, “Quine and Nat. Epist.,”p. 246.
231 Foley, “Quine and Nat..Epist.,” p. 249.
232 Quine in Foley, “Quine and Nat. Epist.,” p. 249.
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value, as in morals; it is a matter of efficacy for an ulterior end, truth or prediction.”
Therefore any theory that would claim realism, a thesis which is not supported by the
sciences, must take place in realm of philosophical justification, which Quine rejects. The
fact that Quine effectively eschews realism is a major point of contention among
contemporary naturalists.
Laurence Bonjour says that if Quine is right, then we are left with a
“thoroughgoing version of skepticism”:
...w e have a set of beliefs, i.e., we accept a set of sentences, that describe the external
world; part of that set of beliefs are caused by observation, i.e., by sensory stimulation;
but we have no cogent reason of any sort for thinking that any of these beliefs are true.
And if knowledge necessarily involves the possession of such reasons, as most
philosophers would still insist, then we also have no knowledge.234

In one sense Quine is the quentissential naturalist, for he identifies all the
necessary moves for post-postivistic philosophy while remaining strictly opposed to
radical empiricism or pure rationalism; but on the other hand, he is a kind of chimera in
that many contemporary naturalists find him controversial and insufficient, or at least
unfulfilled in many respects. Peter Hylton explains:
Quine’s philosophy exhibits a dichotomy that many critics have found puzzling, or
incoherent. On the one hand, his epistemology emphasizes the gap between theory and
evidence; on the other hand, his ontology is unqualifiedly realistic. Epistemologically, he
is concerned to investigate “to what extent science is man’s free creation; to what
extent... it is a put-up job,” and his conclusion is that to a very considerable extent it is a
put-up job. ... In response to the idea that these two views are incompatible, Quine
invokes what he called “naturalism” ; his naturalism, he claims, can reconcile the two.235

Quine defines naturalism as science trained upon itself and given authority to follow
sensory evidence may lead. Quine writes, “Like any technology, it makes free use of
whatever scientific finding may suit its purpose.”

There is controversy over Quine’s

233 Quine in Foley, “Quine and Nat. Epist.,” p. 249.
234 Bonjour, “Against Naturalized Epistemology,” in Midwest Studies, Vol. XIX, p. 287.
235 Peter Hylton, “Quine’s Naturalism,” in Midwest Studies, Vol. XIX, p. 262, emphasis his. Quine’s quote
from Roots o f Reference 1973 pp. 3-4
236 Quine, “Reply to White,” in The Philosophy ofW . V. Quine, pp. 663-65.
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characterization because he has been accused of developing the concepts of “science
itself’ and “first philosophy” in non-standard ways:
What then am I excluding as ‘some prior philosophy,’ and why? Descartes dualism
between mind and body is called metaphysics, but it could as well be reckoned as
science, however false. He even had a causal theory of the interaction of mind and body
through the pineal gland. If I saw indirect explanatory benefit in positing sensibilia,
possibilia, and spirits, a Creator, I would joyfully accord them with scientific status too,
on a par with such avowedly scientific posits as quarks and black holes.237

The “non-standard” way that is criticized is his blatant allowance of the
possibility of nonmaterial

substance being

scientific.

Contemporary naturalists

automatically question the validity of Quine’s examples because of the impossibility of
identifying their causal relationship to the world. Quine thinks that explanatory benefit is
enough to secure rational acceptance.
But why does Quine use this “non-standard” analysis of science? He says,
“Demarcation is not my purpose,” and explains how his point is that method is what
determines a science and not any set of previously standardized criteria. No method is
more successful than the experimental method and therefore every theory can be judged
accordingly. Controversy continues to arise when Quine criticizes the other side of the
positivist/empiricist debate, further blurring the traditional notion of science. He makes it
clear that science is not to be identified with empiricism.238
Even telepathy and clairvoyance are scientific options, however moribund. If would take
some extraordinary evidence to enliven them, but if that were to happen, then
empiricism itself—the crowning norm ...of naturalized epistemology— would go by the
board. For remember that that norm, and naturalized epistemology itself, are integral to
science, and science is fallible and corrigible.
Science... would still be science, the same old language gam e... [but] The
collapse of empiricism would admit extra input by telepathy or revelation, but the test of
the resulting science would still be predicted sensation.39

237 Quine, “Naturalism; or, Living Within One’s Means,” Dialectica, Vol. 49, 1995b, p. 252.
238 Rea, World Without Design, p. 45.
239 Quine, The Pursuit o f Truth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) 20-1, cited in Rea, p. 45

But this is not really as questionable as it might have seemed to an empiricist of
the time. If we take into account Quine’s adherence to science as a fallible discipline, we
can easily respect his recognition that to presuppose empiricism would simply beg the
question of justification. The methods of science, that is experiment and dialogue with
previously held theories, are separable from empiricism, since empiricism implies a
normative project which are not claimed by experiment. Commenting on the above, Rea
notes:
If naturalism is a well-defined view, why beg off the challenge to draw lines between
naturalistic philosophy and non-naturalistic philosophy? But if we take the view...that
methodology is more central to naturalism than any thesis, ontological or otherwise, and
if we keep in mind the fact that the nature of scientific method is not precisely defined, it
becomes very easy to see why Quine says that ‘demarcation is not his purpose’.240

Quine’s epistemology may be described as primarily descriptive while his
naturalism is a normative call for philosophy to strictly adhere to science. We can only
know facts about the way humans come to knowledge through the only legitimate
method of knowing, that is, natural science. Its normative force lies in the pragmatic
success of science as the most effective method of inquiry into the world. Contemporary
epistemologists have found problems with Quine’s reduction of epistemology to
psychology in that, while it adds a previously unaddressed element, it does not
accomplish what the naturalist wants: to proscribe nonnaturalistic beliefs on the basis of
scientific evidence.
Philip Kitcher is an evolutionary naturalist who takes his own project to be
epistemological. Though he is reluctant to applying adaptationism to every area of
interest, he does believe that design and function can be brought about through ‘blind’

240 Rea, p. 42.
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evolutionary processes.241 Kitcher is an ardent defender of a realist position, but Kitcher
believes that scientific methods and findings are largely “nonepistemic,” which means
that it is a theory’s pragmatic “impersonal goals” that matter and not the truth-functional
aspect.

242

Kitcher flips flops on the issue of truth a little. He says that truth is not what he

is interested in, since that is easy to get through logic, and that this truth is boring. He
says, rather, that he is interested in “significant truth,” but he even wants to downplay the
‘truth’ part of this phrase. When he feels pressed about science’s ability to support
realism Kitcher responds, “Perhaps, as I shall suggest later, what we want is significance
and not truth.”

•JA'i

This means that Kitcher either regards all truth as purely vacuous logic

or a property epistemically unavailable to the methods of science. If it is the second,
which I doubt, then Kitcher is not a realist after all. If it is the first, then Kitcher has
redefined realism, as we saw Bergmann do in chapter 2, to fit what he feels can be
defended by science, namely truth as reliabilism rather than correspondence with reality.
Kitcher bases his picture of the relationship between epistemic goals and practical
goals on the fact that different people weight the values of evidence differently, which
precludes agreement on absolute truths on any methodology, but claims that ultimately
the value “system” shared by all persons is the same. He explains:
My picture of the situation is illustrated by the following (obviously artificial)
suggestion. Assume that there are two fundamental epistemic goals E t and £ 2, and a
much larger set of fundamental (nonepistemic) practical goals P \,...,P n. Each person’s
conception of value is given by an assignment of weights, Uy, u2, W], ..., w„. I imagine
that
(i) The absolute values of all the weights are variable from person to person.
(ii) The relative values of the w, vary from person to person.
(iii) The relative values of the w, are constant: i.e., u ju 2 takes some k which is the same
for (almost) all people.
241 Kitcher, “Function and Design,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Philosophy o f Science, Vol. XVIII, p.
396, n. 2.
. 242 Kitcher, The Advancement o f Science, pp. 91-92.
243 Ibid., p. 94, emphasis his.
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To sum up this idea in a simple way, we may suppose that people differ in their
practical values, differ in their understanding of the value of the epistemic, but, insofar
as they commit themselves to any epistemic projects, share the same fundamental value
2d d
system.

Something that makes Kitcher’s position seem odd in light of his realism is that
he is thoroughly Quinean in that he thinks all epistemology should be reduced to
psychology. He has just finished arguing that most of our understanding of the efficacy of
science takes place at the nonepistemic level, based on pragmatic impersonal goals,
inciting images of Neolithic trial and error, and then he argues that, without psychology
as a fundamental element, epistemology is basically positivistic logic chopping:
Despite what the logical positivists taught...rationality and justification are not simple
matters of logical connection among beliefs. When psychology is left out of
epistemology...we are offered the following picture: there are epistemic rules declaring
that a subject who has received a certain stimuli and who believes that p is automatically
justified in that belief (the belief is rational); other rules declaring that if the subject
rationally believes that p and if q bears certain logical relations to p ..., then, if the
subject believes that q, the belief that q is automatically rational. As the last type of
example makes especially obvious, these rules may fail precisely because the
justificatory connections are never made in the life of the subject.245

Kitcher says that the possibility of the subject not “appreciating” a logical relation
forces epistemology into the realm of occurrent beliefs and behaviors based on the
testimony of these beliefs. He writes, “The general moral is that epistemology should be
psychologistic.”246 The interesting thing is that, despite Kitcher’s appeal to psychology
for determining operant factors in belief formation, he does not deny the ‘absolute truths’
of logic, or that p and q, from above, stand in relations that have a truth-functional value
in empirical reality, implying at least the existence of a correspondence theory of truth.
He only doubts human ability to be in possession of the truth-functional values and, in
addition, argues that we do not need them. Practical values within a conceded value

244 Ibid., p' 93, n. 2.
245 Ibid., pp. 183-84.
246 Ibid., p. 184, emphasis his.

system conjoined with a psychological account of why we form the beliefs that we form
is enough, according to Kitcher, to support a naturalistic account of cognition and
scientific realism. This may well be true. Kitcher has certainly offered us a powerful
sketch of epistemology.
So what counts as ‘rational belief forming processes’ for Kitcher? Interestingly
enough, his criterion for determining rational acceptance of a methodological system is
very similar to the account of epistemic warrant offered by Plantinga in chapter 1.
Remember that Plantinga’s (EW) went as follows:
(EW) A belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive
faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that
is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is
successfully aimed at truth.247

Kitcher calls his criterion “The External Standard,” (ES), and explicates it as follows:
(ES) The shift from one individual practice to another was rational if and only if the
process through which the shift was made has a success ratio at least as high as that of
any other process used by human beings (past, present, and future) across the set of
epistemic contexts that includes all possible combinations of possible initial practices
(for human beings) and possible stimuli (given the world as it is and the characteristics
of the human recipient).248

The contexts of epistemic function and combinations of initial practices of
Kitcher correspond roughly to the proper functioning of faculties in appropriate
environments of Plantinga. Whereas Plantinga’s warrant is successful only if the subject
believes his project is approximating truth, Kitcher’s subject can be comfortable with a
greater success ratio of one belief over another. Since Kitcher believes that natural
selection can produce complexity and the appearance of design there is no conflict with
Plantinga’s requirement of a design plan, though Kitcher’s plan runs just shy of the
‘truth’ toward which Plantinga’s is aimed. Of course, Plantinga’s only achieves truth if

247 Plantinga, Warranted Christian B elief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 156.
248 Kitcher, Advancement o f Science, p. 189.
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something acts in addition to natural selection to guarantee truth-approximating faculties,
such as a creative God.
The supposedly naturalistic aspect of Kitcher’s epistemology, as well as Quine’s,
is the introduction of the psychologistic element that makes room for relativism with
regard to what is ‘taken to be’ ‘truth’ or compelling argument. Kitcher also follows Quine
in accepting reliabilist justification for the success of science. But, interestingly, Kitcher’s
project is not very different from that of Plantinga’s. The upshot is that a psychologistic
project such as Kitcher’s does not seem to proscribe the rational holding of
nonnaturalistic beliefs, such as those of Plantinga. Even if we followed Kitcher’s
suggestions holistically, it does not seem that we would end up at any normative claims
concerning the sole authority of the sciences for determining legitimate inquiry. In fact,
Plantinga argues quite to the contrary that an epistemology based on successful scientific
reasoning actually has the ability to support a supematuralistic theism.
The questions that contemporary epistemological naturalists must answer is how
naturalistic epistemology differs from traditional epistemology and to what extent they,
through the sciences, proscribe nonnaturalistic beliefs. Whereas many have undertaken
the first task with a great deal of success, the second task remains. Because the second
task remains, and remains difficult, many naturalists have rejected the attempt to
formulate a specific epistemology.
The Controversy over Epistemological Naturalism
Problems with epistemological naturalism take a number of forms. One is whether
the project should be normative or descriptive. Another problem, or set of problems,
concerns whether naturalized epistemologies can even address traditional questions about
knowledge, or, whether, after a project has been sufficiently ‘naturalized’ those questions
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are even intelligible. Another problem is whether and to what extent naturalized
epistemologies are practically different from traditional epistemologies. We have seen
that the main difference concerns which half of the epistemological project is given
primacy (whether physical mechanism or cognitive mechanism) and the type of evidence
allowed into analysis. But of course, nether natural epistemologies or traditional
epistemologies deny that thoughts, beliefs, mental states, and reasoning strategies play
key roles in the acquisition of knowledge. The fruitfulness of any epistemology is shown
only by argument, and though the naturalistic dispositions mentioned in chapter two are
evident in the work of epistemologists who are naturalists, it is unclear to what extent this
is exemplified in their theories.
Since naturalism has defined its only relevant source for epistemic evidence to be
obtained from natural science, the question of justifying an epistemological position gets
cloudy. Laurence Bonjour says that the central problem with naturalized epistemology is
that of justification. As an analytic thesis, epistemological naturalism is committed to the
truth, however tenuous and well qualified, of the findings of natural science. But what is
the epistemological justification for this whole-hearted acceptance? Notice that the claim,
“We should only believe what can be scientifically proven,” is self-defeating, since the
statement itself cannot be scientifically proven. If you believe it then you need scientific
justification for believing it, since we should only believe that which can be scientifically
proven. But this assumes what is intended to be proven. So, the answer to the question of
why choose to believe only what can be scientifically proven, is only pragmatic. Science
has proven effective for ‘doing things’ in the past. Does this conclusion hold any negative
implications for naturalism or epistemology when considered independently? Not at all. It
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just indicates that there might be a better characterization of naturalism than
‘epistemological,’ as I hope to show in chapter 4, when naturalism is construed as a
worldview.
3.7: Methodological Naturalism
Methodological naturalism is naturalism intent upon determining the only
legitimate methods of inquiry into reality, using the methods and findings of the natural
sciences. Methodological naturalists do not typically defend specific epistemological or
ontological theses for their projects. This is not to say that certain theses are not assumed
or argued for under different circumstances, but that specific analytic theses or specific
philosophical projects are not the defining characteristic of methodological naturalism.
Methodological naturalists typically accept that the same project undertaken by science,
that is, inquiry into the nature of the world, should be the project undertaken by
philosophy, though with emphasis on the more abstract issues. Philosophy tends to
become theoretical or conceptual science.
Methodological naturalists take their naturalism to be a feature of products of the
project of science rather than defenses of ‘naturalistic’ positions. They sometimes qualify
their position as naturalistic and then go on to make arguments that have nothing to do
with naturalism or even philosophy specifically. Examples of such works include Paul
Sheldon Davies’s Norms o f Nature: Naturalism and the Nature o f Functions,249 where he
does little more than define naturalism and then only allows it to be relevant for one
chapter, Elliot Sober’s collection Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology,

where all

of the contributions derive from a naturalistic point of view, but none explicitly describe
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or defend it, and Wilfrid Sellars’s Naturalism and Ontology, where he scarcely hints at
what naturalism might be in his introduction only to never speak of it again.
The version of naturalism characterized by ‘methodological’ is somewhat trickier
to define than the previous two. This has been to the advantage of some naturalists for
defending this position. It’s sometimes vague formulation leads critics on rabbit trails and
straw men, which all but ignore some of the fundamental issues involved. The arguments
invariably turn to the specific argument that the naturalist is defending rather than
addressing the naturalistic presupposition on which it is based. The central feature of
methodological naturalism is its emphasis on the explanatory function of philosophical
arguments and the methods of science that support explanation. Naturalist Robert
Pennock writes,
The methodological naturalist does not make a commitment directly to a picture of what
exists in the world, but rather to a set of methods as a reliable way to find out about the
world— typically the methods of the natural sciences, and perhaps extensions that are
continuous with them— and indirectly to what those methods discover.251

The most general and widely held characterization of methodological naturalism
is the thesis that the methods employed in the empirical natural sciences are the only
methods capable of generating legitimate knowledge. Since its main concern is the
methods for obtaining knowledge, it is ultimately an epistemological question, but it is
rarely couched as such. And methodological naturalists may not even accept the task of
epistemological naturalism. In fact, it is a virtue of methodological naturalism that it does
not adhere to any analytic thesis strictly. Pennock continues from above,
An important feature of science is that its conclusions are defeasible on the basis of new
evidence, so whatever tentative substantive claims the methodological naturalist makes
are always open to revision or abandonment on the basis of new, countervailing
evidence. Because the base commitment of a methodological naturalist is to a mode of

251 Pennock, Tower o f Babel, p. 191.
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investigation that is good for finding out about the empirical world, even the specific
methods themselves are open to change and improvem ent...252

This commitment to the open-endedness of science gives methodological
naturalism more prima facie support than the previous versions of naturalism. Unlike, for
example, ontological naturalism, which makes “substantive claims about what exists and
then adds a closure clause stating ‘and that is all there is,”’253 methodological naturalism
holds its claims tenuously, just as the methods it employs. Because of this it might seem
odd to characterize methodological naturalism as an analytic thesis at all. Its open-ended
claims make it sound very similar to what we will define as a worldview in chapter 4.
The aspect that holds it under the rubric of ‘strict analytic thesis’ is, again, the normative
claim inherent to naturalism itself. The methods of the natural sciences, according to
methodological naturalism, are the only legitimate methods of inquiry, even if those
methods are ever changing.
Methodological Naturalism in Contemporary Use
Many in the methodological camp have disagreed with Quine’s radical
“replacement naturalism,” on which epistemology is replaced by empirical psychology.
Methodologists have attempted to avoid the dilemmas posed by philosophical theses.
Every epistemological attempt in history was an attempt to combat skepticism. Quine
thought the only way out was “replacement naturalism” by way of an argument that
David Shatz calls the “argument from despair”:
The traditional project of validating common sense and scientific beliefs in the face of
the skeptical challenge has been, and is doomed to be, a failure; therefore, the project is
best dropped; therefore, “epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a
chapter of psychology and hence natural science” (Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,”
82-83).254

252 Ibid.
253 Ibid., p: 190.
254 Shatz, p. 117.
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Quine and replacement naturalists like Kitcher, assume therefore, that there are
only two options for true knowledge, a priori justification of a rationalist type, supported
by pure reason, or a radical abandon to the pragmatic nature of contingent reality. The
first option was a failed or unfruitful project; the second option is undesirable.
... [M]ethodologists are confronted with a dilemma. Either they can continue to insist
that philosophers know a priori the principles of confirmation and evidence, concluding
that the actual reasoning of scientists is cognitively deficient, or they can abandon the a
priori status of methodological claims and use the performances of the past and present
sciences as a guide to formulating a fallible theory of confirmation and evidence. Since
the first option has an uncomfortable air of arrogance, it is hardly surprising that most
responses to Kuhn have followed the latter course.255

In order to adhere to some version of integrative methodological naturalism, one
must have a theory of justification that threads the eye of the dilemma. Shatz claims that
just such a theory is found in a thesis called “dialectical naturalism”.256 Instead of
dropping the epistemological project altogether, and especially that of refuting the
skeptic, a dialectic in the form of a debate takes place with the skeptic, using various
philosophical means to show that appeal to empirical findings is not problematic with
regard to justification.
In particular, you incur no vicious circularity by appealing to empirical data to validate
the reliability of human faculties or to establish claims about the conditions in which
beliefs are formed (viz., that they are formed in circumstances conducive to their being
true); you do not fall into relativism; and you do not fall prey to specific skeptical
challenges such as arguments based on the possibility of illusions.257

This dialectical approach seems to mirror Laurence Bonjour’s “third alternative”
with regard to the dilemma. He claims that this third option is what has been termed
“inference to the best explanation” in contemporary theory. Instead of “(i) sticking
stubbornly and perhaps dogmatically to one’s initial, allegedly a priori precepts,” or “(ii)

255 Kitcher, “The Naturalists Return,” Philosophical Review, Vol. 101,1992, p. 73, cited in Bonjour,
“Against Naturalized Epistemology,” p. 294.
256 Shatz, p. 120.
257 Ibid.
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adopting what may seem to amount to an abandonment of philosophy altogether in favor
of a kind of psychology or sociology of scientific practice,” there is a “seemingly
obvious” third option,
(iii) reconsidering one’s initial a priori assessment in light of what scientists seem to be
doing, while insisting that any acceptable mode of scientific reasoning must ultimately
be able to be seen or shown to be rationally cogent in an a priori way that transcends the
mere fact that it is employed in practice.258

Methodological naturalism seems most identifiable as a form of dialectical
naturalism. No one who was partial to naturalism really took Quine’s route, leaving
justification behind; nor did they give up science for a priori theorizing, since they would
also have given up the progress made through the demise of Classical Foundationalism
and Verificationism, and would have missed out on the power of inference to the best
explanation. Bonjour explains the historical context of dialectical naturalism:
What eventually happened, of course, was not an abandonment of a priori epistemology
in favor of psychology or sociology, but rather the realization of a gradually increasing
group of philosophers, beginning with Peirce, that the initial philosophical view was
seriously oversimplified and that an a priori case (or at least apparent case) could be
made for the kind of reasoning in question (what has come to be called “inference to the
best explanation”). I do not mean to suggest that such reasoning is now entirely
unproblematic or that the issues in question have been fully resolved. The point for now
is just that this case illustrates a third alternative.. ,259

If methodological naturalists have made headway with this ‘third alternative,’
without which previous philosophies of science have struggled, then what are we to make
of epistemological or ontological naturalism? These are obviously more serious about an
analytic thesis than methodological naturalists, but they do not prescribe a radically
empiricist doctrine, relegating every claim, even logical claims, to the mercy of
contingent science. The question is pertinent and, as we have seen, many naturalists
choose an anti-justificationist stance claiming that the proofs and value of science and

258 Bonjour, “Against Naturalized Epistemology,” p. 294.
259 Ibid., pp. 294-95.

claim that this includes the necessary rationality for the acceptance of a naturalist
doctrine. This is, of course, the weakness of these theories. They are weak because they
are left with only two options: (1) make claims completely consistent with the natural
sciences, which deprives them of normative force with regard to epistemic claims about
the scope of knowledge or reality as a whole, making their claims to science’s total
epistemic authority unjustified, or (2) claim that naturalism just is philosophy in the role
of science, which makes it tautologous with scientific methods, and not naturalism at all,
since conflicting worldviews are consistent with this claim. Methodological naturalism
has more room to make use of scientific reasoning, arguing that the explanatory power of
the methods of science is greater than traditional philosophical systems, and therefore
deserves greater attention. The only question that is left is the justification of the
normative claim that scientific methods are the only legitimate methods of obtaining
knowledge. Their pragmatic stance toward the methods of science potentially undermines
their central claim. Paul Moser and Keith Yandell provide three possible formulations of
methodological naturalism:
(iv) Eliminative methodological naturalism: all terms, including empirically disputed
terms (for example, normative and intentional terms), employed in legitimate methods of
acquiring knowledge are replaceable, without cognitive loss, by terms employed in the
hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences.
(v) Non-eliminative reductive methodological naturalism: all terms, including
empirically disputed terms, employed in legitimate methods of acquiring knowledge
either are replaceable, without cognitive loss, by terms employed in the hypothetically
completed methods of the empirical sciences or are reducible (by, for example,
definition, mutual entailment, or entailment) to terms employed in those methods.
(vi) Non-eliminaiive non-reductive methodological naturalism: some empirically
disputed terms employed in legitimate methods of acquiring knowledge neither are
replaceable by terms employed in the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical
sciences nor are reducible to those terms, but the referents of these terms supervene upon
those of the terms employed in the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical
•. sciences. 260

,

260 Moser and Yandell, “Farewell to Philosophical Naturalism,” p. 9.
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As with their characterizations of ontological naturalism, these formulas highlight
shifts in perspective on certain entities that show up in scientific theories. The aspect to
notice is the tendency to use science as a tool for proscribing from the realm of rational
inquiry methods that are supposedly illegitimate. Given Pennock’s definition of
methodological naturalism above it seems unreasonable to think a methodological
naturalist would presume a hypothetically complete aspect of the sciences that could
determine something substantive with regard to inquiry. But, given that methodological
naturalism remains an analytic thesis, this must be the implication of a normative claim
concerning the ‘only’ legitimate methods of inquiry.
The Controversy Over Methodological Naturalism
The most prominent problem surrounding methodological naturalism is the
inability of critics and proponents to keep the issues of argument clear. If an attack
purportedly intends to undermine the naturalistic disposition of an opponent, the attack
must be directed toward the relevant aspects of the opponent’s naturalism. If it is
methodological naturalism, the critic must either focus on the specifically naturalistic
adherence to science as possessing the only legitimate methods of obtaining knowledge,
or the use to which the theorist puts scientific knowledge in order to defend an
explanatory or methodological function in his or her overall argument. What often
happens is that the argument turns specifically to the issue at hand in the argument being
offered rather than the naturalism that is supposedly the problem in the first place.
Alvin Plantinga begins an argument against methodological naturalism in his
article, “Methodological Naturalism?” by identifying the position with ‘provisional
atheism.’ “[Methodological naturalism] is the idea that science, properly so-called,
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cannot involve religious belief or commitment.”

1

This definition obviously colors the

rest of Plantinga’s attack on methodological naturalism, possibly, though I am not
prepared to argue it, missing the point of why methodological naturalism might imply the
rejection of religious belief. Interestingly, in reply to Plantinga, naturalist Michael Ruse
does not clarify the problem:
I have characterized the notion— ...as indeed I did in the Arkansas Creation Trial...— as
an approach to the empirical world that demands understanding in terms of unbroken
law (Ruse 1982, 1988, 1995, 1996). That is to say, it requires understanding in terms of
regularities, which in some way or another we feel are more than mere contingencies,
but rather part o f the necessary succession of the empirical world. Neither I, nor anyone
else, has ever insisted in our characterization of methodological naturalism that the
necessity o f law be interpreted in and only in some particular way. I myself have
endorsed a neo-Humean position, seeing the necessity of laws as a natural regularity on
which one imposes an evolutionarily derived psychological construction.262

Here we see strains of the methodological dispositions that we described early on
as foundational to naturalism. ‘Unbroken law’ and ‘necessary regularities’ imply the
causal closure of the universe. There are hints at the priority of science over theory and,
of course, a strong adherence to the natural sciences. Methodological naturalism is
described as an ‘approach’; it is a normative guide for conducting scientific research.
Ruse also reminds us of the normative importance that Darwinism plays in theory. But
nowhere do we hear him say anything about the methods of the empirical sciences or
legitimate knowledge claims. What he does say, implicitly, is that all explanatory
arguments must reduce to claims concerning causal closure within a system of unbroken
law. Because he addresses the explanatory feature of causal closure, Ruse’s position is
technically conceived as a methodological position. Until he offers some reason to
believe that a finding or method of science supports physicalism (which he does not) his
explanation is not analytically naturalistic—it remains a presupposition.
261 Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism?” in Pennock, Intelligent Design Creationism..., pp. 340, 341
262 Ruse, “Methodological Naturalism under Attack” in Pennock, Intelligent Design Creationism..., pp.
366-67.
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Ruse does not appeal to any method of science, except explanatory reliance on a
system of unbroken laws. But within science unbroken laws are part of the conditional
ceteris paribus perspective on which investigation is based. So long as the laws have
remained unbroken, or nothing new has been introduced into the system on which the
laws can act, then we may predict X. But, of course, the anti-naturalistic claims of
Plantinga are directed to the crack in the ceteris paribus clause: indeed, something has
either broken the laws, or something (like matter or physical events) has been introduced
on which the laws can act. And science is not the type of project that can make a
judgment about these factors. And how is the naturalist to justify scientifically the claim
that something like the resurrection of Jesus did not occur?
Therefore Plantinga has misdefined methodological naturalism and Ruse has
presupposed it without criticizing Plantinga’s bias only to defend himself through
physicalism, which does not provide the necessary justification for a position supposedly
supported by the sciences. The clarification of positions could enable arguments to be
more fruitful. In addition, it remains unclear that any naturalistic position that I have
defined has adequately met the demands of some form of justification for the normative
claims involved.
An Unresolved Problem
Have I shown that naturalists hold the strictly normative claim that the only
legitimate form of knowledge is scientific knowledge? I have at least shown how
naturalists appeal to science above all else, and how they eschew traditional forms of
philosophical analysis. I have also shown that they provide little by way of justification
for naturalism apart from the success of the sciences. But do they hold more than a mere
strict adherence to science? Do they hold, in addition, the normative claim, proscribing
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other possible forms of inquiry that may produce legitimate knowledge? Let me quickly
review some comments from naturalists.
Concerning a priori theorizing, Hilary Komblith writes, “It is of little concern to
defenders of such views that there is no more place for these things in contemporary
scientific theory than there is for phlogiston, entelechies, or telekinesis.”263 In addition
she writes, that there is, “ ...no extrascientific route to metaphysical understanding.”264
Jerry Fodor thinks that we must presuppose a reduction of some form to empirically
available structures. He writes, “ ...what we want at minimum is something of the form
‘R represents S’ is true iff C where the vocabulary in which condition C is couched
contains neither intentional nor semantic expressions.”265 Naturalist Keith Parsons agrees
with Philip Johnson when he writes, “Naturalism does not explicitly deny the mere
existence of God, but it does deny that a supernatural being could in any way influence
natural events, such as evolution, or communicate with material creatures like
ourselves.”266 Naturalist Philip Pettit, in 1992, wrote that, “Naturalism imposes a
constraint on what there can be, stipulating that there are no nonnatural or unnatural,
praetematural or supernatural entities.” Naturalist Frederick Schmidt, in 1995 wrote,
“Ontological naturalism is the view...that only natural objects, kinds, and properties are
real.” In addition to what I have already covered, naturalist William Rowe writes, “As a
philosophical position, naturalism holds (1) that the only reliable methods of knowing
what there is are method continuous with those of the developed sciences...”

It seems,

263 Kornblith, p. 40.
264 Ibid.
265 Fodor, “Semantics, Wisconsin Style” p. 32.
266 Philip Johnson, Darwin on Trial, pp. 116-17.
267 William L. Rowe, “Theological Naturalism,” Cambridge Dictionary o f Philosophy, p. 911, emphasis
mine.
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then, that we at least have testimony to a central continuity among naturalists, namely
that the methods of the natural sciences are the only allowable methods of obtaining
knowledge.
After examining naturalism as an analytic thesis, we see that there are many
unanswered questions concerning its justification as a unifier of science and it autonomy
in explaining reality as a whole. Rosenberg says that naturalism has yet to bridge the
logical gap between causation and justification. Material causation provides no grounds
for belief.
In the empiricist’s hands, justification is a logical relation (employing deductive or
inductive logic) between evidence (sensory experience) and conclusion, and logic is a
matter of meanings. Naturalists, or at least Quineans, cannot help themselves to this way
of drawing the distinction between causation and justification. Yet draw it they must.
Without recourse to a “first philosophy”, some body of a priori truths, or even
definitions, naturalism can only appeal to the sciences themselves to understand the
inference rules, methods of reasoning, methodologies of inquiry and principles of
epistemology which will distinguish between those conclusions justified by evidence
and those not justified by it.268

Rosenberg goes on to explain that if naturalism appealed to any justification apart
from pure scientific practice and/or findings, it would be reasoning in a circle.
“Naturalism is thus left with an as yet unfulfilled obligation.”269 Some naturalists
recognize this intrinsic flaw of naturalism. Quentin Smith actually concedes that every
attempt at a justification for naturalism has been defeated by theists.

ones

Alex Rosenberg

acknowledges that the naturalist has an “unfulfilled obligation,”271 but things are hardly
as bleak as all that. If nothing else, an occurrent belief in the falsity of supematuralism is
prima facie justification for naturalism regardless of the lack of any cognitivist
foundation. They may still seek out a justification or work within the framework of a

. 268 Rosenberg, Philosophy o f Science, p. 154
. 269 Ibid.
270 Quentin Smith, “Metaphilosophy of Naturalism,” Philo: A Journal o f Philosophy, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 5.
271 Rosenberg, Philosophy o f Science, p.
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broadly naturalist worldview. But what might this be? It is certainly not a philosophical
position in terms of a reasoned thesis. But such a thesis is rarely demanded at the
individual level.
If there is such a thing as basic beliefs for which no independent justification is
required, and an individual, seeking information about the world within a system of belief
that held only empirical data as basic evidence, that individual (we typically say) would
be warranted in holding that system of beliefs. The warrant involved here is not
specifically “rational” in the traditional foundationalist sense, since the system was not
chosen based on any evidence, and not justified logically, and since there are no
“rational” grounds offered because of which the beliefs are held. But this definition of
what is to count as “rational” was found to be too strict long ago. A belief is warranted if
it is acquired in a reasonable way, as we said in chapter 2, though the qualification
‘reasonable’ may differ from circumstance to circumstance. The usefulness of a
warranted belief tends to be derived from scientific reasoning and practice. This makes
naturalism viable if found to be more practical than any other position. I am calling
naturalism as a warranted belief a worldview, since all worldviews are the culmination of
a set of relevantly basic beliefs. In the next chapter I will argue that naturalism has never
been formulated into a successful analytic argument and that its strict adherence to
science actually disallows such an argument in favor of naturalism. This means that
characterizing naturalism as a worldview is the only plausible alternative. I will examine
the structure of naturalism as a worldview and argue that naturalism retains plausibility
on this route, but that, despite this plausibility, there are some implications that might be
less than desirable.
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.. .the native naturalist’s tendency to thrust her head in the scientific sands when encountering foreigners
from distant cognitive lands— and then to malign their unscientific epistemological practices— smacks of
an imperialism...
(Marc Alspector-Kelley, “Empiricism Naturalized,” fn. 15)

Chapter 4: A Critique of Naturalism
4.1: Critique o f Naturalism as an Analytic Thesis
The central question for naturalism as an analytic position is whether science, in
method or result, is sufficient to the task of deductively justifying the claim that science is
the only legitimate method of inquiry. Science has proven itself through the working out
of science and I agree that we cannot be discouraged by the circularity of such a
justification. Quine argued that all epistemological questions should be relegated to the
field of scientific psychology, which, as a branch of science, could still enlighten us to the
manner by which we come to know. He defends his suggestion against the objection of
circularity:
Such a surrender of the epistemological burden to psychology is a move that was
disallowed in earlier times as circular reasoning. However, such scruples against
circularity have little point since we have stopped dreaming of deducing science from
observations. If we are out simply to understand the link between observation and
science, we are well advised to use any available information, including that provided by
the very science whose link with observation we are seeking to understand.27

Michael Rea also defends the naturalist against circularity with regard to the efficacy of
science when he allows that science might warrant the qualification ‘self-justifying’:
I must admit that it is hard to accept the idea that science, or indeed any discipline, could
be self-justifying. But it appears that something like this must be accepted by naturalists
and nonnaturalists alike. After all, nobody believes that we have infinitely many sources
o f evidence, each being certified as reliable sources at a higher level. Thus, naturalists
and nonnaturalists alike must believe that at least some sources of evidence are
appropriately trusted even in the absence of evidence certifying their reliability. ... We
might say, then, that at least some sources of evidence stand in no need o f justification.
But we might just as well speak in terms of self-justification, where a source is said to be
self-justifying just in case (a) it is trusted in the absence of evidence for its own
reliability, and (b) it delivers consistent outputs and fails to generate evidence that leads
to self-defeat.273
272 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” reprinted in American Philosophical Naturalism in the Twentieth
Century, ed. John Ryder (Amherst, New York: Prometheus, 1994) p. 300.
273 Rea, World Without Design, p. 61,emphasis his.
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Rea goes on to say that, in the case of naturalism, scientific findings do not confer
justification upon naturalism if construed analytically, though, importantly, they do not
generate information that eliminates them as a source of evidence. The crucial point for
the naturalist is that scienfitic evidence has done nothing to eliminate the claim that
science is the only legitimate form of epistemic evidence, thus warranting naturalism as a
worldview. As we saw in the section on realism (2.7), it might be the case that
Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism gives us good reason to doubt that
science is a source of epistemic evidence at all. But my claim concerning that argument
was weaker than Plantinga’s in that I think Plantinga’s argument defeats the belief that
science, unaided by some additional warranted belief, is or could be a realist program. If
I am correct, then we may take it that science is self-justifying in just the way Rea defines
it above, and the way Ramsey defined reliability in section 2.7 (as a product of
evolutionary development based on reliable behavioral interaction with an environment).
But this leaves us with a pragmatic program, just as the positivists recognized.
Now we are back to the question of why it matters whether science is a realist
program or not. This does not entail any defeat for science or reliable (as opposed to
truth-approximating) cognitive function when both are narrowly conceived

as

mechanisms for determining consistency within a goal-specified scope of research
interest. Most naturalists, however, make the additional claim that science is the only
legitimate method of coming to know the world, a concept that implies truth in the
classical sense. Naturalists who are philosophers generally accept that truth is a necessary
component of knowledge. But if it is the case that science is self-justifying within its
goal-specified scope, then nothing guarantees that it is self-justifying for all Such goal-
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specifying scopes. "This is especially the case with the goal of truth-approximation, since
it is a fallacy to assume that what is systematically empirically successful is also true.
And nothing guarantees that it, then, is the only legitimate method of obtaining
knowledge. Systematic empirical success does show us however that science is one
legitimate method for the goal-specified purposes of prediction and manipulation,
especially within the realm of physical entities, which is the central specified goal of
scientific research. Both Quine and Carnap quickly realized that a program that cannot
connect to the truth-conditions of the world becomes a constructivist enterprise.
Concerning Carnap’s Logical Reconstruction o f the World, Quine wrote:
If Carnap had successfully carried such a construction through, how could he have told
whether it was the right one? The question would have had no point. He was seeking
what he called a rational reconstruction. Any construction of physicalistic discourse in
terms of sense experience, logic, and set theory would have been seen as satisfactory if it
made the physicalistic discourse come out right. If there is one way there are many, but
any would be a great achievement.274

Quine’s statement is referring to Carnap’s logically reductive program that
everyone came to understand was physically impossible. But the statement can be
extended to all pragmatic programs, since pragmatism typically implies a certain amount
of constructivism. Without some additional scientific finding—perhaps a “meta-finding”
that indicates something about the system of investigation as a whole275—there is no
scientific evidence available to analytically justify a naturalist’s claim to realism. In
addition, if science is a pragmatic program, as successful as it is and may yet become for
its purposes, the naturalist has no room to claim an exclusive role for science, at least not
analytically. Naturalist Marc Alspector-Kelley concurs in this regard:

274 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” p. 300.
275 Note that I make no claims as to what a ‘meta-finding’ might consist of. The concept that comes to mind
is a theoretical argument to the best explanation based upon relevant physical data. It seems to me that such
an argument must presuppose naturalism as a worldview in order to construct a theory that would support
naturalism as a worldview, thereby constituting a circular argument.
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...one might contend that science stands in no need o f such external validation, but insist
that without it science enjoys no unique significance that is not enjoyed by other forms
of cognitive life. Science presents us with a wealth of opinion, but it is not the only
institution that does so; there are, for example, a variety of alternative religious world
views. 1 might agree that science stands in no need of philosophical validation only
because no such alternative requires it. I might then proceed to adopt the scientific
standpoint, perhaps as in keeping with local tendencies, while recognizing the adoption
of other standpoints—perhaps in keeping with tendencies in other localities—to be
equally legitimate.276

Alspector-Kelley immediately follows with, “That is not naturalism.” Naturalism, he
says, is the “endorsement of science’s authority over other forms of intellectual life.”277
The naturalist considers science the “best measure of right opinion.”278 He says that
naturalism needs something, in addition to the respected success of science, to justify
naturalism, yet the naturalist, in strictly adhering to the open-ended posture of science,
rejects any such addition:
...first philosophy would at least have provided grounds for science’s authority: science
would enjoy an authority derivative from the authority of the philosophical higher court
and its favourable judgment.2791161 But without such external credentials, it is hard to
understand why the respect she accords the scientific endeavor is deserved. What, in the
absence of first philosophy, renders the authority of science legitimate rather than
despotic? To say that science is the best measure o f right opinion is to apply a standard
o f some sort to the scientific endeavor, against which it measures up. But the autonomy
of science, which distinguishes the naturalist from the first philosopher, seems to rule
out the very possibility that such a standard is available.280

Alspector-Kelley says the naturalist faces a sort of Euthyphro dilemma. The
problem comes back to that of circularity. The naturalist considers science to have earned
her intellectual respect, but if science has no independent standard of first philosophy it is
difficult to see how this respect could be earned. “The authority of science upon which
the naturalist insists looks either despotic or arbitrary without such a standard; but the
naturalist, no more than Euthyphro, does not intend science’s authority to be despotic or

276 Alspector-Kelley, “Empiricism Naturalized,” p. 13.
277 Ibid., p. 14.
278 Ibid., emphasis his.
2791161 It would, of course, then behoove the first philosopher to identify the source for the philosophical
court’s authority. [Part of quote text.]
280 Marc Alspector-Kelly, p. 14, emphasis mine.
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arbitrary.”281 It is the “interaction” of the naturalist’s adherence to both the autonomy of
science and the authority of science that constitutes a dilemma similar to that of
Euthyphro.
A philosopher could hold that science has complete autonomy—that is, the
complete rejection of a priori philosophy— if it conceded that science had no “epistemic
significance” and precisely because he acknowledges that such a strict validation is not
available. This philosophy would then live content among, “a variety of alternative
religious world-views.” But this is, again, “not naturalism,” according to AlspectorKelley. Naturalism is insistent upon the addition of the, “endorsement of science’s
authority over other forms of intellectual life.”282 This, of course, places the naturalist in
the position of being critical of worldviews not in accord with the epistemic content of
science, even those that are not specifically a priori in nature. But Alspector-Kelley, a
naturalist himself, argues that first philosophy of some sort is required to justify why
science would “deserve” such an honored epistemic status.
The Euthyphro-type dilemma should be clearer now. In Plato’s dialogue, Socrates
questions whether that which is pious is so because it is loved by the gods or whether the
gods love what is pious because it is by nature pious. The conflict comes when Euthyphro
considers that the gods must be the final authority, but that in choosing what to love, that
which is pious is then arbitrary, and even different from god to god. Euthyphro does not
want to admit that the gods choose arbitrarily and wants to say that the gods love that
which it is right to love. On the other hand, if the gods appeal to something that is by
nature pious, then they admit that they are not the final authority on such matters.

281 Ibid., p. 15.
282 Ibid., p. 14.
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Similarly, the naturalist considers her alignment with science rather than with other
cognitive endeavors to be appropriate because, like Euthyphro, she considers science to
have earned her respect in such as way as to legitimize the authority she ascribes to it.
But without such an independent standard as the first philosopher purports to offer, it is
hard to see how that respect could have been earned. The authority of science upon
which the naturalist insists looks either despotic or arbitrary without such a standard; but
the naturalist, no more than Euthyphro, does not intend science’s authority to be despotic
or arbitrary.283

A naturalist needs additional justification to make her claims rationally
authoritative. By “authoritative” I mean precisely what Alspector-Kelley means—that
naturalism has an analytic connection to science to the effect that science has the final say
about the nature of reality. But to obtain this justification she would have to step beyond
the bounds of science, which would undermine her naturalism; and then it seems
naturalism’s adherence to science would be purely arbitrary and without authority. But
this is far from what the naturalist desires:
The naturalist cannot be accused of inconsistency if she admits that her alignment with
science is arbitrary, that this is merely how she has decided to proceed in light o f first
philosophy’s downfall, and that others are free to react in other ways. But that is, again,
not the naturalist’s view. She is not merely engaged in an autobiographical description of
her reaction to the fall of first philosophy. She also recommends that philosophy be
pursued in alignment with science, that this is the right, or the best, way to proceed. But
that normative judgment seems to require a standard against which science (and other
pursuits) is measured, a standard which the downfall of first philosophy itself seems to
render unavailable.284

Quine thinks that there are only two options available for the justification of
science: a rational reconstruction, in the spirit of Carnap, or psychological analysis. What
Quine fails to see is that there are any number of competing options for the project. Just
because a Carnapian reduction failed, nothing guarantees a default to psychologism,
“ ...epistemology could fall into place as a chapter of Zoroastrian mysticism, or Christian
fundamentalism, or Pythagorian numerology, or . . .

.

The failure of the first-

philosophical project does not in itself imply that epistemology must be embedded in
scientific psychology instead of within one of these alternative traditions.”285
Alspector-Kelley attempts to overcome the Euthyprho Dilemma of naturalism by
adding empiricism to the naturalist’s claims. He characterizes the empiricism that he
needs as a doctrine obtained purely through empirical data and not a first philosophical
reduction, which would merely restate the Euthyphro problem. This type of empiricism,
when added to naturalism, explains that all information ultimately begins with sensory
experience and that, with an empirical epistemology being the only one available, the
naturalist is rationally justified in holding both the autonomy and authority of science.
What Alspector-Kelley does not seem to realize is that he is making the
assumption that an empiricism of the kind he is prescribing will naturally (no pun
intended) work in favor of naturalism as opposed to in favor of some anti-naturalistic
doctrine. But it is obvious from the twentieth century work in analytic philosophy of
religion, especially scientific theologies like the contemporary work of biophysicist,
theologian, and philosopher Alister McGrath,286 that empiricism, as Alspector-Kelley
describes it, may not be restricted to use by the naturalist. Also, in making this move,
Alspector-Kelley admits to shifting in the direction of pragmatism and away from
realism, though he does not admit it specifically. He is moving the weight of his evidence
into one horn of the Euthyphro problem. Instead of seeking analytic justification, he
wants to say that empiricism provides broadly inductive justification. He wants to keep
the normative claim, as he said, and supplement the philosophical justification with a
broadly empirical one. By restricting all of his evidence to perceptual evidence, it is clear
285 Ibid., p. 17.
286 Alister E. McGrath, The Science o f God: An Introduction to Scientific Theology (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2004).
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that he incurs the skeptical threat of anti-realism. For an example of his implicit
admission of this, he employs an example similar to that of Plantinga, which I explained
in section 2.7, of how perceptual information can be reliable, yet false in a significant
sense.
He explains that, when faced with minor perceptual illusions, such as the
perception of relative distance affected when we are observing underwater, we are
provided a narrow scope of information [what he labels “informationi”] for which we can
adjust our normal mode of interpretation to account for error. But when perceptual
content must convey a “message” via representation [what he labels “informations”], the
correlation between perceptual faculties and the message must be much more strict to
count as ‘true’ rather than merely reliable:
Information carried by representations in this more robust sense is information,,.
Transmission of informations depends, not only on a channel from one system to
another, but also on the “content” of the “message” arriving at the receiver. It therefore
requires that the end result o f the information transmission be a representation whose
status as such is independent o f the informationi relation in which it stands with the
source, so that it might still be uninformatives or misinformatives even while being
informative^ In the perceptual case, it is not enough that an information, channel exists
between states of the perceiver and of the world. The states of the world must
perceptually seem to be as they in fact are; the perceptual “message” must be accurate.287

It is unclear to what form of “accurate” Alspector-Kelley might be referring when
he says that the message “must be accurate,” since he agrees that there is no extrascientific standard of accuracy, and since he agrees that a perception may be
substantively misinformative while being largely reliable. He must presuppose thatthere
is a

certain “way the world is” that is objective and fixed, constituting “truth” in a

substantive classic philosophical sense, while acknowledging science’s, and thereby our,
perceptual inability to capture nature “as it is.” This is, of course, what has lead many

287 Alspector-Kelley, p. 26, emphasis mine.

184

postmodern philosophers to reject classical notions of truth. Alspector-Kelley seems tom
as to whether he should relinquish science as a realist project, though he seems to argue
that reliability somehow substitutes for the classical notion of truth. Many seem
sympathetic to his tendencies on this matter.
Positively, naturalists have not relinquished the notion that there are truth
conditions about the world and that they are knowable, they have just failed in their
attempts to define the correspondence relationship in a satisfactory manner. This has lead
many naturalists to perceive science as a pragmatic project and claim that the usefulness
of science approximates truth to the exact degree we need, though they have no analytic
justification for the connection between the concepts.
In my research Alspector-Kelley does the most comprehensive job of defending
naturalism from an analytic standpoint. He admits the weaknesses of naturalistic claims
and offers a well-formulated defense in favor of naturalism. Ultimately I think he fails.
The introduction of empiricism does not offer direct support for naturalism in the way he
wishes. Many anti-naturalists, like van-Fraassen, hold empiricism without inconsistency.
Some, like Richard Swinburne, hold empiricism alongside a supernatural faith. In
addition, Alspector-Kelley’s naturalism, after the introduction of empiricism, places
epistemology at the mercy of sensory perception, leaving us with the classic question
concerning truth-conditions about the world, which so many naturalists wish to retain in
their philosophy— including Alspector-Kelley.
With this final analysis out of the way I can now explain why an analytic
justification for naturalism is destined to fail.

If science is self-justifying, and if, in

being self-justifying it does not preclude the knowledge claims of competing or mutually
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consistent traditions, what reasons do we have to accept the naturalist’s claim that science
is the only legitimate mode of inquiry?
To evaluate the question we start with naturalism’s central claim:
(1) Science is the only legitimate method of inquiry, eschewing first philosophy and
nonphysical causation. [A naturalist holds both the autonomy and authority of science.]

This claim is supposedly follows from or is warranted by the immanently reliable
and extremely successful program of natural science. Naturalists accept science as selfjustifying and I indicated that this need not be problematic, so long as we allow that
science consists in a methodology of revision that at least meets Rea’s criteria above.

5 0 0

But the success of science is typically attributed to the reliability of human experience. If
this is the case, then the naturalist is, by a transitive relation, committed to the reliability
of experience.289 Naturalism is not undercut by this adherence, since experience is taken
to be necessary for the scientific process. This gives us the statement:
(2) The enduring success of science as a mode of inquiry into the physical world is based
upon an adherence to the reliability of the inquirer’s experiences of and/or within the
world.

In contemporary science, experience cannot be restricted to directly testable,
sensory perceptions. From entities described in formal theoretical physics to the everyday
experience of time and memory, the search for a criterion to reduce all statements to
sense data has been abandoned. This means that the character of contemporary science
includes the following beliefs:
(3) Experience is foundational to science.

288 Rea says that a program is self-justifying if it (a) it is trusted in the absence of evidence for its own
reliability, and (b) it delivers consistent outputs and fails to generate evidence that leads to self-defeat.
289 A transitive relation is defined as, “For any three things, if the first is equal to the second, and the second
is equal to the third, then the first is equal to the third.” (Klenk, Understanding Symbolic Logic, p. 354). If
A, then B. If B, then C. Therefore, If A, then C. If naturalism is dependent upon the success of science, and
the success of science is dependent upon the reliability of experience, then naturalism is dependent upon
the reliability of experience.
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(4) All attempts to restrict experience to multiple, independently attestable, testable
methods (strict empiricism, positivism, e.g.) have failed because they always
underdetermine an experience relevant to experiment.
(5) Science makes progress in spite of our inability to prove some form of reductionism.
(6) Therefore, nonempirical, or indirectly empirical, modes of experience are allowable
into scientific theorizing, i.e. reliability of memory, belief in other minds, perception of
time, intentional states, scientific reasoning which includes argument to the best
explanation, etc.

As we have said, science is composed of the classical forms of logic and mathematics
plus all the major disciplines labeled ‘science’ in the university. This means that the
naturalist is also appealing to science as ‘the sciences’:
(7) Science includes all forms of valid reasoning and mathematics and those disciplines
found within the contemporary academy.

A current understanding of science is what supposedly rationally implies or
warrants belief in (1). A contemporary adherence to science includes statements (2)— (7).
If the naturalist takes it that (1) is rationally implies by science then the naturalist’s
central argument must be something like:
(8) Contemporary science, which includes theses (2)— (7), implies (1).

If (8) is accurate then either:
(8.1) [(2) • (3) • (4)...] -> (1)

or
(8.2) (2) v (3) v (4)... -> (1)

But (4) removes the possibility of proscribing any claim before it is examined by science.
This is consistent with naturalism’s rejection of a priori philosophical constraints on
inquiry. This means that all experiences are possibly valid, though they must withstand
the scrutiny of scientific reasoning and leaves us with the statement:
(9) Without being able to differentiate a priori between a legitimate experience and an
illegitimate one, science allows all possible experience into possible scientific scrutiny,
including Alspector-Kelly’s examples, “Zoroastrian mysticism, or Christian
fundamentalism, or Pythagorian numerology,” as well as first philosophy and
nonphysical causation.
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(9) presents no special problem for contemporary naturalism since most claims to inquiry
beyond science have been proven false, even though they were theoretically possible
before investigation. Therefore, if someone claims any special privilege though
clairvoyance, the claim is put to the test of scientific reasoning. Since most unscientific
‘systems of inquiry’ have proven extremely unreliable, the naturalist has increased
warrant for (1) and (8). But apart from the already established results of science, the
naturalist can make no claims. Therefore, if there are any methods that exist beyond the
scope of science that purport to offer knowledge, science can make no claims about them,
and therefore naturalism could make no claims about them. Therefore naturalism cannot
make claims beyond the scope of what science can detect.
As in our earlier example, if a machine detects only blue objects, it does not have
the capacity to make justified claims about objects of other colors. If it detects objects
that are not blue, but does not assign color to them, then it may claim that there are
objects that are not blue, but it cannot claim that there are objects of other colors besides
blue. If naturalists appeal to science to claim that nothing exists beyond science, it is like
appealing to a blue object machine in order to claim that no other colors exist, or no other
objects exist. The scope of the structure does not support the claim. To say that it does
would be to appeal to the argument from silence.
(2)— (7), individually or conjunctively, do not imply (1). This means that (2)— (7)
are compatible with ~(1). If (8.1) or (8.2), then (1). Yet both (8.1) and (8.2) are
compatible with ~(1):
(10) [(8.1) v (8.2)]

[(1) v -(1)1

Therefore, since science has given us no deductive reason to accept (1), the naturalist’s
analytic argument fails.
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The naturalist might agree that this is the case if we were attempting a strict
reduction to observable entities, but that is not the character of contemporary science. We
take relevant evidence and make explanatory claims and postulate entities that are
continuous with the data we have. These entities are not beyond science in a strict sense,
but they are conducive to laboratory controls either. So, in one sense scientists can
employ scientific reasoning and extend scientific claims beyond data. However, I am not
arguing against this. This rebuttal does not tell against my argument. My argument claims
that since the naturalist restricts knowledge to science, however broadly construed and
stipulated to include theoretical physics but leave out, for example, Cartesian souls, if
there were anything beyond the scope of this science, then science could make no claims
about it, and therefore naturalists cannot say that science is the ‘only’ method of inquiry
into the world.
To this the naturalist might respond that I should come down out of
epistemological space, and that, he could concede this point strictly, but pragmatically it
makes no serious strike against naturalism. All that my argument might show is that
naturalism does not follow strictly from any specific claim of science, but that does not
eliminate the possibility of the naturalist being warranted in holding (1). Most
unscientific theories that are suggested (as we have mentioned throughout things like
clairvoyance or telepathy) are available to science in a practical sense, and science has
shown them to be unreliable, so that, even if they were true to some mediocre extent, or
useful to believe in some personal or private extent, science is certainly immanently more
useful. Therefore, according to the naturalist, without logic-chopping things to death,
naturalists can still claim that science is the only legitimate— in the sense of being the
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most reliable—tool for inquiring into the nature of the world. It seems I now have done a
great deal to support naturalism rather than defeat it.
4.2: An Exposition o f Naturalism as a Worldview
We must ask, in what way do naturalists hold that science warrants belief in
naturalism? I said earlier that, current understanding of science is what supposedly
rationally implies or warrants belief in (1). We saw that science does not rationally imply
naturalism. But in what way could it warrant belief in naturalism? The naturalist has only
two choices:
(11) Current scientific findings legitimate naturalism’s central claim,

or
(12) Current scientific findings legitimate the claim that science is a successful program
for controlling and manipulating the world, and, for most naturalists, obtaining
knowledge.

The problem here is twofold. We know that (11) is false. No scientific finding or
collection of scientific disciplines provide evidence to the effect that naturalism is true.
And (12) is not naturalism. Naturalism makes a specific normative claim that science is
authoritative, as Alspector-Kelley explained, “over other forms of intellectual life.” The
success of science—its universal applicability, its compelling evidences and methods, is
usefulness in all aspects of life— is available to every consistent worldview. A Buddhist,
Hindu, and Christian may, and in some sense must, and in some sense do, all adhere to
the powerful tools of science and the view of the world it defines. The questions are, as
they have perennially been, is science all there is, and how can we know? To the first
question the naturalist wants to answer affirmatively, whereas the Buddhist, Hindu, and
Christian want to answer negatively. Answering the second question is much trickier. But
this is not specifically the question I have raised earlier. I want to know whether the
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naturalist is warranted in believing in naturalism, and whether science provides this
warrant.
Remember that warrant means broadly inductive justification as opposed to the
more strict analytic justification I attempted earlier. I noted earlier that someone is
warranted in their belief so long as they did not form it in an irrational manner, and may
hold the belief until presented with defeaters to the effect that the belief is irrational. This
means that, so long as a philosopher feels that he is operating within a cognitively
favorable environment and it seems rational to believe that naturalism is true, then he is
warranted in believing naturalism until something is brought to his attention that would
make him think otherwise.
This significantly changes the philosophical approach to the epistemic question.
The naturalist cannot preemptively reject anti-naturalistic positions. But neither can anti
naturalists preemptively reject naturalism. This means that there is nothing intrinsic to
naturalism that is contradictory or self-defeating at the broadly inductive level of
investigation. Since few philosophical positions begin from any more solid foundation
than that of broadly inductive investigation, there is no reason to think that we must
demand a stronger proof.
Principles of epistemic warrant rely on broad categories of evidence in the
perceiver’s life including occurrent beliefs (or “seemings”), childhood environment,
education, and personal experiences with those who agree or disagree with the
perceiver’s basic presuppositions. If this type of evidence is not included in contemporary
science, then the naturalist is appealing to a nonscientific source of evidence for
knowledge concerning belief in naturalism. However, we have already said that science
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presupposes that human experience is generally more reliable than not, and that, except
by stipulation, naturalists cannot excise any relevant experience from possible scientific
scrutiny. And even though specific experiences such as occurrent beliefs and childhood
experiences have proven unreliable in scientific discourse, they remain part of a broader
category that has proven reliable more often than not, and thus stand as possible form of
justification for belief in naturalism. This means that anti-naturalists have no more reason
to exclude experiences that would lead to a belief in naturalism any more than naturalists
have for excluding those that lead to belief in, say, theism.
A naturalist may hold that he is warranted in believing naturalism in two ways:
(13) Current scientific findings warrant belief in naturalism.

or
(14) Naturalists are epistemically warranted in believing in naturalism’s central claim.

There do not seem to be any scientific findings that add support to naturalism.
Most scientific findings are directed at specific questions that are not significantly
epistemic. This means that a naturalist cannot point to something within a scientific
discipline, or to a discipline as a whole or a group of disciplines, and say, “That’s why
I’m a naturalist.” In addition, for (13) to be true, science must provide evidence that
principles of epistemic warrant are reliable producers of knowledge. We might ask with
Moser and Yandell, what principles of epistemic warrant combine with the empirical
sciences to justify naturalism? The principles of empirical science logically permit that
naturalism is unwarranted. This question remains contentious at several levels, namely,
according to Alvin Goldman: meta-epistemic, substantive epistemic, and methodological
epistemic levels (Goldman, 1994). This means that we currently have no way to address

192

(13) and must leave it open to future investigation. This means that (13) does not
currently offer much hope in the way of warranting naturalism.
(14) is much more promising. Broad epistemic warrant is actually a naturalistic
approach to epistemology that relies upon a perceiver’s beliefs concerning whether his
interactions with the world have been largely historically reliable. If it is the case a
philosopher feels that his experiences have been more accurate than not and that these
experiences combine to predispose him to the belief that science is the only legitimate
form of epistemic evidence, then he is warranted in believing naturalism’s central claim.
This means that it is easy to see how a philosopher might feel (14) is true. This means
that (14) then provides a relevant, epistemically acceptable starting point for a naturalist
to pursue philosophical inquiries through the sciences.
Since we have followed the epistemic landscape away from attempts to
analytically disprove naturalism, concluding that naturalism can possess broadly
inductive epistemic warrant, just as any acceptably formed worldview does, we must now
consider whether there are any reasons to reject naturalism—that is, we must determine
whether there are any substantive defeaters for naturalism. The criterion that I have to
overcome to show that naturalism is untenable is the one mentioned in the quote from C.
S. Lewis in the title section of chapter 3: “.. .if any one thing makes good a claim to be on
its own, to be something more than an expression of the character of Nature as a whole—
then we have abandoned Naturalism.” I have to offer some reason to think that something
either prohibits the naturalist from being warranted in believing science is the only
method of inquiry, or show that there is something the naturalist accepts that conflicts
with the claim that science is the only legitimate method of inquiry.
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To do this I might offer examples of problems in philosophy and science that
scientists have yet to solve, like that of consciousness, or the issue of realism and truth, or
even altruism, on an evolutionary framework. Lewis himself offers, as a possible
example, the fact that we possess rational thought and are compelled (he argues that
deductive proof holds a causal relation to the knower) by deductive premises to their
conclusions as an example of something inexplicable on a naturalistic worldview. But
none of these, I think, would be particularly compelling. The reason is that one of the
virtues of the scientific process is that it always has puzzles left to solve and it retains an
open-ended posture toward these problems, allowing for unique and novel solutions at
any given time.
4.3: Defeaters fo r Naturalism as a Worldview
The naturalist takes pride (justifiably) in the fact that science could possibly
answer all these questions. Therefore, merely identifying unsolved problems does not
undercut or significantly rebut warranted belief in naturalism, even if we have shown so
far that it is only warranted from silence. The solution lies in identifying specific
elements of reality that are obvious enough to constitute evidence and yet which arguably
lie outside the scope of substantive scientific investigation— though, of course, not
outside the scope of solid reasoning processes which have proven scientifically valid. I
will first show that the open-ended posture toward future uncertainties prohibits
naturalists from making the normative claim that science is the only legitimate method of
inquiry. I aim to show that broadly inductive warrant is a difficult concept for naturalists
to explain scientifically. Must evidence arise from the sciences to count in the inductive
proof, or is general human experience enough? Is general human experience typical to
epistemic warrant scientifically reliable? Is the reliability of broadly inductive warrant
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presupposed by or justified by the sciences? Beyond this I will identify three defeaters for
naturalism that I feel constitute significant obstacles for a worldview that claims to be
comprehensive, yet restricts its evidence to science alone. These defeaters are arguments
by which I am personally compelled, and believe that they push the rational mind to
consider scientific knowledge too narrow to constitute a comprehensive worldview.
4.3.1: An Undercutting Defeater fo r Naturalism
Since it is possible to make claims beyond what can be strictly observed, and
since naturalists accept the fact that the universe is much more informationally rich than
we currently understand, the fact that scientific reason can be employed to defend
theories of knowledge that have an origin beyond the scope of science, naturalism cannot
hold its normative claim against non- or extra-scientific forms of knowledge. Paul Moser
and Keith Yandell explain:
Minimally, the empirical sciences rely on abductive epistemic principles that certify
inferences to a best available explanation of pertinent phenomena. The empirical
sciences are, after all, in the business of best explanation. Even so, their domains of
pertinent phenomena to be explained are not, individually or collectively, monopolistic
in the manner required by abductive warrant for [naturalism]. For example, those
domains do not, individually or collectively, preclude any kind of religious experience
suitable to abductively warranted theistic belief. So, the abductive epistemic principles
accompanying the empirical sciences will fall short of warranting [naturalism], given the
monopolistic assumptions of the latter.290

I have substituted ‘naturalism’ for their term ‘Core Scientism’ which we saw in
chapter three was their technical term for the conjunction of doctrines held by naturalists.
In other words, we might say, if there are possible experiences that justify beliefs outside
of scope of science, and science does not preclude these experiences but instead, appeals
to experiences that are rational in just the same way as these experiences that justify
beliefs that are not scientifically confirmable, then these experiences are no more to be

290 Moser and Yandell, “Farewell to Philosophical Naturalism,” p. 12.
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rejected prior to scrutiny than those that are typically considered rational for scientific
use.
Just because a theory is rational, however, does not mean that it is true. But this is
not an aspect of the immediate question. If and whether a theory is true will depend on
information beyond what is available scientifically. If and whether a theory is plausible,
on the other hand, is directly related to scrutiny by scientific methods and reasoning. If it
is found untenable or implausible by scientific reasoning, then I have a defeater for the
belief (an undercutting defeater just in case the reason for a belief is shown to be neutral
regarding the belief itself, and a rebutting defeater just in case it is found implausible in
light of the defeater). But the naturalist cannot discard the possibility of its truth before
investigation. If he does then he is employing a criterion that is prior to science, if he
does not then that which is called naturalism merely becomes an appeal to apply the
methods of science and innocuous as a doctrine, since worldviews that are in conflict
with naturalism also agree with the latter.
To put it differently, the naturalist, in order to hold (1), must either appeal to
something purely philosophical, say, classical empiricism (£), to support (2), or appeal to
the methods and findings of the sciences themselves, in order to show that ~(1) is false. If
the naturalist appeals to something like E in support of (2), the naturalist is already in
violation of (1), since he is employing a philosophy prior to the methods of the sciences.
In addition, the naturalist accepts that E is contrary to (4), since no purely philosophical
criterion has been able to ‘fit up’ to scientific entities, theories, or processes, or proscribe
entities, theories, or processes from legitimate inquiry prior to investigation by the
methods of science. But if E is contrary to (4), then E implies ~(8), and therefore ~(9).
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~(9) would be a major step forward for naturalism, but ~(8) would be devastating. The
naturalist eschews first philosophies such as E for this very reason. If the naturalist
appeals purely to the methods of the sciences themselves to show that ~(1) is false, then
he will be sadly disappointed. The methods of science remain agnostic concerning the
possibility of knowledge outside of the methods of science. Therefore every selfconsistent knowledge claim is open to investigation by the sciences, only to be
determined true or false after investigation has taken place, and then the truth-values
apply only tentatively as the best currently available scientific methods are employed.
But at this stage, philosophers and scientists disagree radically as to the implications of
the findings of the sciences. If a naturalist cannot proscribe certain claims to knowledge
prior to the employment of scientific methods, then the posture described by philosophers
when they employ the term naturalism is not really naturalism at all, but merely
something that means “using the methods of science,” and retains no normative epistemic
force, except that we should apply to science to questions of knowledge. But the
normative claim that we should use science is most commendable and immanently
justifiable— and compatible with most worldviews that are in conflict with naturalism. If
nothing else, the success of science warrants such a belief.
What about the claim that a philosopher is warranted by the sciences in her
naturalism? As we have seen, warrant derives from a broad spectrum of experiences that
range from upbringing, occurrent beliefs, education, personal experiences, and testimony
from apparently reliable sources. Though occurrent beliefs arid childhood experiences
confer rationality onto beliefs formed in these acceptable ways, surely these are riot
experiences accepted in most scientific processes. At least, if they are acknowledged to
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be legitimately physical or empirical experiences, they are not counted among the most
reliable and are therefore not appealed to for experimental purposes. But these are the
experiences that are typically agreed to confer rational warrant on a position. So, if a
naturalist claims to be warranted in her naturalism, then the warrant does not derive
specifically from the sciences. As we have seen, the sciences leave us with a virtual
epistemic parity concerning entities or processes or agents outside of the scope of
science. For example, if science had completed everything it could possibly accomplish,
how could we ever know scientifically that this was the case? Surely there are things that
the sciences can tell us about themselves. Surely the sciences can indicate their reliability
through continuous testing and an open posture toward revision. The can provide insight
to the nature of their structure. But they cannot provide insight into the nature of
competing knowledge producing structures. We should feel caution because there is no
such warrant currently available within the sciences to proscribe other methods of
inquiry, and though there may one day be such evidence, we cannot assert a universal
claim concerning evidence on the basis of an intrinsically incomplete body of evidence.
The warrant would have to derive from broadly personal experiences that may or may not
be reliable indicators of truth or reliability, and which reach beyond what is currently
accepted as scientific.
However, as an anti-naturalist with no analytic proof against naturalism and a
strong belief in the efficacy of science, I must admit that we do in fact presuppose the
general reliability of human experience, even those that contribute to broad inductive
warrant, even when specific instances of human experience prove experimentally
;unreliable. With this in mind then naturalists and anti-naturalists alike must conclude that
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when someone has come to believe in naturalism in a manner that is not irrational, then
that person is warranted in naturalism subject to defeat. With this agreement, the
naturalist would then turn to me and ask the fundamental question: What competing
knowledge producing structures exist, and what would they even look like?
I could respond, with Rea, that two options seem readily available, namely
intuitionism and supematuralism. But there are problems with this answer. On one hand,
neither claim to compete with science on any significant level. Both can hold that science
leads to truth. Both hold that all truth is truth, regardless of the source, and that
consistency will always hold among true propositions. On the other hand this may be a
relevant answer, since both purport to adduce knowledge from supposedly extrascientific
sources. The scientist or naturalist could object that these may just be as yet unsolved
problems later explainable by science. If this is the case, and I see no reason to think that
it might be, then the supematuralist has merely gone the route of the naturalist, claiming
that science has nothing to do with supematuralism, which may not be the case at all. As
I explained before, intelligent design may prove scientifically valid, in which case a
naturalist could come to theism through a naturalistic position with scientific methods.
This seems perfectly valid, especially to those who hold the efficacy of natural theology.
At this point, the boundaries between supematuralism and naturalism would be blurred, if
there were any boundaries to begin with, and the question would then be how much of
this designer is knowable via scientific methods. But this would not preclude the same
designer from contacting humans through other avenues. The scientific findings would be
telling one side of a possibly larger story, but not that there is no other side of the story—
how could it?

199

Because of this, the line between scientific and pseudo-scientific might seem to
become even blurrier. But this is not technically the case. Normal, everyday science still
relies on testable, observable data that are subsequently confirmable by other observer
who applies the same methods. But these everyday scientific methods presuppose, and/or
appeal to, the reliability of experience, which, as we have seen, warrants beliefs that are
not scientifically confirmable, but which, if internally consistent and comprehensive,
offer a possible justification for why our normal scientific successes are the successes
that they are, why our senses and mental structures seem to be perfectly suited to
knowing the universe, and for the significance of the findings (whether pragmatic or
realistic). However, certain of these experiences are not allowable into scientific practice,
if for no other reason than their inability to be tracked to a specifically empirical or
rational source. In most cases the evidence in favor of a belief system are systematically
unreliable for scientific test conditions—upbringing, education, personal encounters, and
first impressions. This means that the naturalist cannot appeal to broad inductive warrant,
since many of the typical sources of evidence involved in warrant are not typically
allowable into the process of science. If science, and experiences sanctioned or accepted
by science is the only allowable source of evidence, then the philosopher claims too
much in saying that science warrants holding naturalism. Far from making science less
respectable, the anti-naturalist is being honest about the scope and limitations of the
scientific project and remaining critically open to possibilities of understanding outside
that scope.
The naturalist may object at this point. He might say, ‘yes, it is always possible
that there are many ways of constructing an explanation that are internally consistent and
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that any one might do as well as any other for determining the nature of a subject, but
show me one that does better than science. If you cannot— and I see that you have yet to
do so—then I take it that I am warranted in my giving a privileged place to science. What
am I missing?’
A worldview may retain a personal, universalistic, and critical posture toward
other worldviews. As a worldview, a naturalist is making a contention that he is
personally warranted in believing the universality of science and that his concepts will
always be restricted to this view, but that this is merely programmatic, and he will not
make any academic claims or opinions outside of what he can prove scientifically. He
personally concludes that nothing is missing from his worldview and challenges those
who would oppose him to show him something that is outside the scope of science. He
accepts science as offering a comprehensive perspective concerning reality. This is a
viable option, as it is for any compendium of personal beliefs from which we enter the
intellectual forum of life— open to challenge, revision, or defeat. The philosopher who
holds naturalism as a worldview has more going for it than most worldviews because
science is taught and accepted in almost every society regardless of controversial
ideology. The global community accepts the validity of science and the naturalist is
merely affirming that we need nothing to supplement the knowledge obtained from this
universally accepted program.
With this said, are there any reasons that might lead us to want to reject
naturalism? Has naturalism offered us something unique and good? It seems that there is
some profit to be acknowledged, even while it remains an amorphous term. Any strict
adherence to science will produce positive results. What it has tended to leave out is
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compelling accounts of meaning, moral structures, modal properties, ‘presence,’ the apriority of logic, and religious experience. If the same measures were taken by naturalists
to address the former questions as there have been toward theistic arguments, morality
and modality would be removed from philosophy further than God. There are at least
people who stand up philosophically for the concept of God, where it is unclear that any
would do so for modality. But in other areas, naturalism has been more interesting. The
application of Darwinian theory has allowed for diverse and complex explanations of
natural processes that previously lay concealed. Increased understanding of the material
conditions within which sensory faculties operate has expanded the possibilities for a
more accurate account of epistemology. The restriction of metaphysical entities to
observable causal properties has streamlined our understanding of the nature of reality
and increased our ability to see the fundamental problems with areas such as
consciousness and subatomic particles.
It seems that naturalism as a project is not wrong-headed or even unfruitful. It is
just severely incomplete, as anyone who has attempted to attach an analytic thesis to it
has discovered. As a research program, naturalism is a plausible and tenable project that
lacks the ability to compel adherence to its dispositions either through the sciences or
scientific reasoning. It rests on an appeal to the presupposition of the autonomy and
authority of science for the success of science, and whether or not this posture is circular,
it has proven successful.
So what is the naturalist missing? As I mentioned earlier, philosophical and
scientific questions are the type of questions suited to scientific inquiry, even if only
theoretically. Therefore, to raise problems of this nature will not be very powerful
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counterexamples. Most of the questions to which naturalists lack access are the
fundamental questions about meaning that a worldview is supposed to provide. I use the
term “meaning” in both its logical sense and its personal sense. Logically we still do not
have a clear concept of what it is for a term to ‘refer’ or ‘denote’ or possess meaning for a
subject. We do not understand ‘representations’ when they come to us rich and full of
content that is indescribable with language. Just because we do not currently understand
the relation between a term or phrase and its personal impact does not imply that science
could not figure out “what” is going on. It is very possible. But science has trouble with
“why” questions. Science offers explanations in terms of causation. “Why did the red ball
move?” “Because it was struck by the blue one.” “Why did the blue ball move?”
“Because it was pushed by my hand.” “Why did you push the blue ball... .”
Why is belief in naturalism undercut by this dialogue? Because the fact that
science is open-ended, not restricted from non-empirical questions, and possesses the
capacity to support anti-naturalist positions places it in a neutral position regarding the
fundamental claims of naturalism. An undercutting defeater is successful if it shows that
the claimed reason for a belief is actually neutral regarding the belief. If I wear a Red Sox
jersey backward everyday for the entire season and they win the World Series, I might
infer that my wearing the jersey contributed to their victory. However, an undercutting
defeater would be if I behave the same way next year and the Sox do not win. My
behavior will prove neutral with regard to a Red Sox win. Science is immanently
successful and rests on a justification that we have all conceded to be less than analytic,
and that we have also agreed to be its strongest asset. But science is neutral regarding
questions about ultimate reality. It may narrow the possibilities, but so long as contrary
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possibilities remain— such as naturalism and anti-naturalism— then naturalism does not,
it seems cannot, follow from science. At least it cannot follow from science any more
than any other worldview can follow from science alone.
4.3.2: Three Rebutting Defeaters fo r Naturalism as a Worldview
There are, of course, more fundamental questions of meaning. These are
existential questions to which sentient creatures seem drawn to ask and ponder, such as:
Why is there something rather than nothing? Why do sentient creatures exist in such
improbable circumstances? Why am I here? If there are no ultimate answers, then nothing
ultimately matters. Are we prepared to accept the consequences of this? Without ultimate
answers, ultimate questions become meaningless...just as the positivists explained. I will
explore three areas of traditional fundamental human importance, about which naturalists
are content to either vehemently reject or remain agnostic. These are justice, origins, and
love.
The first area of fundamental human importance is that of justice. If naturalism is
true then justice is merely the agreement, whether explicit or tacit, among groups of selfconscious biological entities. For naturalism, whether an act is “right” or “wrong” in an
ultimate sense is really not the ultimate question, since it cannot be, though we may
phrase the issue in this manner. According to naturalists, those rules that are typically
called moral imperatives are the derivative of evolutionary processes developed within a
species population in order to enhance the survival of that population by defending it
from predation from within the group. This means that the group itself, and its social
dynamics, are the determining factors in moral decisions. Acceptable moral decisions—
actions considered morally permissible— are those that naturally aid survival by
protecting the population from the inside. On this characterization, decisions concerning
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moral permissibility are only viable if the action is subject to peer review. In the off
chance that a member of the group is absent from the group, nothing the organism could
do could possess the attribute of “good” or “bad” in the moral sense. Perhaps the
organism’s absence from the group could be considered a moral failure, if the group’s
size was a survival factor, or if that particular organism was integral to the defenses of the
group as a whole. So long as an act does not infringe upon the group’s ability to survive
and prosper then the act is morally permissible, according to naturalism. This sounds a
good deal like political liberalism—but that, of course, is miles away from the deeper
problem.
If there is no ultimate foundation for what we consider “right” and “wrong,” then
all that we consider “right” and “wrong” is either arbitrary, since not all moral intuitions
are related to survival, or biological in a deep sense, which usurps moral accountability.
If a person possesses a deviant behavior type, then the evolutionary mechanism
concerning group survival behavior did not develop properly. But biological misfortune
hardly seems like solid grounds for physical or social punishment. In addition, if public
scrutiny is the foundation for all moral behavior, then behavior is immoral only in
relation to an available populace. This means that, so long as accountability is
unavailable, an act is not morally significant. Any member of a population who kills
another member in secret, and who escapes capture, has not been “judged” or “found”
immoral and the act remains neutral. We could say that, given a state’s or nation’s laws
concerning the act that, according to social circumstances, if the act is discovered, then
that act is not permissible. But until the act is discovered, there is no accountability or
peer group to determine liability. Morality is reduced to personal accountability to other
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humans. Naturalists claim that moral instincts or intuitions develop according to rules of
social acceptance and that feelings of “guilt” result from self-conscious violations of
those rules, even if accountability is not present. A person knows, by virtue of
acquaintance and perhaps genetic transcription, that just in case accountability is present,
then an act would be found permissible or impermissible. The question is whether this
account is comprehensive in the way we need to be human.
The question hinges on whether there is ultimate justice in the universe. Someone
might object that “in the universe” is too strong, since morality and the justice which
would support it belong exclusively to self-conscious creatures, the only ones of which
we know are confined to earth. But of course, if there were ultimate “Justice,” then that
justice would be confined to one race of self-conscious creatures only if there is only one
race of self-conscious creatures that exists. But this need not change the qualification “in
the universe.” If those on earth are indeed the only self-conscious creatures, then my
description stands. The universe “belongs to us” in a way that it cannot for creatures that
cannot objectify it with reason. But if there are other creatures of a self-conscious nature
within the universe, then Justice will apply to them as well, otherwise it would not be
“ultimate” in a significant way, and my description still stands.
We know—we know deeply—that justice is not accomplished in the short run of
human life. Dachau, Auschwitz, Iraq, and the Sudan bring to mind images of cruel
immoralities and murders that we judge to be morally impermissible. A close friend’s
murder, mutilation, or rape, self-inflicted wounds or drug-induced incapacitation convey
the same feelings. If moral permissibility is dependent upon the direction of human
civilization or biological development, then justice is not accomplished and will not be
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until we have achieved world peace. Perhaps more than world peace is required, but at
least world peace is required. We must continue to work toward a world without such
atrocities in the knowledge that, in the absence of such a world, justice does not exist. But
even if world peace is accomplished, we have only established that behaviors under
scrutiny by peers and which affect the population are morally significant.
Justice, when defined as social regulation, implies that a thought, or personal act
not affecting another person or the population, or a consensual act between two or more
parties that does not affect the population in a negative manner could never be considered
“wrong” in a substantive sense. But we have the concept of justice. We know what it is
supposed to be. We know that when a stranger steps on our foot or pushes us down that,
if they do not apologize, or if the act was done intentionally, we are not appealing to
societies laws when we feel morally wronged. We are not appealing to an irrelevant
standard that may not apply to someone from another culture. We are appealing to a
standard that all humans agree on. We just need to know this standard’s true nature. Since
there are rules of conduct agreeable across all culture lines, we cannot appeal to mere
cultural assent to describe the nature of morality. There are simply too many rules that
transcend arbitrary legal regulation. Our concept of justice, and our feeling that we
deserve it in certain instances, has one of two explanations: universal knowledge o r
evolutionary mechanism. Justice either will be done or should be done in a substantive
metaphysical sense or it is a survival mechanism for which there are only legal
consequences. Two philosophers put it this way:
Since justice is not done in the short run in human life on earth, either (1) justice is done
in the long run— in which case there must be a “long run,” a life after death— or else (2)
this absolute demand we make for moral meaning and ultimate justice is not met by
reality but is a mere subjective quirk of the human psyche—in which case there is no
foundation in reality for our deepest moral instincts, no objective validity or justification
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for justice. The statement, “I want justice,” only tells something about us, like “I feel
sick,” not about objective reality, what real is or what really ought to be.291

One might object that Kreeft and Tacelli have missed the power of naturalistic
morality. Justice need not be “ultimate” to be “objective” because, just in case there are
only physical entities and processes and humans are the only self-conscious creatures in
existence, then those creatures are the measure of what is “right,” in a substantive sense.
But, of course, “man as measure” does not meet the criterion of objectivity. For a theory
to be objective it must be independent of the knower. This means that “known by all,” or
“believed by all,” or “publically proved,” are not sufficient to denote “truth” in a
substantive sense. A belief held by all parties involved, or all people, in the case of
morality, could still be false. In addition, nothing prevents an objective truth from being
privately known. A fact could be known— Kreeft and Tacelli give the example of the
location of a hidden treasure—in the absence of public arguments or reasons for the
fact.292 “Stephen King wrote Cujo,” is an example of an objective truth. “I feel sick,” is
an example of a subjective truth.
Naturalists could counter that, given the open-ended nature of science, we do not
need “objective” morality in the sense I have described. This does not mean that
naturalists do not believe objective truth exists. In fact, their appeal to science as an everincreasingly truth-approximating program of inquiry commits them to an objective state
of the universe. They may merely admit that we cannot know, at any given time, the
extent of “objective” truth, or “morality” as conceived on a scientific worldview.

291 Peter Kreeft and Ronald K. Tacelli, Pocket Handbook o f Christian Apologetics (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2003) p. 92.
292 Ibid., p. 133.
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This counter-argument would not actually tell against my analysis. It only
highlights the implications of naturalism for morality. If science is the only source of
knowledge, and morality, according to current science, is either arbitrary or biological in
nature, then morality is not undergirded by justice in a substantive sense.
This is not a change of position from what I said earlier about an act being “right”
in a substantive sense. An action can be “right,” according to a definition set out, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, by a group agreeing upon a standard. All legal matters
are substantive in this sense. Driving on the right side of the road is “right” in the U.S.
and “wrong” in England. Both laws are substantive and binding, but neither is
undergirded by a universal concept of justice, unless driving laws are subsumed under
“societal order,” the details of which need not be objectively or universally binding to be
true. In other words, it need not be objectively or universally “right” to drive on the righthand side of the road, even though it is an objective fact that this is the case in the U.S.
The universally objective fact might be something like, “It is universally ‘right’ that a
society apply a structure of law and order.”
How might we know if a universal system of morality is in place? We all feel the
tug

of moral imperatives,

yet most of us

are compelled by

the apparent

comprehensiveness of science. There seem to be only two choices in explanation of this:
(1) morality is somehow natural in the sense of survival and prosperity, and science has
the ability to illuminate this, and Justice does not exist, or (2) morality is somehow
natural in the sense that it is universally binding upon all self-conscious creatures,
whether this-worldly or not, and Justice does exist and will resolve moral instability.
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At this point no specific theory of universal morality is implied. The Buddhist
moral intuition is that the universe constantly oscillates between balance and imbalance
and will ultimately achieve moral balance. The theist also has an understanding that a
divine being possesses the quality of perfect justice and will bring about or is constantly
bringing about justice.
The question left for philosophers is how such a moral imperative might be
known. If naturalists have an explanation for our moral intuitions that is as
comprehensive as the Buddhist or theist, then the naturalist was right all along that his
worldview was comprehensive. It is not my intent to argue in favor of an anti-naturalist
version of morality, but to highlight the implications for morality according to naturalism.
If the naturalist is correct, moral feelings lose all significance. Moral intuitions do
not signify an ultimate justice to which we have the right to appeal as self-conscious,
morally accountable participants in the human struggle for “goodness.” Christian
philosopher William Lane Craig writes:
Without God, science itself becomes meaningless. M an’s search to understand himself
and the universe is ultimately without significance. Nor can scientific knowledge
provide man with moral values. ... Nor can science overcome the absurdity of life
caused by death. ... The point is that man’s being the Cosmic Orphan is not an
exhilarating adventure. It is the final tragedy. It means that man is the purposeless
outcome of matter, time, and chance. He is no more significant than any other animal,
and is destined only to die. Therefore we weep for him.293

Purpose and goodness get swallowed up in death. Right and wrong become catch
all terms for concepts that have nothing to do with justice outside of legal stipulation. But
just believing that there must be something more to morality than what the naturalist
describes does not make it so. Remember, just because everyone believes something, it
may still be false. And so arguments must be constructed in order to determine whether
293 William Lane Craig, The Son Rises; The Historical Evidence fo r the Resurrection o f Jesus (Eugene, OR:
W ipf and Stock Press, 1981) p. 15.
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naturalists are faced with a personally unlivable worldview. Of course, if it is true that a
maximally intelligent being exists who is powerful enough to bring matter and natural
law into existence, then naturalism in ethics is false and the only open explanation for
morality is that it is universally binding and must, by definition, be knowable.294 This
brings me to the next traditional fundamental question of human importance: origins.
If the naturalist is correct, then humans are, as Craig mentioned above, “...the
purposeless outcome of matter, time, and chance.” A human is, as atheist Loren Eiseley
writes, the “Cosmic Orphan.”295 Remember that naturalism, while not committed to
atheism, does not and cannot appeal to an interactionist god as a relevant explanation for
an event. This means that, for a naturalistic theist, if the universe came into existence,
then the process of this becoming must have a naturalistic explanation. For, to whatever
naturalistic deity the naturalist appeals, the co-existence of this being with non-divine
creatures is as happenstance as seashells on the beach. Though an animal may exist
content with the happenstance of the universe, humans have traditionally been obsessed
with denying it. The fact that we can consider our existence and its termination and our
ultimate fate pushes us to investigate why there is something rather than nothing, why is
there order rather than disorder, and why are there self-conscious creatures as opposed to
only animals (the last question usually implying the deeper supplication: “Why am /
here?”). I will look at these questions in turn, looking very briefly at the last.
Naturalists have traditionally accepted the fact that something cannot come from
nothing, so that, historically they conceived that the universe existed eternally into the
past—the steady state model. Science had not progressed to the point of offering any
294 Notice that universal moral laws might not necessarily be “known,” since we typically consider
ignorance of the law invalid as a defense so long as the law could be known.
“The cosmic orphan,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 15* e d Propaedia, s.v.
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alternative. Even with discoveries surrounding the question of the beginnings of the
universe, such as the expansion of the universe by Edwin Hubble and the diffusion of
background microwave radiation combined with the second law of thermodynamics,
physicists conceived of possibilities for the universe’s eternal existence into the past. One
example is the “cyclical theory” in which a Big Bang universe expands and collapses
infinitely into the past where as the current universe is one cycle of expansion. Another
example is the “cyclical ekpyrotic theory,” where the current universe is one dimension
of a many dimensional cosmic membrane that intersects with an identically shaped
cosmic membrane in such a way that the impact pushes the membranes away from one
another providing the appearance of the universe coming into existence out of nothing.
The base assumption, however, has always been that something cannot come from
nothing— ex nihilo, nihil fit. That was the assumption, until recently.
Within the last fifty years, quantum mechanics has drastically changed the way
we view the universe at the subatomic level. Subatomic particles, within the boundaries
of quantum structure, appear to disappear and reappear in a different place with no
detectable causal connection. And more than that, it seems impossible that there be a
causal connection as understood at the molecular level. Hubble interpreted the expansion
of the universe to imply that the universe expanded from increasingly smaller states. The
state of the universe prior to the Big Bang event was a infinitesimally small singularity. If
this singularity was a quantum particle, it seems that, according to quantum mechanics, it
may very well have come from nothing.
There is, of course, a hidden presupposition. A subatomic particle’s spontaneous
generation is confined to the boundaries of quantum physics. The subatomic particle
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called a “muon” could not disappear and then reappear as the one called a “pion” or a
cheeseburger. The reappearance of a particle does not constitute an increase of matter, or
the generation of matter. The disappearance does not constitute the destruction of matter.
If either were true then the first principle of thermodynamics, which says that matter is
neither created nor destroyed, would have to be relinquished in light of quantum physics.
But physicists do not accept that quantum physics violates this law. Therefore, the
cosmological singularity from which the universe sprang could not constitute the coming
into existence of matter out of nothing, in the scientific sense that separates an event from
a structure and claims that the structure of the universe originated with the Big Bang. If
the singularity were a subatomic emergence, then a natural structure, namely quantum
mechanics, must have already been in place. In addition, the matter that constituted the
singularity could not have arisen from a matterless void, since the emergence of a
subatomic particle “out of nothing” does not constitute an increase in matter in the
universe. The matter would have already had to have been present prior to the existence
of the singularity—at least to understand the event through the lens of quantum
mechanics.
Suppose, on the other hand, that we relinquish the assumption that all natural laws
came into existence with the Big Bang, as do the cyclical cosmogonal theories, and
assume that events occurred within a natural structure that existed prior to our universe
and that these events were the “causal” (I use the apostrophes to indicate that quantum
mechanics actually belies causal relations as we understand them at the molecular level)
explanation for the introduction of the singularity. If this were so, then the fundamental
question I raised at the beginning of this section, why is there something rather than
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nothing, has just been pushed back a stage. This universe exists because a prior physical
state brought it about, though perhaps not causally in the traditional sense. We may
subsequently ask, “And why did that state exist rather than nothing?”
At this point the naturalist may revert back to the traditional answer to my
question: The universe— in a broader sense of “universe” since it could not be limited to
what we know as the current Big Bang universe—has always existed, though not in a
steady state; but there is no first cause. This would seem to be a common sense answer.
Buddhists have held this for centuries. The idea that the universe has existed eternally has
enamored both scientists and Christians as well. Some Calvinists have held that God is
completely immutable— incapable of change— and, since he is a creator, he eternally
generates (present tense) the universe complete and intact, so that the universe is
coexistent with his eternity. In this case the universe is eternal because a creator God is
eternal and unchanging. But an “unchanging” universe can still be filled with events.
These events follow one another in causal succession. This last statement is a
presupposition of science. If effects do not follow lawfully from causes, then explanation
is impossible. We will not know how to control and predict what we cannot conceptually
connect in relationships. But is the eternity of a universe filled with events a possibility?
An eternity of events progressing ever toward the future would constitute, at any
finite event, an infinite number of events. Is this reasonable? Can an infinite number of
effects be brought about by a finite accumulation of causes? It seems unreasonable to
think so. Let me separate the issue from mathematics. In mathematical set theory, there
exist sets of infinite members. These sets possess properties that finite subsets do not
possess. Of the natural numbers, the set of even numbers is equal to the set of even and
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odd numbers combined. There is no contradiction in this because we are working with
sets of infinities that are already conceptually complete. I say “conceptually complete”
because sets and numbers are objects of thought and not physical reality. In calculus the
concept of infinity defines the limit to which any finite process can approach. If I take a
line and begin to cut the line in half, then its half in half, and then that half, etc. I will be
embarking on an unending process. I will never actually reach a number that I could call
“infinity,” and so the process would be indefinite. The terminological distinction between
infinity in this process and infinity in set theory is typically called, thanks to Aristotle,
“potential infinity” and “actual infinity,” respectively. William Lane Craig explains it this
way:
...the concept of an actual infinite needs to be sharply distinguished from the concept of
a potential infinite. A potential infinite is a collection that is increasing without limit but
is at all times finite. The concept of a potential infinite usually comes into play when we
add to or subtract from something without stopping. Thus, a finite distance may be said
to contain a potentially infinite number of smaller distances. This does not mean that
there actually are an infinite number of parts in a finite distance, but rather that one can
keep On dividing endlessly. But one will never reach in “infinitieth” division. Infinity
merely serves as the limit to which the process approaches. Thus, a potential infinite is
not truly infinite— it is simply indefinite. It is at all points finite but always increasing.296

We still need an answer to whether the universe could have existed from eternity
until now. The answer becomes obvious when we attempt to apply the concept of infinity
to finite objects and events and witness the contradictions. Craig uses the example of a
library.
Imagine a library that had an actually infinite number of books, each of which
was either all black or all red, and which are placed on the book shelves alternately:
black, red, black, red, etc. Since the collection is infinite, then the number of red books
equals the number of red books plus black books. Even if there were more than just two
296 William Lane Craig, “Philosophical and Scientific Pointers to Creatio ex Nihilo,” Contemporary
Perspectives on Religious Epistemology, eds. R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992) pp. 186-87.
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colors, say, an infinity of colors, then the number of just one color would equal the
number of all the books added together; an infinity of infinities. Merely add all the books
of all the colors together and you will not have one more or less book than that of the set
of books of just one color. Now suppose every book in our infinite library has a number
on the side. This means that every possible number is printed on some book. But now we
could not add one more book to the library. Why? Because all the numbers are already
used up. What if we could add a book? According to mathematicians, the library has
exactly the same number of books as before. No more no less.
To put it in terms of events, if you and I chop logs, one each at the same time, and
we reach an infinity of chopped logs, then the number of logs I chop will equal the
number of logs that you and I both chop put together. And here’s another catch: so do the
number of logs you chop! There are many other examples of the consequences of
combining the concept of infinity with finite objects, but these few are enough to get
understand the problem. Since we know all finite objects can be numbered and
collections of finite objects, no matter how large, can be increased or decreased in size by
adding more finite objects, these examples show the absurdity of finite objects
constituting an actually infinite set. The examples actually constitute contradictions.
In logical analysis x + 1 = x + 1. The example of the books asks us to conceive
that when an infinite number of books, (x), is increased by 1, (+ 1), then the sum is still x.
This means that x + 1 = x. If we add this to our initial identity statement we have the
conjunction of x + 1 = x + 1 and x + 1 = x. Since x is not x + 1, then we have the
instantiation of the contradiction ([x + 1] • ~[x + 1]). Since contradictions are a valid test
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for irrationality, then it is unreasonable to believe that we can create an actually infinite
set by adding finite objects. But how does this relate to the universe’s eternal existence.
A universe filled with events is subject to the addition of these events in causal
succession—from cause to effect— and in temporal order— that event occurred either
before or after this event. These events are temporally finite occurrences, not being
extended completely the space-time dimension. Of course, even if it were, the
consequence would be irrelevant, since the space-time dimension is limited to this finite
universe from the Big Bang until now. The realm denoted currently by “universe” implies
all those states of “nature” prior to the instantiation of our Big Bang universe that stand as
the explanation of the cause of our universe. But typically we take events to be isolated
temporal occurrences that possess before and after relations to other finite events. This
means that, conceivably, the beginning of our Big Bang universe is one type of event in a
string of events leading to and from our Big Bang universe. Either way our Big Bang
universe is finite, and therefore so are the events that constitute it.
Since the universe is filled with events, then if the universe existed eternally into
the past, any single finite event anywhere on the chain of events would constitute the
existence of an actual physical infinite and the instantiation of all the contradictions that
go along with that. Consider counting down from infinity to zero. You had no starting
place, but had merely been counting down forever. Now pick any finite number. Any
finite number—either seventy trillion or three—would be infinitely far away from
infinity. If the universe consisted of events stretching causally backward into infinity,
then any finite event—the Ice Age or Kennedy’s assassination—would be infinitely far
from infinity, thus constituting an actual infinity and all the contradictions that go along
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with it. But we know of no instantiated contradictions. In fact we understand the order of
the Big Bang universe precisely because it works in congruence with logical boundaries
like that of the law of noncontradiction.
And so I have established—not universally or necessarily, but contingently and
based on our best science—that it is reasonable to think that:
(A) Anything that begins to exist must have a cause for its existence.

and
(B) A beginningless series of events constitutes an actual infinity.

These two assumptions will constitute part of a larger argument below. Someone
might counter that there are no actual “events” in the universe. If time is relative, as
Einstein’s theory tells us, and events are stretched across space-time depending upon
which frame of reference you perceive events from, then events may have always existed,
complete and intact. If the universe—not just the Big Bang universe, but all those prior
states— was this way, then everything could exist intact and eternally. There would need
to be no cause, because causes are not really the causes of the events, but coincidental
correlations of events with other events giving the illusion of explanation. Motion would,
of course, be an illusion, and all actions would be determined in a strong sense, but it
would certainly get around the problem of an actual infinity. There indeed could be an
infinite set of all historical events, complete, intact, just like number sets, and we would
not detect contradictions because we are situated in such a way that they are not visible to
us scientifically. From one perspective of the universe, our Big Bang universe might exist
and from another perspective it might not exist. Both truth-values would hold, while
neither being perceivable from the same vantage point—whatever this might mean.
Though the universe’s existing eternally, uncaused, and complete is a valid option, in that
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it surmounts my objections, it seems to require a heavy scientific price. Causal
explanations are all illusions, along with motion, and free will. It is difficult to find this
intellectually compelling as an option. The implications of not accepting this alternative
have been formulated into a series of logical deductions called the kalaam Cosmological
Argument:
(C) Anything that begins to exist must have a cause for its existence.
(D) The universe began to exist.
(D I) An actual infinite cannot exist.
(D2) A beginningless series of events constitutes an actual infinite.
(D3) Therefore, a beginningless series of events cannot exist.
and
(D4) The series of historical events is a collection formed by adding one member after
another.
(D5) A collection formed by adding one member after another cannot be actually
infinite.
(D6) Therefore, the series of events in time cannot be actually infinite.
(E) Therefore, the universe has a cause for its existence.

Well, so big deal, the universe has a cause for its existence. What might this cause
be? It cannot be physical. All matter, energy, and lawful structure came into existence
with the universe. That which is physical is made up of matter, energy, or lawful
structure, or is an emergent property of these. It is the existence of matter, energy, and
lawful structure that is in need of explanation. So it assumes what is to be proved to say
that something physical caused all that which is physical. And so, by elimination we
know that the cause of the universe must be nonphysical. This is all that is necessary as a
defeater for naturalism. Lewis wrote that, “if any one thing makes good a claim to be on
its own, to be something more than an expression of the character of Nature as a whole—
then we have abandoned Naturalism.” Whether Muslim’s are correct in their assumption
that the existence of Allah is proved by the Kalaam argument is irrelevant at this point. I
feel that naturalists have a significant obstacle in the Kalaam argument.
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There have been increasing controversy over the efficacy of the Kalaam
argument. And for those who find science much less cut and dry, especially with regard
to our current understanding of causation, I must interject a similar argument offered by
William Lane Craig. The success of science is grounded primarily in its explanatory
power. In fact, it is the explanatory power of contemporary scientific theories that have
led many theorists to believe that there is no need for the introduction of a Creator into
discussions about reality. But Craig says that there are only two concepts of explanation
relevant to any subject: an intrinsic explanation based upon the nature of the subject or an
external explanation. The argument, then, looks like this:297
]. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its
own nature or in some external cause.
2. The universe (including any singular state) exists.
It follows from (1) and (2) that the universe has an explanation of its existence. Premiss
(3) states:
3. The universe (including any singular state) does not exist by a necessity of its own
nature.
4. Therefore, the universe has an external cause.

This argument underscores my example of the blue object detector. If there is
something beyond the scope of scientific investigation, then science is incapable of
offering advice on this something. In addition, it is the appearance of an infinite regress
intrinsic to scientific explanations that drove philosophers to ask the hard questions like,
“Why is there something rather than nothing?” and “What existed prior to the universe?”
Since the laws and constituents of the universe are bound up in the contingent
circumstances by which the universe came about— since our current understanding of

297 This form of the argument comes from a debate between Craig and Quentin Smith at Harvard in 2003.
http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-smith_harvard02.html.
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science is compatible with several cosmogonal explanations—then the explanation for
the beginning of the universe must lie outside of the universe itself.
In addition to addressing the ultimate origins of existence, naturalists must
confront the complexity of structural order in the universe, including sentient life. We
know from evolutionary theory that for complexity to increase information must be added
to the gene pool. For biological creatures, this addition is accomplished through random
mutations— mistranslations of DNA by biological transcribers— that are then subjected to
environmental adaptation for development or elimination. But, of course, there are three
mechanisms necessary for natural selection to take place: reproduction, heritable
variation, and mutation. Since reproductive organisms are already considered complex in
a substantive sense, complexity is a presumption of evolution. It must exist for Darwin’s
theory to work. In fact, Darwin was well aware of the limitations of his theory, titling his
work the Origin of Species, rather than the origins of life or the origins of complexity.
Yet we find the universe with an incredible amount of complexity.
Complexity is defined as an arrangement that is “not so simple that it can readily
be attributed to chance.”298 Complexity is a form of probability. The less chance of
something coming about by random processes, the more likely it is that the event was
planned, designed, or programmed by something that can reduce probabilities by
overcoming the obstacles of blind chance. William Dembski offers an illustration.
Consider a combination lock:
The more possible combinations of the lock, the more complex the mechanism and
correspondingly the more improbable that the mechanism can be opened by chance.
Complexity and probability therefore vary inversely: the greater the complexity, the
smaller the probability. Thus to determine whether something is sufficiently complex to

298 William Dembski, Intelligent Design (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999) p. 17.
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warrant a design inference is to determine whether it has sufficiently small
probability.299

Of course complexity is not enough to reasonably ensure “outside influence.”
Dembski admits this and argues that three criteria are actually required, adding
“contingency” and “specification.” But compounding probabilities serves in some of the
same ways as adding more criteria. For instance, if the probability of a Big Bang universe
is low, and the probability of that universe producing an atmosphere conducive to life if
low, and if that universe’s actually conceiving life is low, then the existence of human
beings in a Big Bang universe seems to lend favor to the idea that we would not be here if
there were only time, matter, and chance.
But this type of reasoning is subject to a fundamental flaw. The fact that we are
here and all those probabilities have been overcome does not leave us with
supematuralism as the only option. Since all those improbabilities I just mentioned are
valid probabilities, regardless of how much the boggle the mind, they may still occur.
This is the reverse gambler’s fallacy. The gambler’s fallacy is to believe that a certain
number on set of dice is bound to come up if it has not done so in a long time. If I want to
roll double sixes, and double sixes have not appeared in multiple dice throws, then I
might fallaciously assume that double sixes must be coming soon. The fallacy is that, the
dice have “no memory,” as it is sometimes put, and every throw contains an equal
probability that double sixes will come up. It is logically possible that double sixes will
never ever come up, regardless of the probabilities. Double sixes might never come up
because there is also always a certain probability, in every throw, that they will not come
up. However, there is the reverse gambler’s fallacy. This argument states that, so long as

299 Ibid., p. 130.
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there are a finite number of possibilities, given enough time, all possibilities will
instantiate. Since the universe has existed for a finite amount of time and is composed of
a finite number of parts, all of which are finite in themselves, the possibility of the
conditions for human life, combined with a scenario in which human life actually appears
will eventually instantiate. The fact that we are here does not necessarily lend us any
clues as the reason we are here.
We need not overcome the truth of the reverse gambler’s fallacy. All we need to
understand is that, in absence of a mechanism like that of Darwin’s theory, which already
presupposes a certain amount of order, order cannot come from disorder. At the
cosmological level there is no way to “introduce” information into the system.
Transcriptions and reproduction do not occur. The first law of thermodynamics prevents
physical intrusion of matter or energy, so either life and sentience are emergent properties
of physical and chemical processes, or they have origins outside the physical universe.
It should be clear why Darwin’s theory cannot help us here. In presupposing
complexity and life we cannot propose that complexity and life originated by the process
of natural selection. Several philosophers of science have argued to this effect. Richard
Dawkins proposed that inert processes can “mirror” biological processes leading us to
believe that natural selection takes place at levels other than biological ones. He
conceives that wind blowing a certain dust into streams could subsequently dam the
stream, mixing with other compatible dust, and then get blown once again to other
streams, to subsequently dam them, thereby “reproducing.” In the same way gasses could
mix with chemicals in improbable environments that are then electrically charged, which
then leads to life. He presents the examples more clearly than I do and shows how each
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aspect mirrors reproduction, heritable variation, and mutation. To presume without clear
argument that evolution takes place at all levels of physical interaction is subject to the
fallacy of composition. Just because an event takes place at one level does not mean that
it takes place in the same way at another. A clearer example of the fallacy is: all men
have a mother; therefore, all men have the same mother. Dawkins gives a clear argument
and so does not fall prey to the fallacy. I think Dawkins’s argument is incomplete and
therefore inconclusive, because we have no idea what chemically distinguishes life from
nonlife. Humans possess all the same chemicals found in nonliving things, and no
amount of combination of chemicals has produced life artificially.
In addition to the problem of life generally, the problem of self-conscious life
possessed arguably by humans alone is also difficult to explain scientifically. Most
scientists and philosophers have given up the classical dualistic model insinuated by
Descartes. Some have modified approaches to a mind or soul that attempt a functional
unity. Both sides suffer from a severe argument from silence. There’s no compelling
indication on either side of the debate. Those who presuppose physicalism must think that
the person is identical to the brain. Those who presuppose more than physicalism are at
liberty to think that the person is distinct from the brain, though they may choose not to
do so. The consequences are existential. If the naturalist is correct, then she must live
with the knowledge that her life is meaningless. No God exists or at least he does not
have the power to call her into existence, giving her purpose that exceeds her self and
even earthly life. Self-conscious life has the ability to objectify itself and consider its fate.
If the discovery is purely scientific, then the result is a fate identical to death. Why do we
get up in the morning? If it is for ourselves, then we must make life the best we can for
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ourselves. If it is for others, then we must make life the best we can for them. Either way,
it matters for only a period of time, and for nothing morally or eternally significant. It
matters for nothing. If I am a naturalist and I create my own purpose, then I have to
convince myself of something I do not believe: that I am something that deserves life and
justice and beauty and that my purpose is worthy and good. But if the naturalist is correct
then there is nothing good about created purpose, it only “is.” It may serve to give others
pleasure, but their life has no ultimate end or justice either, and therefore giving pleasure
to others is meaningless. If giving pleasure to others is pleasurable to myself, then I have
pleasure for a time, knowing that it serves nothing except to get me closer to death more
comfortably.
People criticize Pascal’s wager because it asks them to act like they believe
something that they find intellectually uncompelling. “Believe in Christianity, which you
find untrue, just in case it will be good for you in the end.” But the naturalist asks exactly
the same thing. “There really is no God or ultimate purpose, but act like there is so that
you will feel motivated to get up in the morning and so you will act morally, so that the
world can be a better place.” A dialogue from the movie Equilibrium puts the issue
logically:
Prisoner: Why do you exist?
Policeman: To preserve order.
Prisoner: Why?
Policeman: For the preservation of the colony.
Prisoner: So that you can continue to exist. Don’t you see that it’s circular?

This leads me to the final fundamental question of human importance: love. I am
approaching this question from a purely existential perspective and starting with an
argument from Blaise Pascal. Pascal claims that there are three fundamental motivators in
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the world: carnality, mind, and charity. By carnality Pascal means the pleasures of
wealth, power, sex, and fame. By intellect Pascal means the pleasures of discovery,
creativity, and genius. By charity Pascal is referring to selfless compassion and altruism.
Kings typically strive for carnal pleasure, scientists typically strive for intellectual
pleasure, and saints strive for the pleasures of charity. Pascal’s major point is that, of the
three, only carnality and intellect are natural. We understand the desire for them, we can
generally comprehend the gain achieved by them, and we know the routes to obtaining
them more perfectly. With charity, however, there is something distinctly otherworldly.
We respect and cherish those who are selfless and sacrificial, but we find their motivation
obscure or unclear. We do not fully understand the gain of self-sacrifice and we do not
know, arid even fewer of us care, how to achieve charity more perfectly. It is not easy to
obtain, and it seems to go against reason and biological tendencies to be self-controlled,
humble, generous, respectful, genuinely honest, and unmaterialistic. Pascal says that this
is because charity is supernatural, finding its origins completely in the Christian God. No
amount of carnality and intellect could ever produce one ounce of true charity.
I aim to show that a paradox exists concerning love. Even as a western,
materialistic society, we in the U.S. revere and praise charity in its true form, yet we
loathe being associated with it and resist calls to be charitable ourselves. Naturalism
offers no explanation for the feelings associated with this paradox. On one hand, if
naturalism construes love as merely evolutionary altruism, then the phenomenal force
associated with true charity is merely a byproduct of a natural mechanism that plays, at
best, a secondary role in natural selection. On the other hand, if altruism is truly
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beneficial in a naturalistic manner, why do we resist it so vigorously? Allow me to quote
Pascal at length before I begin my analysis:
The infinite distance between body and mind is a symbol of the infinitely more infinite
distance between mind and charity; for charity is supernatural.
All the glory of greatness has no luster for people who are in search of
understanding.
The greatness of clever men is invisible to kings, to the rich, to chiefs, and to all
the worldly great.
The greatness of wisdom, which is nothing if not from God, is invisible to the
carnal-minded and to the clever. These three are orders differing in kind.
Great geniuses have their power, their glory, their greatness, their victory, their
lustre, and have no need of worldly greatness, with which they are not keeping. They are
seen, not by the eye, but by the mind; this is sufficient.
The saints have their power, their glory, their victory, their lustre, and need no
worldly or intellectual greatness, with which they have no affinity; for these neither add
anything to them, nor take away anything from them. They are seen of God and the
angels, and not of the body, nor of the curious mind. God is enough for them.
Archimedes, apart from his rank, would have the same veneration. He fought no
battles for the eyes to feast upon; but he has given his discoveries to all men. Oh! how
brilliant he was to the mind!
Jesus Christ, without riches and without any external exhibition o f knowledge,
is in His own order of holiness. He did not invent; He did not reign. But He was humble,
patient, holy, holy to God, terrible to devils, without any sin. Oh! in what great pomp
and in what wonderful splendor He is come to the eyes o f the heart, which perceive
wisdom!
All bodies, the firmament, the stars, the earth and its kingdom, are not equal to
the lowest mind; for mind knows all these and itself; and these bodies nothing.
All bodies together, and all minds together, and all their products, are not equal
to the least feeling of charity. This is of an order infinitely more exalted.
From all bodies together, we cannot obtain one little thought; this is impossible
and of another order. From all bodies and minds, we cannot produce a feeling of true
charity; this is impossible and of another supernatural order. (F 793, Pensees)

Why do these words seem to ring true? There is no obvious logical argument
here. Pascal is merely stating what we seem to feel intrinsically. “Wow, those guys are
really holy and committed. I wonder why they do that?” Leaders lead in the answer,
“They are free to do as they will. This is the gain of liberty!” Scientists follow, more
subtly, “They do this because there is a gene connected to ‘religious feeling,’ which these
dear people possess to a greater degree than the rest of us. Honor and respect them, and
be thankful you don’t have it.” Political philosophers resound, always heard last and
least, “It does not matter why they do it. Maybe they are genetically malformed, maybe
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not, but whatever their motivation, society is better for it. They are law abiding and
peaceful—just don’t let them vote or your rights are toast!”
The paradox remains. We respect and reject “true charity”— love— so regularly
that it does not even seem like a contradiction. Moral philosophy has left charity in the
dust. Contemporary moral philosophy is so caught up in legal rights and universal legal
imperatives that it has left out the fundamental guiding force behind morality-based
action, namely, beliefs about the nature of reality. Many tend to hold a scientific view of
the world, which presupposes an objectively fixed world that is knowable to the sense,
while rejecting that there is anything absolute that can be known about human nature. Yet
we face the same problems day by day: humans are morally egregious creatures. We have
the free will to be good and decent, yet we only tend to do so when people are watching.
It has been written that, “Character is who you are when no one is looking.” Few of us
even fantasize about emulating comic book hero genuineness and honesty any more. We
still cherish them in the back of our minds. We are reminded of them when the carnal
mind and the charitable mind are lost on the same day as with Princess Diana and Mother
Theresa. We recognize the moral tragedy of the generous airtime that Diana received
verses the minor press releases announcing the death of Mother Theresa.
This brings us to question charity and its true source. If naturalism is correct, then
Pascal is wrong—completely wrong— and this paradoxical disposition toward charity is
nothing but a middle-of-the-road shift in evolutionary development. We are genetically
fighting an overly developed sense of altruism in order to keep the herd alive. Natural
selection is struggling with moderation. On one hand, Christian morality Would tells us
that systematic altruism would bring the species to a level of peace and contentment

228

never before experienced. Altruism in the form of true charity is the design structure of
our deepest nature, and our rebellious hearts strive against it. On the other hand,
evolution would tell us that systematic altruism—which at the level of the individual
organism is commonly considered a favorable blunder in mutation— would bring about
the demise of the species. Altruism is only beneficial on a small scale. The current state
of the world, however, would suggest otherwise.
4.4: Conclusion
Just because it seems so does not mean that it is so, or that it should be so.
Therefore, none of these arguments necessarily compel assent that theism, especially
Christian theism is true. But they are, at least to my mind, significant obstacles to the
naturalistic worldview. They merely ask naturalists to reconsider their initial assumptions
about the scope of epistemic evidence and invite them to search more deeply into the
fundamental questions of living. If they can defeat these obstacles satisfactorily to their
own minds then I would like to understand, more fully, their reasoning. If not, there are
many options for exploration, not the least of which is Christian theism.
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